United States v. Phillip Smith

USCA11 Case: 25-13472 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 06/30/2026 Page: 1 of 7

NOT FOR PUBLICATION In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 25-13472 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee, versus PHILLIP SMITH,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia D.C. Docket No. 1:23-cr-00062-JRH-BKE-2 ____________________

Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Phillip Smith, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). After careful consideration, we affirm.

I.

In 2023, Smith was arrested and charged with several crimes including conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to dis- tribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; distrib- uting methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); and possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). After his arrest, he was released on bond. One condi- tion of the bond was that he not violate any federal, state, or local law.

While Smith was awaiting trial, his girlfriend reported to po- lice that he had forced her to engage in a sexual act. Local police arrested Smith. He was charged with several crimes including ag- gravated sodomy and aggravated sexual violence. The district court revoked Smith’s bond.

In the federal criminal case, Smith pleaded guilty to the drug conspiracy and firearm counts. In exchange, the government agreed to dismiss the drug distribution count.

At Smith’s sentencing hearing, the district court determined that his total offense level was 32. He did not receive any down- ward adjustment to his offense level for acceptance of responsibil- ity. Given his total offense level and his criminal history category of III, the court calculated Smith’s guidelines range as 151 to 188 months’ imprisonment. It imposed a sentence of 156 months’ imprisonment. And it directed that this sentence would run con- currently with any sentence imposed in the pending state court case in which Smith had been charged with aggravated sodomy, aggravated sexual violence, and other crimes.

About a year after the district court imposed the sentence, Smith, proceeding pro se, filed a motion seeking a sentence reduc- tion under § 3582(c)(1)(A). He argued, based on the Sentencing Commission’s policy statement at § 1B1.13(b)(6), that extraordi- nary and compelling reasons supported a sentence reduction. He asserted that he had “received an unusually long sentence,” he had “served at least 10 years of the term of imprisonment,” and there was a “change in the law” that produced a gross disparity between the sentence he was serving and the sentence likely to be imposed on the date he filed the motion. Doc. 402 at 5–6. 1 In his motion, Smith explained that he had not received credit for acceptance of responsibility at sentencing because of his pending state charges and after his sentencing, the state court case against him had been “placed on a ‘dead docket.’” Id. at 6. Given this development, Smith argued, he “would be elig[i]ble for a lesser sentence if sentenced today.” Id.

The government opposed Smith’s motion for a sentence re- duction. It argued that he was ineligible for a reduction because there was no extraordinary and compelling reason for it. In the al- ternative, the government argued that Smith should not receive a sentence reduction because he posed a danger to the community and the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) did not support a reduction.

The district court denied Smith’s motion. It concluded that he was not eligible for a reduction because he had not established extraordinary and compelling reasons. According to the district court, Smith was not eligible for a reduction under § 1B1.13(b)(6) because he had “not served at least ten years of imprisonment on his federal sentence.” Doc. 406 at 3. The court acknowledged that § 1B1.13(b)(1)–(5) listed additional circumstances that would estab- lish extraordinary and compelling reasons for a sentence reduction. But it stated that Smith was not relying on any of these categories. The court also concluded, in the alternative, that Smith should not receive a sentence reduction because “given [his] criminal history, the facts of the instant offenses, and the recentness of his convic- tion,” he remained a “danger to society.” Id.

This is Smith’s appeal.

II.

“We review de novo whether a defendant is eligible for a sen- tence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).” United States v. Giron, 15 F.4th 1343, 1345 (11th Cir. 2021).

Pro se filings are liberally construed. Campbell v. Air Jam. Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168 (11th Cir. 2014).

III.

A district court has no inherent authority to modify a de- fendant’s sentence; it may do so “only when authorized by a statute or rule.” United States v. Puentes, 803 F.3d 597, 606 (11th Cir. 2015). A federal statute, § 3582(c)(1)(A), authorizes a district court to re- duce a term of imprisonment when three requirements are satis- fied: (1) there are “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for granting a sentence reduction under § 1B1.13 of the Guidelines; (2) the § 3553(a) factors favor a reduction; and (3) awarding a sen- tence reduction “wouldn’t endanger any person or the commu- nity.” United States v. Tinker, 14 F.4th 1234, 1237 (11th Cir. 2021) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)). If a defendant fails to satisfy even one of these requirements, the court cannot grant relief and need not analyze the remaining requirements. See Giron, 15 F.4th at 1348.

A policy statement in the Sentencing Guidelines lists catego- ries of circumstances that qualify as “extraordinary and compelling reasons” justifying a sentence reduction. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b). These categories include the defendant’s medical circumstances, his age, his family circumstances, or his status as a victim of sexual or physical abuse while in custody. Id. § 1B1.13(b)(1)–(4). In addi- tion, the policy statement provides that a defendant is eligible for a sentence reduction if he “presents any other circumstance or com- bination of circumstances that . . . are similar in gravity to” the four enumerated categories. Id. § 1B1.13(b)(5). Finally, the policy state- ment provides that “[i]f a defendant received an unusually long sen- tence and has served at least 10 years of the term of imprisonment, a change in the law . . . may be considered in determining whether the defendant presents an extraordinary and compelling reason.” Id. § 1B1.13(b)(6). The change in law must “produce a gross dispar- ity between the sentence being served and the sentence likely to be imposed at the time the motion is filed.” Id.

We agree with the district court that Smith was not eligible for a sentence reduction. As an initial matter, he did not establish extraordinary and compelling reasons under § 1B1.13(b)(6). We agree with the district court that Smith was not eligible for a sen- tence reduction under this provision because he has not yet “served at least 10 years of the term of imprisonment.” Id. § 1B1.13(b)(6). 2

Smith nevertheless argues that he is eligible for a sentence reduction under § 1B1.13(b)(5). He points out that after he was sen- tenced, the state chose not to pursue the criminal case in which he was charged with aggravated sodomy, aggravated sexual violence, and other crimes. He asserts that this development means that at a new sentencing he would receive credit for acceptance of respon- sibility.

We conclude that Smith is not eligible for a sentence reduc- tion under § 1B1.13(b)(5). At most, he has shown that after he re- ceived a lengthy custodial sentence in the federal case, the state elected not to pursue separate criminal charges against him. This development does not establish a circumstance or combination of circumstances that are similar in gravity to those circumstances ex- pressly set forth in § 1B1.13(b)(1) through (b)(4), which relate to a defendant’s medical condition, his old age, his family circum- stances, or his status as a victim of abuse while incarcerated.

Because Smith failed to establish that he was eligible for a sentence reduction, the district court correctly denied his motion.3

AFFIRMED.