U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, 2026

Charles King, III v. United States

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · Decided May 19, 2026

Opinion

USCA11 Case: 25-12480 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 05/19/2026 Page: 1 of 4

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 25-12480 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________ CHARLES KING, III, Petitioner-Appellant, versus UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent-Appellee. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama D.C. Docket Nos. 2:24-cv-08005-ACA, 2:18-cr-00317-ACA-SGC-1 ____________________ Before LUCK, LAGOA, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: Charles King, III, a pro se federal prisoner, appeals the dis- trict court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate. The USCA11 Case: 25-12480 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 05/19/2026 Page: 2 of 4

2 Opinion of the Court 25-12480 district court granted a certificate of appealability (“COA”) in part as to the issue of “whether trial counsel provided ineffective assis- tance by failing to argue that King’s Fourth Amendment waiver was distinguishable from the waiver in Samson v. California1 be- cause King’s waiver covered only warrantless searches and did not extend to suspicionless searches.”

On appeal, King argues that his attorney at trial was ineffec- tive by failing to argue in support of his motion to suppress that his parole condition waiving warrantless searches did not include sus- picionless searches. He argues that he was prejudiced because, were the fruits of the suspicionless search excluded, he would not have been convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed ques- tion of law and fact that we review de novo. Devine v. United States, 520 F.3d 1286, 1287 (11th Cir. 2008). In order to prevail on an inef- fective assistance claim, a defendant must demonstrate both that (1) “counsel’s performance was deficient,” and (2) “the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). We need not address one of the foregoing two prongs if the defendant cannot meet the other. United States v. Webb, 655 F.3d 1238, 1258-59 (11th Cir. 2011). To prove that coun- sel’s performance was constitutionally deficient, the appellant must show that counsel made errors so serious that he was not function- ing as the counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Strickland

1 547 U.S. 843 (2006).

USCA11 Case: 25-12480 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 05/19/2026 Page: 3 of 4

25-12480 Opinion of the Court 3 v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Counsel is not deficient for failing to raise a meritless claim. Denson v. United States, 804 F.3d 1339, 1342 (11th Cir. 2015).

In Samson v. California, the Supreme Court held that a suspi- cionless search of a parolee did not violate the Fourth Amendment because (1) individuals on state parole have a diminished reasona- ble expectation of privacy generally and (2) California’s parole con- ditions explicitly permitted a suspicionless search. 547 U.S. 843, 851-52, 57 (2006). In Samson, the Supreme Court reasoned that such a search did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the condition was clearly expressed to the parolee and his expectation of privacy was diminished. Id. at 852.

Earlier, we had held that a probation condition requiring the probationer to submit to searches without a warrant was constitu- tional. Owens v. Kelley, 681 F.2d 1362, 1366-69 (11th Cir. 1982). The defendant in Owens argued that we should, at least, require that a warrantless search be based on reasonable suspicion. Id. at 1368.

We explicitly “decline[d] to impose such a requirement,” reason- ing, [T]he primary purpose of . . . search[ing] [of a proba- tioner’s residence and person] is to deter the commis- sion of crime and to provide supervisors with infor- mation on the progress of their rehabilitative ef- forts. It is clear that a requirement that searches only be conducted when officers have ‘reasonable suspi- cion’ or probable cause that a crime has been commit- ted or that a condition of probation has been violated USCA11 Case: 25-12480 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 05/19/2026 Page: 4 of 4

4 Opinion of the Court 25-12480 could completely undermine the purpose of the search condition. Id. The record shows that King was not denied effective assis- tance of counsel. This Court had already held that a suspicionless search was not unconstitutional for those on probation. See Owens, 681 F.2d at 1368. Samson did not expressly alter that holding be- cause it relied, in part, on the justification that individuals on parole have a diminished expectation of a right to privacy and did not ex- plicitly state that reasonable suspicion is needed if it is not explicitly waived. In light of Owens and the Supreme Court’s holding in Sam- son, it was not deficient for King’s attorney to not raise the specific language of his parole conditions. Therefore, the district court did not err when it determined that his attorney was not ineffective and the decision of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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