Ali Abdulsamad v. Director, Georgia Bureau of Investigation

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 25-14071 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________ ALI ABDULSAMAD, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus DIRECTOR, GEORGIA BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, SERGEANT GILBERTO LORENZO, Supervisor, Internal Affairs, Gwinnett County Police Department, DETECTIVE JOHN MUTCH, Gwinnett County Police Department, SERGEANT MARSHALL, Internal Affairs, DeKalb County Police Department, DETECTIVE HAMMER, DeKalb County Police Department, et al., Defendants-Appellees, CHIEF, GWINNETT COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al., Defendants.

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2 Opinion of the Court 25-14071 ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia D.C. Docket No. 1:25-cv-04223-LMM ____________________ Before JORDAN, BRASHER, and KIDD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: Ali Abdulsamad, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s dismissal without prejudice of his first amended complaint as a shotgun pleading. He argues that the district court (1) abused its discretion by dismissing his complaint and disregarding his evi- dence of unauthorized surveillance, (2) penalized him for comply- ing with its order to replead, (3) erred in concluding that amend- ment would be futile, and (4) failed to liberally construe his pro se filings. He also argues that cumulative errors and bias warrant re- assignment to a different district judge. After careful review, we af- firm.

Separately, Abdulsamad has moved to supplement the rec- ord and for the Court to take judicial notice or order in camera re- view of an FBI document. We deny his motion.

I.

This case arises from Abdulsamad’s allegations of unlawful surveillance and harassment by an ex-girlfriend. Abdulsamad al- leges that his ex-girlfriend is a senior CIA official who lives in Ger- many and coordinated with others to plant surveillance cameras in his Georgia home. She allegedly has used her surveillance of him USCA11 Case: 25-14071 Document: 19-1 Date Filed: 06/09/2026 Page: 3 of 11

25-14071 Opinion of the Court 3 to conspire with others to break into his car, tow his car, hit his car, make discriminatory remarks to him while he is driving for Uber, publish private details of his life on social media, steal skincare cream from his mailbox, tamper with his hair treatment medica- tion, hack his Uber account, hack his phone, and suspend his license under the designation “Super Speeder” even though he had paid his speeding ticket.

Abdulsamad has also sued various law enforcement officers at the local, state, and federal level, alleging that they have been conspiring with his ex-girlfriend to harass him. The alleged harass- ment includes stopping him for immigration interviews in foreign and domestic airports, characterizing him as mentally ill and para- noid, refusing to let him enter the FBI building in Washington, D.C. even though he had driven there to file a formal complaint, and ignoring official complaints that Abdulsamad filed about the surveillance and harassment.

Abdulsamad’s initial complaint asserted several causes of ac- tion against numerous defendants. Abdulsamad also moved for a preliminary injunction. The district court denied the motion, ex- plaining that Abdulsamad had not addressed the required factors of a preliminary injunction. The court also struck Abdulsamad’s com- plaint as a shotgun pleading because it was impossible to discern which claims and allegations applied to which defendants. The court granted him thirty days to file an amended complaint, in- structing him to assert each claim in a separate count, specifically USCA11 Case: 25-14071 Document: 19-1 Date Filed: 06/09/2026 Page: 4 of 11

4 Opinion of the Court 25-14071 connect each claim with an individual defendant, connect his fac- tual allegations to specific elements of each cause of action, and not incorporate other pleadings or exhibits by reference.

Abdulsamad timely filed an amended complaint that again alleged that he had suffered years of unlawful surveillance, intimi- dation, and obstruction of justice by his ex-girlfriend as well as fed- eral, state, and local law enforcement. He alleged that these defend- ants violated his federal and state rights and sued them under a myriad of federal and state causes of action, including several crim- inal statutes. In his first count, for example, he alleged that his ex- girlfriend was conspiring with local, state, and federal law enforce- ment to surveil, intimidate, and retaliate against him in violation of the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, also citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, 50 U.S.C. § 1809, and Georgia Code §§ 16-11-62, 16-10-20, and 45-15-10. In the following counts, he alleged that other defendants retaliated against him and falsely character- ized him as mentally ill, consistently returning to his claim that each incident was part of a larger pattern or conspiracy linked with his ex-girlfriend. He incorporated all prior paragraphs in his final count and attached hundreds of pages of exhibits to his complaint.

Abdulsamad also filed an emergency motion for a temporary re- straining order and preliminary injunction.

The court dismissed the first amended complaint without prejudice as a shotgun pleading and for failing to state a plausible claim. The court explained that Abdulsamad’s allegations de- USCA11 Case: 25-14071 Document: 19-1 Date Filed: 06/09/2026 Page: 5 of 11

25-14071 Opinion of the Court 5 scribed what appeared to be lawful interactions, which Abdulsa- mad had “infused with unreasonable suspicion.” Doc. 24 at 5. The court accordingly denied his emergency motion as moot.

Abdulsamad filed another emergency motion for a TRO and preliminary injunction as well as a second amended complaint. The district court denied his emergency motion as moot and stated that it would not reconsider its previous order dismissing the case. The court added that Abdulsamad had attempted to file his second amended complaint without leave of court and that those filings carried the same deficiencies as his previous ones.

Abdulsamad appealed the district court’s dismissal.

He has also moved this Court for leave to file a supplemental appendix and for judicial notice. The supplemental appendix con- tains a two-page letter from the FBI notifying Abdulsamad that there are media files and 45 pages of records that are potentially responsive to his Freedom of Information/Privacy Act request.

II.

We “review a dismissal on Rule 8 shotgun pleading grounds for an abuse of discretion.” Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291, 1294 (11th Cir. 2018) (citing Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sher- iff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015)). Discretion means that the district court has “a range of choice, and that its decision will not be disturbed as long as it stays within that range and is not influenced by any mistake of law.” Guideone Elite Ins. Co. v. Old Cut- ler Presbyterian Church, Inc., 420 F.3d 1317, 1324 (11th Cir. 2005) USCA11 Case: 25-14071 Document: 19-1 Date Filed: 06/09/2026 Page: 6 of 11

6 Opinion of the Court 25-14071 (quoting Ameritas Variable Life Ins. Co. v. Roach, 411 F.3d 1328, 1330 (11th Cir. 2005)). Applying this standard, we will reverse only upon finding that the district court made “a clear error of judgment” or “applied the wrong legal standard.” Rance v. Rocksolid Granit USA, Inc., 583 F.3d 1284, 1286 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc)).

III.

After explaining why the district court did not abuse its dis- cretion in dismissing Abdulsamad’s first amended complaint, we discuss why we deny Abdulsamad’s motion to supplement the rec- ord and for judicial notice.

A.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Abdulsamad’s first amended complaint because it was a shotgun pleading. A shotgun pleading violates Federal Rule of Civil Proce- dure 8(a)(2) or Rule 10(b), Barmapov v. Amuial, 986 F.3d 1321, 1324 (11th Cir. 2021), and fails to give a defendant “adequate notice of the claims against him and the grounds upon which each claim rests.” Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1323 (citation modified). If a district court determines that a complaint is an impermissible shotgun pleading, the court ordinarily has the power to dismiss it after pointing out the defects in the complaint and giving a litigant a chance to replead. Jackson v. Bank of Am., N.A., 898 F.3d 1348, 1357– (11th Cir. 2018) (citation modified).

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25-14071 Opinion of the Court 7 Abdulsamad argues that the district court erred in four ways.

First, he argues that the court erred by dismissing his complaint as fanciful and delusional while disregarding his evidence of unau- thorized surveillance. Second, he argues that the court abused its discretion by demanding factual particularity and then penalizing Abdulsamad for complying. Third, he argues that the court erred in concluding that further amendment would be futile. Fourth, he argues that the court failed to liberally construe his pro se filings.

We disagree.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Abdulsamad’s first amended complaint as a shotgun pleading. Dis- trict courts have “inherent authority to control their docket.”

Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1320 (citation modified). This authority in- cludes the power to dismiss a complaint on shotgun pleading grounds. Id. A shotgun complaint is a complaint that: (1) realleges previous allegations in each count so that “the last count [is] a com- bination of the entire complaint”; (2) makes factual allegations “re- plete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts”; (3) fails to sep- arate each cause of action or claim for relief into a different count; or (4) alleges multiple claims against multiple defendants without identifying which defendants are responsible for which claims. Id. at 1321–23.

Abdulsamad’s first amended complaint exhibits at least three of these characteristics. For example, the complaint relies on conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts, such as the baseless asser- tion that his ex-girlfriend has placed cameras in his home, or that USCA11 Case: 25-14071 Document: 19-1 Date Filed: 06/09/2026 Page: 8 of 11

8 Opinion of the Court 25-14071 she is coordinating with multiple levels of law enforcement to har- ass him. See id. at 1322. His complaint also fails to separate each claim for relief into a different count. See id. at 1323. For example, the complaint asserts multiple constitutional, federal statutory, and state law claims in the first count. And, his complaint alleges mul- tiple claims against multiple defendants in a single claim without identifying which defendants are responsible for which claims. See id. at 1323.

Not only was the district court correct that his first amended complaint was a shotgun pleading, but also the court followed the proper procedure before dismissing his case by giving him a chance to replead his initial complaint. If a district court determines that a complaint is an impermissible shotgun pleading, the court ordinar- ily has the power to dismiss after pointing out the defects in the complaint and giving a litigant a chance to replead. Jackson, 898 F.3d at 1357–59 (citation modified). The court did so here, giving Abdulsamad a chance to replead and explaining why his initial complaint was a shotgun pleading. If Abdulsamad had followed the district court’s instructions for properly drafting a complaint, he could have avoided submitting another shotgun pleading. Because his first amended complaint remained a shotgun pleading, the court had the power to dismiss it.

Nor did the district court abuse its discretion in requiring a pro se litigant like Abdulsamad to follow procedural rules when drafting his complaint. Abdulsamad maintains that the district USCA11 Case: 25-14071 Document: 19-1 Date Filed: 06/09/2026 Page: 9 of 11

25-14071 Opinion of the Court 9 court should not have dismissed his first amended complaint be- cause, liberally construed, the complaint is properly pleaded. It is true that federal courts liberally construe pro se pleadings, Campbell v. Air Jam. Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168 (11th Cir. 2014) (citation modi- fied), but this liberal construction does not exempt pro se litigants from complying with applicable procedural rules, Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007). One of those rules instructs that a complaint must contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Abdulsamad’s conclusory allegations and ambiguously grouped legal claims do not satisfy this standard. The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Abdulsamad’s pro se complaint.

Finally, we reject Abdulsamad’s contention that the district court erred by concluding that further amendment would be futile.

His contention rests on an incorrect understanding of the proce- dural history. The district court did not hold that amendment would be futile. Instead, the court stated that Abdulsamad was not granted leave to file a second amended complaint. We thus reject this ground for appeal.

B.

We also deny Abdulsamad’s motion to supplement the rec- ord, take judicial notice of, or order in camera review of an FBI response to his FOIPA request. The FBI response is a two-page let- ter informing Abdulsamad that the FBI has located documents and media that are potentially responsive to his FOIPA request. In his USCA11 Case: 25-14071 Document: 19-1 Date Filed: 06/09/2026 Page: 10 of 11

10 Opinion of the Court 25-14071 motion, Abdulsamad argues that this document is a “missing link” that confirms his suspicions of surveillance and conspiracy and re- futes any claim that he is mentally ill. Dkt. 14-1 at 3. He argues that not admitting the document would result in manifest injustice be- cause it would uphold a dismissal that presumed that there was no record of government surveillance. He adds that a cyber attack cor- rupted his original appellate filings to omit the FBI document, and that he prioritized filing on time rather than filing a complete brief and appendix.

We refuse to take judicial notice because the FBI response is irrelevant to this appeal and Abdulsamad’s interpretation of this document is subject to reasonable dispute. We may take judicial notice of facts that are “not subject to reasonable dispute,” because they are “generally known” or “can be accurately and readily de- termined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be ques- tioned.” FED. R. EVID. 201(b). Standing alone, the FBI response con- firms merely that the FBI located potentially responsive records to Abdulsamad’s FOIPA request. The existence of these records is ir- relevant to whether Abdulsamad’s first amended complaint was a shotgun pleading. But Abdulsamad implies that we should also take judicial notice of his interpretation of the FBI response, which is that the FBI’s response to his FOIPA request corroborates his fac- tual allegations. Abdulsamad’s interpretation cannot be accurately and readily determined from the document, which states only that the FBI located potentially responsive records to his FOIPA re- quest. Because Abdulsamad’s interpretation of the FBI response is USCA11 Case: 25-14071 Document: 19-1 Date Filed: 06/09/2026 Page: 11 of 11

25-14071 Opinion of the Court 11 “subject to reasonable dispute,” it is not a proper subject for judicial notice. FED. R. EVID. 201(b).

We also refuse to supplement the record with this docu- ment. This Court rarely supplements the record to include material that was not before the district court, but we may do so if it would serve the interests of justice and if the material can resolve pending issues “beyond any doubt.” CSX Transp., Inc. v. City of Garden City, 235 F.3d 1325, 1330 (11th Cir. 2000) (citation modified). The FBI response does not serve the interests of justice or resolve pending issues because it would not correct the deficiencies in Abdulsa- mad’s amended complaint. We therefore deny the motion.

IV.

The district court’s dismissal without prejudice of Abdulsa- mad’s first amended complaint is AFFIRMED.

Abdulsamad’s “Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Ap- pendix and Request For Judicial Notice” is DENIED.