Leonard Brown v. United States

USCA11 Case: 25-12477 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 06/24/2026 Page: 1 of 4

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 25-12477 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________ LEONARD BROWN, Petitioner-Appellant, versus UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent-Appellee. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia D.C. Docket No. 1:03-cr-00041-LMM-ECS-1 ____________________ Before JORDAN, JILL PRYOR, and KIDD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: Leonard Brown, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s denial of his postconviction motion filed under USCA11 Case: 25-12477 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 06/24/2026 Page: 2 of 4

I.

A federal grand jury charged Brown with several crimes in- cluding two counts of using and carrying a firearm during a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The indictment al- leged that the predicate crime of violence for each § 924(c) count was attempted armed bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d). Brown pleaded guilty to the two § 924(c) counts and received a sentence of 384 months’ imprisonment.

Brown later filed a § 2255 motion to vacate, set aside, or cor- rect his sentence, challenging his § 924(c) convictions. He argued that under the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. 445 (2019), a conviction for attempted armed bank rob- bery did not qualify as a crime of violence and could not serve as a predicate offense under § 924(c). 1 The district court denied Brown’s motion to vacate. It relied on our decision in United States v. Armstrong, 122 F.4th 1278 (11th Cir. 2024), which held that attempted armed bank robbery quali- fied as a crime of violence for purposes of § 924(c). But it granted

USCA11 Case: 25-12477 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 06/24/2026 Page: 3 of 4

25-12477 Opinion of the Court 3 Brown a certificate of appealability on the question of whether at- tempted armed bank robbery qualifies as a crime of violence.

This is Brown’s appeal.

II.

We review de novo a district court’s determination that an offense is a crime of violence under § 924(c). See Armstrong, F.4th at 1284.

III.

Under federal law, a person who uses or carries a firearm during a crime of violence or a drug-trafficking crime faces a man- datory consecutive sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). Section 924(c) defines a “crime of violence” as a felony offense that: (A) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, or (B) that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of an- other may be used in the course of committing the offense.

Id. § 924(c)(3). Section 924(c)(3)(A) is known as the “elements clause,” and § 924(c)(3)(B) is known as the “residual clause.”

Brown v. United States, 942 F.3d 1069, 1075 (11th Cir. 2019).

In Davis, the Supreme Court held that the residual clause in § 924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutionally vague. See Davis, 588 U.S. at 470.

After Davis, an offense can qualify as a crime of violence only if it USCA11 Case: 25-12477 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 06/24/2026 Page: 4 of 4

Brown challenges his § 924(c) convictions arguing that the federal crime of attempted armed robbery does not qualify as a crime of violence under the elements clause. But we have previ- ously held that the crime of attempted armed bank robbery does qualify as a crime of violence. See Armstrong, 122 F.4th at 1291. As we explained in Armstrong, attempted bank robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under the elements clause “because it requires as an element that the defendant acted by force and violence, or by intimidation in committing the inchoate crime.” Id. (citation mod- ified).

On appeal, Brown argues that Armstrong was wrongly de- cided. But a prior panel decision “is binding on all subsequent pan- els unless and until it is overruled or undermined to the point of abrogation by the Supreme Court or by this court sitting en banc.”

United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008). We thus remain bound by Armstrong. Accordingly, we conclude that the dis- trict court correctly denied Brown’s § 2255 motion. 2 AFFIRMED.

2 The government raises alternative reasons why the district court could have denied Brown’s § 2255 motion, including because he cannot show that his con- victions were based on § 924(c)’s residual clause and his motion was untimely.

Because we conclude that Brown’s challenge to his § 924(c) convictions fails on the merits, we do not reach the government’s alternative arguments.