Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Joshua David Nicholas

USCA11 Case: 25-12377 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 08/17/2026 Page: 1 of 4

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________

No. 25-12377

Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION,

Plaintiff-Appellee, versus

EMPIRES CONSULTING CORP., et al.,

Defendants, JOSHUA DAVID NICHOLAS,

Defendant-Appellant. ____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cv-21997-CMA ____________________

Before LUCK, LAGOA, and WILSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

The Commodity Futures Trading Commission moved to dismiss Nicholas’ appeal because it was untimely as to the February order, arguing that Nicholas had not filed any motions that would have tolled that time. We agreed and dismissed Nicholas’ appeal as to the February 4 order but allowed the appeal to proceed as to the June orders. Despite this court’s order, on appeal, Nicholas argues extensively that the district court used the wrong legal standard when it entered the trading ban in its February 4 order. But that order is not before this court.

Instead, we are reviewing the June orders, which are appeals of denials of Rule 60(b) and Rule 59(e) motions.1 An appeal of a 25-12377 Opinion of the Court 3 ruling on a Rule 60(b) motion “is narrow in scope, addressing only the propriety of the denial or grant of relief and does not raise is- sues in the underlying judgment for review.” Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Fla. v. Nw. Nat’l Ins. Co., 198 F.3d 1332, 1338 (11th Cir. 1999). We hold pro se pleadings to a less stringent standard than counseled pleadings and liberally construe them. Bilal v. Geo Care, LLC, 981 F.3d 903, 911 (11th Cir. 2020). But even as a pro se litigant, Nicholas is still required to properly brief the issues by plainly and prominently raise them, “for instance by devoting a discrete section of his argument” to them. Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted). Nicholas’ brief generally refers to the June orders as Rule 60(b) motions but does not expressly challenge any of the grounds in the June orders. Thus, Nicholas abandoned any challenge to the district court’s de- nials of his motions because he raised no specific arguments under Rules 60(b) and 59(e). 2 a Rule 59 motion for abuse of discretion. Arthur v. King, 500 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam).

2 Even if Nicholas has not abandoned his challenges, the district court did not err in denying Nicholas’ Rule 60(b) and Rule 59(e) motions. First, under Rule 60(b)(1), Nicholas failed to show excusable neglect of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s (CFTC) enforcement action because he admitted to receiving notice of the action and filed numerous pro se filings in his parallel criminal prosecution. Solaroll Shade & Shutter Corp. v. Bio-Energy Sys., Inc., 803 F.2d 1130, 1132 (11th Cir. 1986). Second, under Rule 60(b)(4), Nicholas failed to show that he was denied a notice and opportunity to be heard because he received the default letter and communicated with counsel about the CFTC’s action. Bainbridge v. Governor of Fla., 75 F.4th 1326, 1336 (11th Cir. 2023).

Third, under Rule 60(b)(6), Nicholas cannot show that exceptional circum- stances were met when the court imposed the trading ban on him. BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman, 605 U.S. 204, 211 (2025). Lastly, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying him Rule 59(e) relief because Nicholas’ motion for reconsideration raised old, previously rejected arguments. Arthur, 500 F.3d at 1343.