United States v. Joshua James York

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 25-12958 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus JOSHUA JAMES YORK, Defendant-Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia D.C. Docket No. 5:24-cr-00042-MTT-CHW-1 ____________________ Before LUCK, LAGOA, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: Joshua York appeals his 270-month sentence of imprison- ment for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine.

He argues that the district court erred in finding that his Georgia USCA11 Case: 25-12958 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 04/28/2026 Page: 2 of 5

Summary disposition is appropriate either where time is of the essence, as in “situations where important public policy issues are involved or those where rights delayed are rights denied,” or where “the position of one of the parties is clearly right as a matter of law so that there can be no substantial question as to the out- come of the case, or where, as is more frequently the case, the ap- peal is frivolous.” Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969). 1 An appeal is frivolous if it is “without argua- ble merit either in law or fact.” Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001).

We review a district court’s interpretation and application of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo. United States v. Dupree, 57 F.4th 1269, 1272 (11th Cir. 2023) (en banc). The prior panel prec- edent rule requires us to follow the precedent of the first panel to address the relevant issue, unless the first panel’s holding is over- ruled either by us sitting en banc or by the Supreme Court, even

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25-12958 Opinion of the Court 3 when a later panel is convinced the earlier panel is wrong. United States v. Gillis, 938 F.3d 1181, 1198 (11th Cir. 2019).

A defendant is a career offender if (1) he was at least eighteen years old at the time he committed the instant offense of convic- tion; (2) the instant offense of conviction is a felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense; and (3) he has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a) (2024). The career-offender guideline in § 4B1.2(b) defines a “controlled sub- stance offense” as the following: [A]n offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that . . . prohibits the manufacture, import, export, distribu- tion, or dispensing of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance) or the possession of a con- trolled substance (or a counterfeit substance) with in- tent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense . . . .

Id. § 4B1.2(b)(1). Methamphetamine was a “controlled substance” in Georgia at all times relevant to this appeal. O.C.G.A. § 16-13- 21(4) (2013) (defining “controlled substance” to include various chemical forms of methamphetamine, as listed in O.C.G.A.

§ 16-13-25(3)); id. (2017) (same).

In Dubois I, we held that “[a] drug regulated by state law is a ‘controlled substance’ for state predicate offenses, even if federal law does not regulate that drug.” United States v. Dubois (Dubois I), 94 F.4th 1284, 1296 (11th Cir. 2024), cert. granted, judgment vacated USCA11 Case: 25-12958 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 04/28/2026 Page: 4 of 5

In United States v. Kennedy, we held that the defendant’s Georgia marijuana conviction was a controlled substance offense under state law at the time of his conviction and, therefore, it qual- ified as a career offender predicate offense under the sentencing guidelines. 146 F.4th at 1072. We concluded that, even if Kennedy was correct that there was a “meaningful mismatch” between Georgia’s and the federal definition of marijuana, this inconsistency did not matter for the purposes of the career offender enhancement because “[a] drug regulated by state law is a ‘controlled substance’ for state predicate offenses [under the sentencing guidelines], even if federal law does not regulate that drug.” Id. at 1071 (quoting Du- bois I, 94 F.4th at 1296) Here, the government is clearly correct as a matter of law that York’s arguments as to whether his Georgia methampheta- mine convictions count as “controlled substance offenses” under § 4B1.2(b) are foreclosed by our holding in Kennedy. Kennedy di- USCA11 Case: 25-12958 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 04/28/2026 Page: 5 of 5

25-12958 Opinion of the Court 5 rectly addressed York’s claim about the differing Georgia and fed- eral definitions of methamphetamine. Specifically, we held that, even if there is a “meaningful mismatch” in drug definitions, for purposes of the sentencing guidelines, a “controlled substance” is a drug regulated by state law at the time of state conviction. Id. at 1071–72. Methamphetamine was a regulated drug at the time of both of York’s prior convictions, making his Georgia convictions “controlled substance offenses” under the sentencing guidelines.

O.C.G.A. §§ 16-13-21(4), 16-13-25(3) (2013); id. (2017); Kennedy, F.4th at 1071–72. Thus, we GRANT the government’s motion for summary affirmance. Groendyke Transp., Inc., 406 F.2d at 1162.

AFFIRMED.