United States v. Rodzebies Smith

USCA11 Case: 25-14423 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 07/06/2026 Page: 1 of 6

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 25-14423 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee, versus RODZEBIES JERMINE SMITH,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 9:25-cr-80102-DMM-1 ____________________

Before NEWSOM, BRANCH, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Rodzebies Smith appeals his conviction for possessing a firearm as a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Smith argues that § 922(g)(1), as applied to him, violates the Second Amendment. The government, in turn, moves for summary affirmance, arguing that our precedent forecloses Smith’s constitutional challenge to § 922(g)(1). Because the government’s position is clearly right as a matter of law, we grant its motion and affirm.

We review the constitutionality of a statute de novo. United States v. Wright, 607 F.3d 708, 715 (11th Cir. 2010). Summary disposition is appropriate when “the position of one of the parties is clearly right as a matter of law so that there can be no substantial question as to the outcome of the case.” Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969). 1

In this Court, a “prior panel’s holding is binding on all subsequent panels unless and until it is overruled or undermined to the point of abrogation by the Supreme Court or by this court sitting en banc.” United States v. Dubois, 139 F.4th 887, 892 (11th Cir. 2025) (quotation omitted), cert. denied, No. 25-6281, 2026 WL 135685 (U.S. Jan. 20, 2026). When we “cannot harmonize our decisions” we must follow the earliest-decided precedent. Corley v. Long-Lewis, Inc., 965 F.3d 1222, 1231 (11th Cir. 2020).

We begin by detailing the precedent relevant to regulations of felons possessing firearms. In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court held that the Second Amendment right to bear 25-14423 Opinion of the Court 3 arms presumptively “belongs to all Americans” but the right “is not unlimited.” 554 U.S. 570, 581, 626 (2008). The Court noted that, while it “[did] not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis . . . of the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in [its] opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons.” Id. at 626.

In United States v. Rozier, we considered a constitutional challenge to § 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on felons possessing firearms. 598 F.3d 768, 770–71 (11th Cir. 2010). We held that “statutory restrictions of firearm possession, such as § 922(g)(1), are a constitutional avenue to restrict the Second Amendment right of certain classes of people,” observing that Heller “suggest[ed] that statutes disqualifying felons from possessing a firearm under any and all circumstances do not offend the Second Amendment.” Id. at 771. Heller, we explained, recognized that prohibiting felons from possessing firearms was a “presumptively lawful longstanding prohibition.” Id. (quoting United States v. White, 593 F.3d 1199, 1205–06 (11th Cir. 2010)).

After this Court upheld the constitutionality of 922(g)(1) in Rozier, in N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, the Supreme Court explained that, in determining whether a restriction on the possession of firearms is constitutional, courts must begin by asking whether the firearm law or regulation at issue governs conduct that falls within the plain text of the Second Amendment right. 597 U.S. 1, 17 (2022). If the regulation covers such conduct, it survives constitutional scrutiny only if the government “affirmatively prove[s] that its firearms regulation is part of the historical tradition that delimits the outer bounds of the right to keep and bear arms.” Id. at 19. As in Heller, Bruen confirmed that the Second Amendment protects the right of “law-abiding citizens” to possess handguns for self-defense. Id. at 8–10, 71.

The Supreme Court applied Bruen’s history-and-tradition test in United States v. Rahimi and warned that “some courts have misunderstood the methodology of [its] recent Second Amendment cases,” which “were not meant to suggest a law trapped in amber.” 602 U.S. 680, 691 (2024). Rahimi reiterated that a historical analogue “need not be a ‘dead ringer’ or a ‘historical twin’” to establish that a modern regulation “comport[s] with the principles underlying the Second Amendment.” Id. at 692 (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 30).

Following the Supreme Court’s guidance in Bruen and Rahimi, in National Rifle Association v. Bondi, we said that “[w]hen a person challenges a law regulating arms-bearing conduct, courts must examine the ‘historical tradition of firearm regulation’ in our nation to ‘delineate the contours of the right.’” 133 F.4th 1108, 1114 (11th Cir. 2025) (en banc) (quoting Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 692).

Finally, in United States v. Dubois, we explained that neither Bruen nor Rahimi abrogated our decision in Rozier, which upheld the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) under the Second Amendment. 139 F.4th at 888–89. Applying our prior panel precedent rule in considering the defendant’s Second Amendment challenge to his conviction under § 922(g)(1), we affirmed, holding that Rozier, 25-14423 Opinion of the Court 5 which predated Bruen and Rahimi, continued to bar Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1) unless and until the Supreme Court offered clearer instruction. Id. at 892–94. Rozier, we made clear, remained binding precedent in this Circuit. Id.

The parties agree and are clearly right that Smith’s Second Amendment challenge fails under Dubois and Rozier. Smith, however, argues that Dubois, which reaffirmed Rozier, does not govern because it failed to apply the methodology set forth in Bruen and Rahimi, which we held in Bondi must be used to evaluate all Second Amendment challenges. So, Smith argues, Bondi governs because when circuit authority conflicts, the earliest case controls and Bondi predates Dubois.

Contrary to Smith’s contention, our decision in Dubois does not conflict with Bondi. In Bondi, we said that “[w]hen a person challenges a law regulating arms-bearing conduct, courts must examine the ‘historical tradition of firearm regulation’ in our nation to ‘delineate the contours of the right.’” 133 F.4th at 1114 (quoting Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 692). While Bondi set forth a general rule for how courts must evaluate Second Amendment challenges it did not explicitly overrule any of this Court’s previous Second Amendment decisions. See id. So Bondi and Dubois can easily be read in harmony: Bondi reiterated the Supreme Court’s history- and-tradition test but did not prevent future opinions (like Dubois) from relying on previously decided Second Amendment opinions that are not “clearly contrary to” Heller, Bruen, and Rahimi. Dubois, 139 F.4th at 892 (quotation omitted).

In sum, Dubois clearly dooms Smith’s Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1) and is binding because it does not conflict with Bondi. Because the government’s position as to Smith’s Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1) “is clearly right as a matter of law,” see Groendyke Transp., 406 F.2d at 1162, we grant the government’s motion for summary affirmance.

AFFIRMED.