United States v. Kanethia Tremeka Steele

USCA11 Case: 25-13476 Document: 26-1 Date Filed: 07/01/2026 Page: 1 of 6

NOT FOR PUBLICATION In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 25-13476 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee, versus KANETHIA TREMEKA STEELE, a.k.a. Cookie,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 1:24-cr-00009-AW-MAL-1 ____________________

Before LUCK, LAGOA, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Kanethia Steele appeals her 135-month sentence for conspir- acy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute metham- phetamine. Steele argues that her sentence is substantively unrea- sonable because the district court did not properly weigh the appli- cable sentencing factors. We affirm.

I.

Steele pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of meth- amphetamine or 500 grams or more of a mixture of methamphet- amine. 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A)(viii).

Steele and her son Kenneth supplied methamphetamine and cocaine to a drug enterprise led by Jermaine Freeman. Steele acted as the middleman, connecting Freeman with drug suppliers in Ari- zona. Steele also helped pack the drugs into suitcases, which Ken- neth would transport to Florida. On several occasions, Freeman or his associates traveled to Arizona to meet with Steele and purchase drugs. All told, Steele helped transport approximately forty pounds of methamphetamine.

Before the sentencing hearing, the Probation Office pre- pared a presentence investigation report. Neither party objected to the report. According to the report, Steele had numerous prior con- victions for battery and assault that did not increase her recom- mended sentence because they were too old. She also had a prior conviction for a drug conspiracy, which was counted. The Proba- tion Office adjusted for Steele’s acceptance of responsibility and 25-13476 Opinion of the Court 3 then calculated a Sentencing Guidelines range of 135 months to 168 months. Steele’s conviction carries a 10-year mandatory minimum.

The presentence investigation report also described Steele’s physical condition. Steele suffers from numerous ailments, includ- ing mood disorder, type 2 diabetes, obesity, cirrhosis of the liver, nerve disorder, major depressive disorder, high blood pressure, chronic airway obstruction, and chronic constipation.

At sentencing, Steele requested she be sentenced to the stat- utory minimum. She presented statements from several family members regarding her health issues. During her allocution, she averred that she had received inadequate medical care during pre- trial detention. She also expressed remorse for enlisting her son in her criminal conduct.

After hearing from the government, the district court sen- tenced Steele to 135 months, the bottom of the sentencing range. The district court stated, “without any equivocation that it would be much higher if it weren’t for the health issues.” Doc. 155 at 23. It summarized Steele’s aggravating factors: her violent criminal his- tory, her prior involvement in a similar drug conspiracy, the large amount of drugs she had trafficked, and her decision to enlist her son in the conspiracy. The district court also stated that it consid- ered “all the 3553(a) factors,” giving special weight to deterrence. Id. at 25.

Steele timely appealed.

II.

We review the substantiveness reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Perkins, 787 F.3d 1329, 1342 (11th Cir. 2015). “A district court abuses its discretion when it (1) fails to afford consideration to relevant factors that were due signif- icant weight, (2) gives significant weight to an improper or irrele- vant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment in considering the proper factors.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).

III.

Steele argues that her sentence is substantively unreasona- ble. She believes the district court “disregarded significant mitiga- tion and the applicable sentencing factors” by failing to consider her health issues, her need for treatment, and her role in the of- fense. We disagree.

District courts have broad discretion to weigh the relevant sentencing factors and arrive at an appropriate sentence. Id. Under the abuse of discretion standard, we will vacate a sentence for sub- stantive unreasonableness only if we have a “definite and firm con- viction” that the district court committed a “clear error of judg- ment” in weighing the section 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sen- tence outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts. United States v. Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d 567, 611 (11th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).

25-13476 Opinion of the Court 5

The district court’s sentence was not substantively unrea- sonable. It correctly identified the presence of numerous aggravat- ing factors: the “tremendous volume” of drugs Steele helped traffic, the complexity and scope of the conspiracy, Steele’s previous con- viction for a similar offense, her willingness to involve her son in the crime, and the fact that her guidelines range was “understated” due to the unscored convictions. In considering “all the 3553(a) fac- tors,” the district court reasonably placed special weight on the need to deter both Steele and potential future offenders. The dis- trict court’s decision to impose a sentence at the very bottom of the guidelines range further supports its substantive reasonableness. See United States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir. 2008); United States v. Croteau, 819 F.3d 1293, 1309-10 (11th Cir. 2016) (courts “or- dinarily expect” sentences within the guidelines range to be reason- able).

The district court properly considered all relevant factors, including the defendant’s personal characteristics. See Irey, 612 F.3d at 1189. The district court chose not to impose a more severe sen- tence due to Steele’s numerous health problems. Moreover, in recognition of Steele’s need for treatment, the district court recom- mended that the Bureau of Prisons consider Steele’s health condi- tions when assigning her to a facility. The district court also recom- mended that Steele be housed near Tampa so that her family could visit her.

Steele is therefore wrong to argue that the district court did not consider her health issues, need for treatment, or role in the offense. Her true objection is that the district court did not weigh the various factors as she would have liked. But the weight given to any factor is left to the district court’s discretion. Cabezas-Mon- tano, 949 F.3d at 611. Because Steele failed to show that her sen- tence is outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case, her sentence is not substantively unreasonable. Id.

IV.

AFFIRMED.