James Thomas Carlan v. C. Ashley Royal

USCA11 Case: 25-13787 Document: 16-1 Date Filed: 06/05/2026 Page: 1 of 5

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 25-13787 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________ JAMES THOMAS CARLAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus C. ASHLEY ROYAL, Defendant-Appellee. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia D.C. Docket No. 5:25-cv-00397-MTT ____________________ Before JORDAN, KIDD, and DUBINA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: Appellant James Carlan appeals pro se from the district court’s order dismissing his in forma pauperis complaint alleging USCA11 Case: 25-13787 Document: 16-1 Date Filed: 06/05/2026 Page: 2 of 5

Royal of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia violated his Seventh Amendment rights. Carlan does not argue that the district court abused its discretion by dismissing his complaint as frivolous. Instead, he only argues that Judge Royal unconstitutionally dismissed his prior actions. Having reviewed the record and read the appellant’s brief, 2 we affirm the district court’s order dismissing Carlan’s complaint.

I.

We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s sua sponte dismissal of a pro se litigant’s in forma pauperis complaint as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1348-49 (11th Cir. 2001). A complaint is frivolous if it lacks arguable merit in law or fact, or, in other words, “has little or no chance of success.” Id.; Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993) (quotation marks omitted).

We liberally construe pro se pleadings and hold them to a less stringent standard than counseled pleadings. Bilal v. Geo Care, LLC, 981 F.3d 903, 911 (11th Cir. 2020). However, pro se litigants are still “subject to the relevant law and rules of court,” and we “cannot act as de facto counsel or rewrite an otherwise defi- cient pleading to sustain an action.” Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835,

2 Appellee did not file a brief.

USCA11 Case: 25-13787 Document: 16-1 Date Filed: 06/05/2026 Page: 3 of 5

25-13787 Opinion of the Court 3 (11th Cir. 1989); Geo Care, LLC, 981 F.3d at 911. “[I]ssues not briefed on appeal” by pro se litigants “are deemed abandoned,” and the district court’s “judgment is due to be affirmed” if pro se liti- gants “fail[] to challenge properly on appeal . . . the grounds on which the district court based its judgment.” Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008); Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir. 2014). All defendants that are par- ties to a lawsuit must be named in the complaint’s caption. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a).

II.

“Judges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity from damages for those acts taken while they are acting in their judicial capacity unless they acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.”

Sibley v. Lando, 437 F.3d 1067, 1070 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotation marks omitted).

Whether a judge’s actions were made while acting in his judicial capacity depends on whether: (1) the act complained of constituted a normal judicial function; (2) the events occurred in the judge’s chambers or in open court; (3) the controversy involved a case pend- ing before the judge; and (4) the confrontation arose immediately out of a visit to the judge in his judicial capacity. Id. Issuing rulings on pending matters is a normal judicial function.

See id. at 1071 (stating that “issuing a decision in the form of a writ- ten opinion [is] [a] judicial action[]” and holding that defendant USCA11 Case: 25-13787 Document: 16-1 Date Filed: 06/05/2026 Page: 4 of 5

The Seventh Amendment preserves the right to a jury trial.

U.S. CONST. AMEND. VII. However, we have held that resolving a case based on a matter of law before trial does not violate the Sev- enth Amendment. See Jefferson v. Sewon Am., Inc., 891 F.3d 911, 919- (11th Cir. 2018) (holding that summary judgment before trial does not violate the Seventh Amendment).

III.

We conclude from the record that Carlan has abandoned any challenge to the district court’s order by ignoring its sole ground for dismissing his complaint—frivolity—and instead chal- lenging the constitutionality of Judge Royal’s dismissals of his prior actions. Even if Carlan had challenged the basis for the district court’s order, the district court did not abuse its discretion by dis- missing his complaint as frivolous. Carlan’s First Amendment claim against Judge Ashford, who Carlan did not name as a defend- ant, was meritless. Carlan’s Seventh Amendment claim against Judge Royal was also meritless because our precedent holds that the Seventh Amendment does not bar judges from resolving a case before it reaches a jury. Finally, Carlan’s Seventh Amendment claim against Judge Royal was barred by Judge Royal’s absolute judicial immunity because it arose out of Judge Royal’s order dismissing USCA11 Case: 25-13787 Document: 16-1 Date Filed: 06/05/2026 Page: 5 of 5

25-13787 Opinion of the Court 5 Carlan’s prior actions, which is a normal judicial function. There- fore, even if Carlan had not abandoned any challenge to the district court’s dismissal order, the district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing his complaint as frivolous.

Accordingly, based on the aforementioned reasons, we af- firm the district court’s order dismissing Carlan’s in forma pauperis complaint.

AFFIRMED.