State of Florida v. Secretary, US Department of Education

USCA11 Case: 24-13814 Document: 72-1 Date Filed: 07/06/2026 Page: 1 of 18

FOR PUBLICATION

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________

No. 24-13814

____________________

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Plaintiff-Appellant, versus SECRETARY, US DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, UNDER SECRETARY, US DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION, DIRECTOR, ACCREDITATION GROUP, OFFICE OF POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION, CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER, FEDERAL STUDENT AID, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 0:23-cv-61188-JB ____________________

Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and BRASHER and ABUDU, Cir- cuit Judges.

BRASHER, Circuit Judge:

The question in this appeal is whether the Department of Education may constitutionally rely on private educational accred- itors in disbursing federal education funds. The Higher Education Act requires that, for their students to be eligible for federal finan- cial aid, colleges and universities must be accredited by a recog- nized accreditor. Accreditors are private, voluntary organizations that are usually funded by the schools or programs that they ac- credit. The State of Florida says that, by requiring accreditation, Congress and the Department of Education have unconstitution- ally delegated governmental power to these private accreditors and that the accreditors should be, but have not been, appointed as fed- eral officers. Florida also says that the accreditation requirement is an unascertainable, and therefore unconstitutional, condition at- tached to federal funds provided to States. After careful considera- tion and with the benefit of oral argument, we disagree. The ac- creditation requirement is neither a delegation of government power nor an unascertainable condition. Because the district court dismissed Florida’s suit for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, we affirm.

I.

Accrediting agencies have been accrediting educational in- stitutions and their programs since the late nineteenth century. ALEXANDRA HEGJI, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43826, AN OVERVIEW OF ACCREDITATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2024). Their primary function was to provide an assurance of qual- ity for postsecondary education institutions and programs. See id. at 1–2. Accreditors are primarily funded by the schools and pro- grams they accredit, and membership in an accrediting agency is voluntary. Id. at 4.

When the federal government began funding higher educa- tion through the Higher Education Act, it incorporated accredita- tion. The main source of funding in the Higher Education Act is federal student financial aid, such as Pell Grants and Direct Loans. Id. at 1. Authorized in Title IV of the Act, federal student aid now comprises billions of dollars per year. Id. To ensure that educa- tional institutions that receive these Title IV dollars perform at a minimum level of quality, Congress requires that they be accred- ited. Id. In fact, Congress has required accreditation as a condition for federal financial aid eligibility since the 1952 GI Bill. See Veter- ans’ Readjustment Assistance Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-550, § 253, 66 Stat. 663, 675 (first incorporation of private accreditors into higher education funding); Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, §§ 302(c), 435(a), 441(3), 123(b)(1), 79 Stat. 1219, 1229, 1247–50 (expanding higher education funding). For an insti- tution’s students to be eligible to receive Title IV financial aid to- day, educational institutions must be: (1) accredited, 20 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(5); (2) authorized to provide a program of postsecondary education within their states, id. § 1001(a)(2); and (3) certified by the Department of Education as having satisfied these require- ments as well as having administrative capability and financial re- sponsibility, id. § 1099c(a). If institutions are eligible, students may receive Title IV financial aid to spend at those institutions.

Accreditation will satisfy the statute only if the Department of Education recognizes the accreditor. Id. § 1001(a)(5) (requiring institutions to be accredited by “a nationally recognized accrediting agency or association”). The Higher Education Act specifies several broad requirements that accreditors must satisfy for the Depart- ment to recognize them. See id. § 1099b. These requirements in- clude that a private accreditor must have “voluntary membership”; “consistently appl[y] and enforce[]” accreditation standards “that respect the stated mission of the institution of higher education” and “ensure that the courses or programs” that the institution of- fers “are of sufficient quality to achieve” their stated objectives; and have accreditation standards that assess each institution’s “success with respect to student achievement,” curricula, faculty, fiscal soundness, recruiting and admissions, program length, student complaints, facilities, equipment, and supplies. Id. § 1099b(a)(2)– (5).

Historically, the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools Commission on Colleges has served as the accreditor for Florida’s state colleges and universities. But the State of Florida has not always had a smooth relationship with SACS. Over a decade ago, Governor Rick Scott suggested that the president of Florida A&M be suspended following a deadly hazing incident, but SACS threatened to withhold Florida A&M’s accreditation if the univer- sity were to act under the Governor’s influence. Am. Council of Trs. & Alumni, Florida Rising: An Assessment of Public Universities in the Sunshine State 39 (June 2013), https://www.goacta.org/wp- content/uploads/2013/06/florida_rising.pdf [https://perma.cc/2XXS-RP8B]. SACS later said that it was launch- ing an inquiry into Governor Scott’s meeting with a prospective candidate to replace the incumbent president at the University of Florida. Tia Mitchell, Gov. Rick Scott’s involvement in UF president de- cision under review, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Jan. 18, 2013), https://www.tampabay.com/news/education/col- lege/gov-rick-scotts-involvement-in-uf-president-decision-under- review/1271239/ [https://perma.cc/5KE8-TBEM]. And recently, SACS threatened to revoke Florida State University’s accreditation because the Florida Board of Governors considered appointing the Florida Commissioner of Education as its next president, and SACS hinted that “some of the candidates” being considered (such as the Commissioner) lacked “appropriate experience and qualifications.” Letter to Sydney Kitson, Chair, Fla. Bd. of Governors, from Belle S. Wheelan, President, SACS (May 13, 2021), https://www.scribd.com/document/508024434/SACS-Letter-to- Sydney-Kitson [https://perma.cc/XC2R-6FTU]; Divya Kumar, Richard Corcoran out of FSU presidential search; three academics move on, TAMPA BAY TIMES (May 15, 2021), https://www.tampa- bay.com/news/education/2021/05/15/richard-corcoran-out-of- fsu-presidential-search-three-academics-move-forward/ [https://perma.cc/GA5F-WEMH].

Until recently, a college or university was assigned an insti- tutional accreditor based on its geographic region. But in 2019, the Department of Education revised its regulations to permit institu- tions to switch to an accreditor outside their region. See The Secre- tary’s Recognition of Accrediting Agencies, 84 Fed. Reg. 58,834, 58,893 (Nov. 1, 2019) (explaining that the regulations removed “geo- graphic area of accrediting activities” from the definition of “scope of recognition or scope”). Florida’s legislature took advantage of this regulatory revision and passed a law directing its public col- leges and universities to switch to an accreditor that the Florida Board of Governors or State Board of Education had approved. FLA. STAT. § 1008.47(2)(a) (2023).

Florida has now sued the Secretary of Education and several Department of Education officials, maintaining that the accredita- tion requirement is unconstitutional. Florida brought four claims: a private nondelegation doctrine challenge, an Appointments Clause challenge, a Spending Clause challenge, and a now-aban- doned Administrative Procedure Act challenge. The federal gov- ernment moved to dismiss, and the district court granted the mo- tion. The district court explained that there was no private non- delegation issue because accreditation is not a legislative function, the government maintains ultimate decision-making authority over Title IV funds, and accreditors are not promulgating generally applicable rules. The court added that the Spending Clause claim was meritless because Title IV funds go to students and not institu- tions, and in any event, the accreditation requirement is unambig- uous and not overly coercive. And the court dismissed the Appoint- ments Clause claim because accreditors do not determine eligibil- ity for Title IV funds.

Florida timely appealed.

II.

We review de novo a district court’s grant of a 12(b)(6) mo- tion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, “accepting the com- plaint’s allegations as true and construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Simone v. Sec’y of Homeland Sec., 156 F.4th 1212, 1215 (11th Cir. 2025) (citation modified). We review ques- tions of statutory interpretation de novo. Id. at 1216. We also review constitutional questions de novo. United States v. Osburn, 955 F.2d 1500, 1503 (11th Cir. 1992).

III.

Florida argues that the district court should not have dis- missed its constitutional claims. Those claims identify two alleged infirmities in the Department of Education’s reliance on accredi- tors. First, in Florida’s view, these private accreditors exercise gov- ernmental power by determining eligibility for Title IV funding. If that’s so, Florida says it creates related constitutional problems. There would be an Article I delegation-of-power problem because the statute delegates that authority without sufficient supervision. And, along the same lines, there would be an Appointments Clause problem because these accreditors have not been properly ap- pointed to act as federal officers. Second, even if the accreditors are not exercising governmental power, Florida says that the condition requiring accreditation is an unconstitutional exercise of Con- gress’s Spending Clause power because it is unascertainable. Flor- ida argues that colleges and universities can never really know what they must do to satisfy a private accreditor, so the condition requiring accreditation is too uncertain to be constitutional.

We will address each issue in turn. We ultimately agree with the Department of Education that private accreditors are not exer- cising governmental authority—so there is no constitutional infir- mity with the delegation of such authority or the failure to appoint accreditors as executive branch officers. We also think that the ac- creditation requirement is an ascertainable condition that Congress may attach to federal funds.

A.

We begin with Florida’s nondelegation and Appointments Clause theories, which are two sides of the same coin. Florida says that the law unconstitutionally delegates to private accreditors the government’s authority to decide who is eligible for Title IV funds (nondelegation), and, if accreditors want to perform the task, they must be properly appointed as executive branch officers (Appoint- ments Clause). We will unpack each theory, but the bottom line is the same: both theories fail because, under the statutory scheme at issue here, accreditors are not exercising government authority.

1.

Let’s start with Florida’s nondelegation theory—that accred- itors are exercising government power that properly belongs to the legislative or executive branches. Generally, the government can- not delegate legislative, executive, or judicial authority to private parties. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936) (hold- ing that “legislative delegation” and regulatory delegation to pri- vate parties is unconstitutional). The Article I, II, and III Vesting Clauses vest “legislative Powers,” “[t]he executive Power,” and “[t]he judicial Power” in Congress, the President, and the federal judiciary, respectively. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; id. art. II, § 1; id. art. III, § 1. The vesting of these three powers is exclusive, meaning that the three branches cannot give away their power. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529 (1935) (ex- plaining that Congress may not “transfer to others the essential leg- islative functions with which it is thus vested”). At a minimum, the Vesting Clauses prevent the delegation of power to a private party to the same degree they prevent the delegation of one branch’s power to a government actor in another branch. See Oklahoma v. United States, 163 F.4th 294, 305 (6th Cir. 2025) (explaining that “un- checked delegations to private entities violate core separation-of- power guarantees”); Pittston Co. v. United States, 368 F.3d 385, 394 (4th Cir. 2004) (similar); Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 575 U.S. 43, 87–88 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (explaining that the private nondelegation doctrine “flows logically from the three Vesting Clauses”); Consumers’ Rsch., Cause Based Com., Inc. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 88 F.4th 917, 935 (11th Cir. 2023) (Newsom, J., concurring) (writing that the private nondelegation doctrine flows from structural Vesting Clause concerns).

Of course, the delegation of government authority to a pri- vate party raises Due Process concerns as well. Private parties may be more likely than government actors to be self-interested or to act arbitrarily. See Carter Coal, 298 U.S. at 311. But States like Florida do not have Due Process rights. The Due Process Clauses protect “person[s]” against the government, U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, not the States against the federal government. Cf. Deshaney v. Win- nebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989) (explaining that the Due Process Clause “is phrased as a limitation on the State’s power to act”). For that reason, Florida has wisely conceded away any private nondelegation theory that depends on the Due Process Clause.

Florida has a similar Appointments Clause theory, arguing that accreditors are wielding executive power without having been appointed to be executive officers. The Appointments Clause pro- vides that all “Officers of the United States” must be appointed in a specific way depending on whether they are principal or inferior officers. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. But for the Appointments Clause to apply at all, the person or entity in question must exercise significant government authority, Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 662 (1997), and occupy an office that is “established by Law,” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Significant authority can include prom- ulgating rules, adjudicating public rights, or determining eligibility for funds or elected office. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 140–41 (1976) (holding that the Federal Election Commission exercised signifi- cant government authority through “rulemaking, advisory opin- ions, and determinations of eligibility for funds and even for federal elective office itself”). Significant authority also includes taking tes- timony, conducting trials, ruling on admissibility of evidence, and enforcing compliance with discovery orders. Freytag v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868, 881–82 (1991); Lucia v. SEC, 585 U.S. 237, 248 (2018).

2.

The problem for Florida’s theories is that accreditors do not exercise the kind of government authority that could violate the Vesting Clauses or the Appointments Clause. Florida asserts that accreditors exercise government power in the form of legislative rule-setting power and executive decision-making power. But a wall of precedent establishes that accreditors exercise neither kind of authority.

To begin with, private educational accreditors preexisted the Higher Education Act. Their power to accredit comes not from the federal government, but from their member institutions who voluntarily submit to their authority and by-laws. See North Dakota v. N. Cent. Ass’n of Colls. & Secondary Schs., 99 F.2d 697, 700 (7th Cir. 1938) (explaining that membership in an accrediting agency is “purely voluntary”); HEGJI, supra, at 4 (explaining that institutions voluntarily submit to accreditation). Private accreditors do not rely on any delegation of government power to do what they have al- ways done: accredit their member educational institutions.

Even though accreditation has a bearing on eligibility for Ti- tle IV funding, this connection does not mean that accreditors are exercising Congress’s spending power. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. States routinely rely on similar, privately controlled institutions to make decisions about who is qualified to receive a license or bene- fit. For example, many States (including Florida) require applicants for certain professional licenses to have graduated from an accred- ited program or institution. 1 Courts have explained that, even 1 See, e.g., Schumann v. Collier Anesthesia, P.A., 803 F.3d 1199, 1203 (11th Cir. 2015) (recognizing that Florida requires applicants for licenses to work as cer- tified registered nurse anesthetists to have graduated from an accredited pro- gram and be certified by a private organization (citing FLA. STAT. §§ 458.3475, 459.023)); McKeesport Hosp. v. Accreditation Council for Graduate Med. Educ., 24 F.3d 519, 520–21 (3d Cir. 1994) (explaining that Pennsylvania will only recog- nize the education or degrees obtained from accredited medical residency pro- grams (citing 63 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 422.2, 422.23(c))); ALA. CODE § 34-39-8(1) (2026) (requiring applicants for an occupational therapy license to have com- pleted an accredited program); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-205-108(1)(a)–(b) (2020) (requiring applicants for an athletic training license to have earned a degree from an accredited college or university and completed an accredited pro- gram); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 20-10 (2026) (requiring certain applicants for med- ical licensure to have graduated from an accredited medical school or pro- gram); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 2817(1)(a) (2025) (requiring certain applicants for a professional engineering license to have graduated from an accredited program); GA. CODE ANN. § 43-11-71(a) (2026) (requiring dental hygienists to have graduated from an accredited program); LA. STAT. ANN. § 37:2805(B)(1)(d) (2023) (requiring applicants for a chiropractic license to have though private accreditors play a significant role in state licensure requirements, accreditors performing these roles are not state ac- tors. See, e.g., McKeesport Hosp. v. Accreditation Council for Graduate Med. Educ., 24 F.3d 519, 524 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that an accredi- tor did not perform state action even though Pennsylvania only recognized degrees from accredited programs); cf. Sanjuan v. Am. Bd. of Psychiatry & Neurology, Inc., 40 F.3d 247, 250 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that a private medical Board was not a state actor even though “states make certification by the Board a prerequisite for some public positions”). graduated from an accredited college or university and an accredited chiro- practic school); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH OCC. § 13-303(a)(1) (2020) (requiring certain applicants for a physical therapy license to have graduated from an ap- proved or accredited program); MASS. GEN. ANN. LAWS ch. 112, § 23I(b) (1982) (requiring certain applicants for a physical therapy license to have graduated from an accredited program); MISS. CODE ANN. § 73-31-13(d) (2025) (requiring applicants for a psychologist’s license to hold a doctoral degree in psychology from an accredited or authorized institution of higher education); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 4741.11 (2016) (requiring certain applicants for veterinary licenses to have graduated from an approved or accredited veterinary college); S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-33-36(D)(1)(d), (E)(1) (2021) (requiring applicants for a gradu- ate nurse license to complete an accredited basic nursing education program within one year of seeking licensure); TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-4-108(1) (2026) (requiring applicants for chiropractic licenses to have graduated an accredited or approved chiropractic college); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 605.252(b)(1) (2017) (requiring that applicants for an orthotics or prosthetics license hold a degree from an accredited program or a program with equivalent standards); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2709(B)(ii) (2017) (requiring that applicants for a dentistry license have graduated from an accredited dental school or department).

In assessing similar arguments, we have also explained that Congress’s decision to use private accreditation as a signal of insti- tutional quality does not transform accreditors into government actors. Despite the important role that private accreditation plays in eligibility, the Department of Education “has never delegated to [private accreditors] its authority to terminate federal funds.” Hi- wassee Coll., Inc. v. S. Ass’n of Colls. & Schs., 531 F.3d 1333, 1335 & n.3 (11th Cir. 2008). As they have done for over a century, accredi- tors decide whether to accredit (a private decision), and the federal government decides whether to fund (a government decision). See Med. Inst. of Minn. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Trade & Tech. Schs., 817 F.2d 1310, 1313 (8th Cir. 1987) (explaining that accreditation decisions are “not attributable to the federal government,” but are “private ac- tions to which the government responds”); Pro. Massage Training Ctr., Inc. v. Accreditation All. of Career Schs. & Colls., 781 F.3d 161, 169 (4th Cir. 2015) (“Accreditation agencies are private entities, not state actors . . . .”).

In a similar vein, our sister circuits have recognized that a funding condition that amounts to a “legitimate request[] for in- put” from a private organization is not a delegation of government authority. State v. Rettig, 987 F.3d 518, 531 (5th Cir. 2021); see also U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 566 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (stating the general rule). Accordingly, the federal government may condi- tion approval on a private party’s certification if there is “a reason- able connection between the outside entity’s decision and the fed- eral agency’s determination.” See Rettig, 987 F.3d at 531 (quoting U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 359 F.3d at 567). We agree. And, here, there is really no debate that the accreditation requirement is reasonable. It is obviously connected to Congress’s goal that federal student aid flow to high quality institutions. The history of private accredita- tion underscores the reasonableness of relying on that kind of preexisting practice.

Finally, private accreditors are not executive officers because they do not exercise any functions recognized as significant gov- ernment authority, nor do they occupy an office that was “estab- lished by Law.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Unlike the rulemaking, advisory opinions, and eligibility determinations of the Federal Election Commission in Buckley, see 424 U.S. at 140–41, accreditors’ standards and decisions are not generally applicable. Their accred- itation decisions apply to a single institution, and their standards apply to a discrete number of voluntary member institutions. Pri- vate accreditors also do not adjudicate public rights or perform classic government functions. Unlike in Freytag and Lucia, accredi- tors do not conduct trials, take testimony, rule on admissibility of evidence, or enforce compliance with discovery orders. See Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881–82; Lucia, 585 U.S. at 247. Moreover, private accred- itors preexisted the Higher Education Act and continue to perform the same function they always have. They therefore do not occupy an office “established by Law,” which is required to trigger the Ap- pointments Clause. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.

In short, Congress’s decision to use private accreditation as a signal of institutional quality does not delegate legislative or ex- ecutive power or require accreditors’ appointment as executive branch officers. Because accreditors are not exercising legislative or executive power, the government’s reliance on accreditation as an indication of quality does not violate the Vesting Clauses or Ap- pointments Clause.

B.

We turn now to Florida’s Spending Clause claim.

There are limits to the conditions Congress can impose un- der the Spending Clause when it gives money to States. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 & n.13 (1981). Among other things, those conditions must be ascertainable. Id. at 17; see also South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (explaining that Congress’s conditions must be unambiguous). The ascertaina- bility requirement reflects the consent-based approach of State-di- rected Spending Clause legislation, Cummings v. Premier Rehab Kel- ler, P.L.L.C., 596 U.S. 212, 219 (2022), and enables States “to exercise their choice [to accept funds] knowingly, cognizant of the conse- quences of their participation.” Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17.

The district court concluded that the ascertainability re- quirement doesn’t apply to the accreditation condition on Title IV funds because those funds only indirectly flow to States through the educational choices of students. We will assume without decid- ing, however, that the ascertainability requirement applies. Indulg- ing that assumption, the federal government argues that the ac- creditation condition is ascertainable because it is straightforward for an institution to determine whether it is accredited. Florida dis- agrees, arguing that the standards that private accreditors apply can be nebulous and change unpredictably.

We agree with the federal government. Congress need not “prospectively resolve every possible ambiguity concerning partic- ular applications of the requirements of [a federal grant program].” Bennett v. Ky. Dep’t of Educ., 470 U.S. 656, 669 (1985). The point is that Congress must “make the existence of the condition itself—in exchange for the receipt of federal funds—explicitly obvious.” Ben- ning v. Georgia, 391 F.3d 1299, 1307 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting May- weathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2002)). That con- dition here is accreditation by a recognized accreditor.

The accreditation condition does not become ambiguous just because it could have diverse applications depending on the accreditor and the institution. In Benning, for example, we held that the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act imposed an ascertainable condition on recipients of federal funds when it applied strict scrutiny to any of their actions that substantially bur- dened religious exercise. 391 F.3d at 1306. There, we acknowl- edged that under strict scrutiny, state actions that constituted dis- crimination could “vary widely,” but we still held that this funding condition was a well understood means-end test that was “far from ambiguous.” Id. In the same way, as the federal government points out, accreditation has been around for over a century and is a well understood system. We have no doubt that the standards are as- certainable.

Florida cites our decision in West Virginia ex rel. Morrisey v. U.S. Department of the Treasury, 59 F.4th 1124 (11th Cir. 2023), but it offers no support. In Morrisey, we considered whether a provision of the American Rescue Plan Act violated the Spending Clause’s ascertainability requirement. The provision prohibited States from using federal funds to offset “directly or indirectly” any reduction in net tax revenue resulting from a change in state law. Id. at 1132 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 802(c)(2)(A)). We concluded that the offset provision was not ascertainable for three reasons: (1) it did not pro- vide a baseline standard against which to measure net tax revenue, (2) the words “directly or indirectly” made it an “extraordinarily expansive” condition considering the fungibility of money, and (3) it was a novel restriction aimed at a State’s entire budget. Id. at 1144–46 (citation modified). None of these reasons apply here. Col- leges and universities know whether they are accredited, the ac- creditation condition doesn’t encumber a State’s entire budget, and accreditation is not novel in any way. We reject the State of Flor- ida’s comparison between this case and Morrisey.

Because accreditation is an ascertainable condition on fed- eral funds, it does not violate the Spending Clause.

IV.

The district court’s order of dismissal is AFFIRMED.