United States v. Markell Coleman

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 25-10693 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus MARKELL ANTHONY COLEMAN, Defendant-Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 9:24-cr-80108-AMC-1 ____________________ Before ROSENBAUM, NEWSOM, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: Markell Coleman appeals his sentence of 92 months’ impris- onment for possession of an unregistered machinegun conversion device. First, he argues that the district court erred in determining USCA11 Case: 25-10693 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 05/04/2026 Page: 2 of 6

2 Opinion of the Court 25-10693 that his 2016 Florida conviction for sale of cocaine was a “con- trolled substance offense” and thus qualified him as a career of- fender because, at the time of his conviction, Florida’s definition of cocaine was categorically broader than the comparable federal def- inition. Second, he argues that the district court abused its discre- tion in declining to grant him a downward variance because the court overstated his prior criminal history and failed to account for the fact that he committed the least serious offense for which a per- son could be punished under 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). Neither argu- ment is availing, and, accordingly, we affirm his sentence.

I First, we consider whether the district court erred in inter- preting the Sentencing Guidelines and applying a career-offender enhancement to Coleman’s sentence. We review interpretations of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo. United States v. Dupree, 57 F.4th 1269, 1272 (11th Cir. 2023).

The Sentencing Guidelines apply a base offense level of 26 if the offense “involved a . . . firearm that is described in 28 U.S.C. § 5845(a)” and the defendant “committed any part of the instant offense subsequent to sustaining at least two felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.”

U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(1). A defendant qualifies as a career offender under the Guidelines if: (1) he was at least 18 years old when he committed the instant offense; (2) the instant felony offense is ei- ther a “crime of violence” or a “controlled substance offense”; and USCA11 Case: 25-10693 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 05/04/2026 Page: 3 of 6

25-10693 Opinion of the Court 3 (3) he has at least two prior felony convictions for a crime of vio- lence or controlled substance offense. Id. § 4B1.1(a). A “controlled substance offense” is, in turn, defined, in relevant part, as “an of- fense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that . . . prohibits the manufacture, im- port, export, distribution, or dispensing of a controlled sub- stance . . . or the possession of a controlled substance . . . with in- tent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense.” Id. § 4B1.2(b). If a defendant qualifies as a career offender, his criminal history category is adjusted to level VI. Id. § 4B1.1(b). No one dis- putes that Coleman’s prior Florida conviction for sale of marijuana qualifies as a controlled substance offense. The only remaining question, then, is whether his prior conviction for sale of cocaine qualifies as a controlled substance offense.

In Dubois I, we held that a drug regulated by state law is a “controlled substance” for purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines, even if federal law does not regulate the substance, and that the definition of “controlled substance offense” incorporates the state drug schedules in effect at the time of the defendant’s conviction.

United States v. Dubois (Dubois I), 94 F.4th 1284, 1296–98 (11th Cir. 2024). The Supreme Court vacated and remanded Dubois I for re- consideration in light of its ruling in United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024). Dubois v. United States, 145 S. Ct. 1041, 1041–42 (2025).

On remand, we reinstated our previous opinion with respect to controlled substance offenses. See United States v. Dubois (Dubois II), 139 F.4th 887, 894 (11th Cir. 2025).

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4 Opinion of the Court 25-10693 At the time that Coleman committed his offense, Florida law prohibited the sale of a “controlled substance,” Fla. Stat. §§ 893.13(1) (2016), which was defined as “any substance named or described in Schedules I-V of § 893.03,” id. § 893.02(4) (2016). Flor- ida’s list of controlled substances included “[c]ocaine or ecgonine, including any of their stereoisomers, and any salt, compound, de- rivative, or preparation of cocaine or ecgonine.” Id. § 893.03(2)(a)(4) (2016). It is of no moment, therefore, that the fed- eral government removed ioflupane—a stereoisomer of cocaine— from its drug schedules in September 2015. See Removal of [123I]Io- flupane From Schedule II of the Controlled Substances Act, 80 Fed. Reg. 54715 (Sep. 11, 2015) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 1308.12(b)(4)(ii)).

All that matters is that Florida prohibited the sale of cocaine and any of its stereoisomers at the time that Coleman committed his offense. See Dubois I, 94 F.4th at 1296–98.

Here, the district court did not err in determining that Cole- man’s 2016 Florida conviction for sale of cocaine qualified as a con- trolled substance offense because Florida law defined cocaine as a controlled substance at the time of his conviction. That was suffi- cient to sustain his career-offender enhancement. Because the dis- trict court did not err, we need not address the government’s alter- native argument that any error was harmless under United States v. Keene, 470 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2006).

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25-10693 Opinion of the Court 5 II Next, we consider whether Coleman’s sentence was sub- stantively reasonable. When reviewing the substantive reasonable- ness of a sentence, we consider the totality of the circumstances under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The party challenging the sentence bears the burden of establishing that it is unreasonable based on the facts of the case and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371, 1378 (11th Cir. 2010). We expect a sentence within the guideline range to be reasonable. United States v. Sarras, 575 F.3d 1191, 1219 (11th Cir. 2009). The district court also has wide discretion to decide whether the § 3553(a) factors jus- tify a variance. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 50.

The district court abuses its discretion when it “(1) fails to afford consideration to relevant factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant fac- tor, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment in considering the proper factors.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc). We will not disturb a sentence unless we are “left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court com- mitted a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” Id. at 1190. The district court need not give each § 3553(a) factor equal weight; rather, the court has discretion to “attach great weight to one factor over oth- ers.” United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1254 (11th Cir. 2015) (citation modified).

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6 Opinion of the Court 25-10693 Here, Coleman has not shown that the district court abused its discretion by declining his motion for a downward variance and imposing a 92-month imprisonment sentence. The district court permissibly based Coleman’s sentence on the dangerousness of his offense, his criminal history, and the need to protect the public from further criminality and promote respect for the law. Further, his sentence was on the low end of the range prescribed by the guidelines. The district court, therefore, did not abuse its discre- tion in imposing a 92-month term of imprisonment.

III Because Coleman’s arguments on appeal do not warrant va- catur of his sentence, we AFFIRM.