Robert Walker v. Brett Michael Waronicki

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 25-11213 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________ ROBERT WALKER, individually and on behalf of himself, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus BRETT MICHAEL WARONICKI, in his individual capacity, JANET CARNEY CROOM, in her individual capacity, BARBARA W. BRONIS, in her individual capacity, HONORABLE JEFFREY T. KUNTZ, in his individual capacity, HONORABLE SPENCER D LEVINE, in his individual capacity, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

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PER CURIAM: Robert Walker, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s dismissal of his civil suit, which raised claims against a law firm— Hinden, McLean, & Arbeiter, P.A. (“Hinden”)—seven Florida state court judges, the Florida Fourth District Court of Appeals, and the Florida Bar. After careful review, we affirm, but we remand for the limited purpose of clarifying that the jurisdictional dismissals were entered without prejudice. We write only for the parties, so we omit a lengthy recitation of the facts.

I. STANDARDS OF REVIEW Summary disposition is appropriate in situations where “the position of one of the parties is clearly right as a matter of law so that there can be no substantial question as to the outcome of the case, or where, as is more frequently the case, the appeal is frivo- lous.” Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969). 1

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25-11213 Opinion of the Court 3 We review the dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim de novo. Watts v. Joggers Run Prop. Owners Ass’n, Inc., 133 F.4th 1032, 1038–39 (11th Cir. 2025). We review issues regarding recusal only for abuse of discretion. United States v. Berger, 375 F.3d 1223, 1227 (11th Cir. 2004). The abuse of discretion standard is deferen- tial; it “allows for a ‘range of choice for the district court,’ as long as that choice is not a ‘clear error of judgment.’” United States v. Beaufils, 160 F.4th 1147, 1163 (11th Cir. 2025) (quoting Rasbury v. IRS (In re Rasbury), 24 F.3d 159, 168 (11th Cir. 1994)).

We construe pro se pleadings and briefs liberally. Wright v. Newsome, 795 F.2d 964, 967 (11th Cir. 1986); see also Parrott v. Neway (In re: Parrott), 118 F.4th 1357, 1363 n.2 (11th Cir. 2024) (“[P]lead- ings filed by pro se litigants are held to a less stringent standard than counseled pleadings and are liberally construed.”). However, “is- sues not briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant are deemed aban- doned,” Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008), and we do not address abandoned issues absent exceptional circum- stances, see United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 873 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc). An appellant can also abandon a claim by making “only passing references to it” in his initial brief or by “rais[ing] it in a perfunctory manner without supporting arguments and au- thority.” Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins., Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014).

II. DISCUSSION In his brief on appeal, Walker makes essentially two argu- ments: (1) the district judge and magistrate judge in this case should USCA11 Case: 25-11213 Document: 62-1 Date Filed: 04/16/2026 Page: 4 of 11

Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555; Greenough, 782 F.2d at 1558; In re Equifax Inc.

2 As a threshold matter, Walker’s initial brief argues that we should summarily reverse the district court’s judgment. However, for the reasons we explain throughout this opinion, Walker has not shown reversible error, let alone that he is “clearly right as a matter of law.” Groendyke Transp., 406 F.2d at 1161–62.

Accordingly, we deny Walker’s request for summary reversal.

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25-11213 Opinion of the Court 5 Customer Data Security Breach Litig., 999 F.3d 1247, 1272 (11th Cir. 2021). Therefore, we affirm on this issue.

B. Hinden’s Motion for Summary Affirmance In Hinden’s motion for summary affirmance, Hinden argues Walker has not preserved any challenge against it because his initial brief “barely references” it and “fails to address or counter the dis- trict court’s” reasons for dismissing the claims against it. It also argues Walker’s claims against it under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 fail be- cause it is not a state actor. The latter argument is clearly right as a matter of law, so we need not address the preservation issue.

Groendyke Transp., 406 F.2d at 1162.

“Only in rare circumstances can a private party be viewed as a ‘state actor’ for section 1983 purposes.” Harvey v. Harvey, 949 F.2d 1127, 1130 (11th Cir. 1992). One way these “rare circumstances” can arise is when a private party is “given powers (or perform func- tions) that are ‘traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State.’” Id. at 1130–31 (emphasis in original) (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edi- son Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974)). Another way a private party can be considered a state actor arises “where the government has ‘so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with the [pri- vate party] that it was a joint participant in the enterprise.’” Id. at 1131 (quoting Nat’l Broad. Co. Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., ALF- CIO, 860 F.2d 1022, 1026 (11th Cir. 1988)). A final circumstance we have recognized occurs when the state compels or encourages cer- tain action by the private party. Id. at 1130–31.

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C. State Court Judges and Fourth District Court of Appeals’ Motion for Summary Affirmance The seven individually named state court judges and Flor- ida’s Fourth District Court of Appeals also move for summary af- firmance. The judges argue that the district court was clearly cor- rect in dismissing Walker’s suit against them based on the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity. They also argue that the district court correctly dismissed the Fourth District Court of Appeals as it was immune under the Eleventh Amendment. Summary affir- mance is warranted on both of these issues.

First, “[j]udges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity from damages for those acts taken while they are acting in their USCA11 Case: 25-11213 Document: 62-1 Date Filed: 04/16/2026 Page: 7 of 11

25-11213 Opinion of the Court 7 judicial capacity unless they acted in the clear absence of all juris- diction.” Sibley v. Lando, 437 F.3d 1067, 1070 (11th Cir. 2005) (quot- ing Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2000)). “This im- munity applies even when the judge’s acts are in error, malicious, or were in excess of his or her jurisdiction.” Id. (quoting Bolin, 225 F.3d at 1239). Whether a judge is acting in his or her judicial capacity depends on several factors, namely “whether: (1) the act complained of constituted a normal judicial function; (2) the events occurred in the judge’s chambers or in open court; (3) the contro- versy involved a case pending before the judge; and (4) the con- frontation arose immediately out of a visit to the judge in his judi- cial capacity.” Id. The record shows that Walker’s claims against the state court judges relate to various rulings in his state court proceedings involving his mortgage, as well as the imposition of sanctions against him. Even if Walker is correct that some—or all—of these rulings were erroneous, the judges were plainly performing judicial acts when they ruled on the cases brought before them. See id. Walker has not plausibly alleged that the judges acted “in the clear absence of all jurisdiction” by ruling on the cases brought before them. See id.; Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11–12 (1991). Therefore, the state court judges are clearly right as a matter of law that they are entitled to judicial immunity, so the district court did not err in dismissing those claims for that reason. Groendyke Transp., 406 F.2d at 1162.

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Ct. 854, 865 (2026) (quoting Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999)). While state sovereign immunity protects the state and arms of the state, “[i]t does not extend to ‘lesser entities,’ such as ‘municipal corporation[s] or other governmental entit[ies]’ that are not arm[s] of the state.’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Alden, 527 U.S. at 756). We have already held that suits brought against Florida state courts are barred by sovereign immunity because state courts are “department[s] of the State of Florida.” Uberoi v. Supreme Court of Fla., 819 F.3d 1311, 1314 (11th Cir. 2016); see also Kaimowitz v. Fla. Bar, 996 F.2d 1151, 1155 (11th Cir. 1993) (“The Eleventh Amendment prohibits actions against state courts and state bars.” (emphasis added)). 3 We are bound by our prior precedent addressing these issues unless they have been overruled or abro- gated by the Supreme Court or by this Court sitting en banc. Griffin v. Coca-Cola Refreshments USA, Inc., 989 F.3d 923, 934 (11th Cir. 2021). Walker presents no argument that these cases have been

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25-11213 Opinion of the Court 9 abrogated or overruled, nor have we found any authority support- ing such a position. See Timson, 518 F.3d at 874; Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 681.

For these reasons, the motion for summary affirmance filed by the state court judges and the Fourth District Court of Appeals is well taken—they are “clearly right as a matter of law so that there can be no substantial question as to the outcome of the case.”

Groendyke Transp., 406 F.2d at 1162.

D. Dismissal of Claims Against the Florida Bar The Florida Bar has not moved for summary affirmance but, in its brief on appeal, it similarly argues that Walker’s claims against it were properly dismissed because it is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. We agree. As noted in the previous sec- tion, we have already held that “[t]he Eleventh Amendment pro- hibits actions against state courts and state bars.” Kaimowitz, 996 F.2d at 1155 (emphasis added). Indeed, we held as much in a case involving the Florida Bar, the same state bar named as a party here. Id. Our precedent in Kaimowitz therefore forecloses Walker’s posi- tion here. See Griffin, 989 F.3d at 934. We affirm on this issue as well.

E. Walker’s Other Arguments Walker’s brief makes several other arguments which we do not discuss at length.4 In general, “[t]o obtain reversal of a district

4 See, e.g., United States v. Paradies, 98 F.3d 1266, 1277 n.13 (11th Cir. 1997) (“In addition to the issues discussed in this opinion, the defendants raised other less USCA11 Case: 25-11213 Document: 62-1 Date Filed: 04/16/2026 Page: 10 of 11

F. Dismissal With or Without Prejudice While we affirm the district court for the reasons explained and reject Walker’s arguments, “[d]ismissals for a lack of jurisdic- tion are not judgments on the merits and are to be entered without prejudice.” Dupree v. Owens, 92 F.4th 999, 1007 (11th Cir. 2024). “[S]overeign immunity is jurisdictional in nature.” Id. (quoting F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994)). “Because the dismissals” of the Florida Bar and the Fourth District Court of Appeals “were based on sovereign immunity grounds, the jurisdictional nature of the dismissal[s] require[d them] to be entered without prejudice.”

Id. at 1007. Yet, the district court dismissed the whole complaint with prejudice. “We therefore vacate and remand for the limited purpose of allowing the district court to dismiss” the claims barred meritorious ones. We find that those issues do not warrant discussion . . . .”).

We also deny Walker’s pending motions as moot, in light of the foregoing.

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25-11213 Opinion of the Court 11 by sovereign immunity “without prejudice.” Id. With this caveat, we affirm.

MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION GRANTED, AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART WITH INSTRUCTIONS.