United States v. Robert Clarke

USCA11 Case: 25-13189 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 08/12/2026 Page: 1 of 5

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 25-13189 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee, versus ROBERT CLARKE,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 8:23-cr-00420-VMC-AEP-1 ____________________

Before ABUDU, TJOFLAT, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Robert Clarke appeals the 24-month prison sentence the Dis- trict Court imposed following the revocation of his supervised re- lease. Clarke argues that his sentence, an upward variance from the 2 Opinion of the Court 25-13189 guideline range, is both procedurally and substantively unreasona- ble because the District Court failed to properly consider the advi- sory guideline range and explain the sentence. He also argues that the district court plainly erred by imposing a lifetime term of su- pervised release following his prison term because it failed to con- duct an individualized inquiry into the facts of Clarke’s case.

I.

We apply a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard when reviewing the procedural and substantive reasonableness of sen- tences imposed upon the revocation of supervised release. United States v. Overstreet, 713 F.3d 627, 636 (11th Cir. 2013).

A.

Clarke did not object to his sentence as procedurally unrea- sonable when the District Court elicited the parties’ objections af- ter imposing sentence, so we review its procedural reasonableness for plain error. 1 A district court imposes a procedurally unreasona- ble sentence in “failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly 25-13189 Opinion of the Court 3 erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sen- tence—including an explanation for any deviation from the Guide- lines range.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).

We find no error here, much less plain error. The District Court touched all of these bases.

B.

A district court “imposes a substantively unreasonable sen- tence only when it (1) fails to afford consideration to relevant fac- tors that were due significant weight, (2) gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment in considering the proper factors.” United States v. Rodri- guez, 75 F.4th 1231, 1241 (11th Cir. 2023) (quoting United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1256 (11th Cir. 2015)).

Clarke challenges the substantive-reasonableness of his sen- tence on the ground that the District Court failed to adequately consider his guideline range. See Clarke’s brief at 11–14. We are not persuaded. The Court properly calculated Clarke’s guideline range, repeated that guideline range during the hearing, said it had con- sidered that range, and acknowledged that Clarke’s sentence ex- ceeded that range. And the Court repeatedly made clear that it viewed the guideline range as inadequate for Clarke’s fifteen viola- tions: It told Clarke that it was considering a statutory-maximum sentence because it found Clarke’s violations “so serious” and “re- ally troubling” and because of his repeated “failure to follow [the court’s] rules.” It also considered Clarke’s “background and his his- tory”—including his prior supervised-release violations and that 4 Opinion of the Court 25-13189 he’s “still breaking the rules”—and that Clarke’s violations in- volved “doing what he had done before,” i.e., accessing pornogra- phy and viewing, possessing, and searching for inappropriate im- ages of children. See United States v. Lavoie, 724 F. App’x 824, 827 (11th Cir. 2018) (noting that defendant’s supervised-release viola- tions involving the use of his mother’s computer “to access adult pornography and images of children” was “conduct close[] to that underlying his offense of conviction”—receipt of child pornogra- phy). Moreover, it considered the need to protect the public as well as other applicable § 3553(a) factors and the Sentencing Commis- sion’s policy statements.

The record shows that the District Court appropriately con- sidered Clarke’s guideline range and adequately explained—based on the applicable § 3553(a) factors—why it exceeded that range. Clarke has not shown that his sentence is substantively unreasona- ble.

II.

Upon the imposition of a term of imprisonment following the revocation of supervised release, a “court may include a re- quirement that the defendant be placed on a term of supervised release after imprisonment.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h). “The length of such a term of supervised release shall not exceed the term of su- pervised release authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in the original term of supervised release, less any term of impris- onment that was imposed upon revocation of supervised release.” Id. In determining whether to impose a term of supervised release, 25-13189 Opinion of the Court 5 courts must consider the factors listed in sections 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), and (a)(7). Id. § 3583(c). Accordingly, the factors courts must consider when de- ciding whether to impose a term of supervised release are as fol- lows: (1) the history and characteristics of the defendant and the nature and circumstances of the offense; (2) the need for the sen- tence to afford adequate deterrence; (3) the need for the sentence to protect the public; (4) the need for the sentence to provide the defendant with needed vocational training, education, medical care, or other correctional treatment; (5) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for the applicable category of of- fense and the applicable category of defendant; (6) applicable guide- lines or policy statements; (7) pertinent policy statements; (8) the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities; and (9) the need to provide restitution to any victims. Id. § 3553(a)(1), (2)(B)–(D), (4)–(7).

Clarke acknowledges that he did not object to his lifetime term of supervised release. We therefore review his objection here for plain error. Clarke has not shown error let alone plain error. We therefore do not disturb the Court’s decision to impose the term.

AFFIRMED.