United States v. John Cato

USCA11 Case: 26-10548 Document: 22-1 Date Filed: 08/18/2026 Page: 1 of 7

NOT FOR PUBLICATION In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 26-10548 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee, versus JOHN CATO,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 5:25-cr-00041-MTT-CHW-1 ____________________

Before NEWSOM, BRASHER, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

John Cato appeals his 180-month sentence for firearms traf- ficking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 933(a)(1) & (b). On appeal, Cato argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. The gov- ernment moves to dismiss Cato’s appeal, arguing that Cato know- ingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal his sentence. After careful review, we grant the government’s motion and dismiss.

We review the validity and scope of an appeal waiver de novo. King v. United States, 41 F.4th 1363, 1366 (11th Cir. 2022), abrogated in part on other grounds by Hunter v. United States, 146 S. Ct. 1702, 1710 n.2 (2026). Generally, sentence appeal waivers are en- forceable if they are made knowingly and voluntarily. Id. at 1367. To enforce a waiver, “[t]he government must show that either (1) the district court specifically questioned the defendant concern- ing the sentence appeal waiver during the [guilty plea] colloquy, or (2) it is manifestly clear from the record that the defendant other- wise understood the full significance of the waiver.” United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343, 1351 (11th Cir. 1993); see also United States v. Boyd, 975 F.3d 1185, 1192 (11th Cir. 2020) (noting that the “touch- stone for assessing” if a sentence appeal waiver was made know- ingly and voluntarily “is whether ‘it was clearly conveyed to the defendant that he was giving up his right to appeal under most cir- cumstances’” (alterations adopted) (emphasis in original) (quoting Bushert, 997 F.2d at 1352–53)). “We have consistently enforced knowing and voluntary appeal waivers according to their terms.” United States v. Bascomb, 451 F.3d 1292, 1294 (11th Cir. 2006). How- ever, we will not enforce a sentence appeal waiver when doing so “would result in a miscarriage of justice—meaning, when it would leave in place the kind of egregious error that would bring the ju- dicial system into disrepute.” Hunter, 146 S. Ct. at 1708.

Cato was charged with two counts of possession and trans- fer of a machinegun, 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(o) & 924(a)(2) (Counts One and Five); three counts of dealing firearms without a license, 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A), 923(a) & 924(a)(1)(D) (Counts Two, Four, and Six), and one count of firearms trafficking, 18 U.S.C. § 933(a)(1) & (b) (Count Three). Pursuant to a written plea agreement, Cato pled guilty to Count Three. The government, in turn, agreed to dismiss the remaining charges. The plea agreement noted that the statutory maximum sentence for Count Three was 15 years impris- onment. The agreement also contained a sentence appeal waiver, which reads as follows:

Although 18 U.S.C. § 3742 authorizes defendants to appeal their sentences under certain circumstances, Defendant knowingly and voluntarily waives any right to appeal Defendant’s sentence, including the amount of any restitution imposed as part of Defend- ant’s sentence. Defendant’s sentence appeal waiver does not apply if: (1) the [c]ourt imposes a sentence that exceeds the advisory guideline range as that range has been calculated by the [c]ourt at the time of sentencing; (2) the [c]ourt imposes a sentence that exceeds the statutory maximum; or (3) the United States appeals Defendant’s sentence under the au- thority of 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b). Nothing in this agree- ment shall deprive the United States of its right to ap- peal Defendant’s sentence, as authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3742(6). If, however, the United States appeals De- fendant’s sentence pursuant to this statute, Defendant is released from Defendant’s waiver of Defendant’s right to appeal altogether. . . .

Defendant understands and acknowledges that the waivers outlined herein may result in the dismissal of any appeal . . . Defendant might file challenging De- fendant’s conviction or sentence. If Defendant files a notice of appeal . . . notwithstanding this agreement, Defendant agrees that this case shall, upon motion of the United States, be remanded to the Court to deter- mine whether Defendant is in breach of this agree- ment and, if so, to permit the United States to with- draw from the plea agreement.

Cato and his attorney signed the plea agreement’s final page and initialed each page of the agreement, including the pages that con- tained the appeal waiver.

The district court held a change-of-plea hearing, and Cato was placed under oath and warned of the penalties of perjury. Cato then testified that he was 24 years old, could read and write, was not suffering from illness, and was not under the influence of drugs, alcohol or medication. He also explained that he had not been co- erced or threatened into pleading guilty; he was, in fact, guilty of Count Three. The district court explained that Cato would be waiving various trial rights by pleading guilty and Cato confirmed that he understood these rights and was waiving them. He also testified that he understood the elements of the crime and the max- imum punishment he faced for his conviction. Next, Cato con- firmed that he had reviewed the plea agreement, signing it and in- itialing each page, and he understood that there were no promises or assurances made to him outside the agreement.

The district court then specifically confirmed that Cato un- derstood the appeal waiver. It noted that the plea agreement con- tained “a section in which” Cato was “gi[ving] up [his] right to ap- peal and [his] right to seek review of [his] sentence,” and noted that there were “some exceptions” to that waiver. He also ensured that Cato had discussed “this part” of the agreement with his attorney. The court then explained the three exceptions to the agreement’s sentence appeal waiver, and it explained each of those exceptions. It asked Cato whether he “ha[d] any questions about that?” and Cato responded that he did not. Cato also stated that he was vol- untarily giving up his right to appeal “except as stated in the Plea Agreement.”

“There is a strong presumption that the statements” Cato “made during” his change-of-plea “colloquy [we]re true.” United States v. Medlock, 12 F.3d 185, 187 (11th Cir. 1994). Given the dis- trict court’s thorough explanation of the appeal waiver provision and its detailed recitation of the waiver’s listed exceptions, we are satisfied that “the district court specifically questioned [Cato] con- cerning the sentence appeal waiver,” Bushert, 997 F.2d at 1351, and that “it was clearly conveyed to [Cato] that he was giving up his right to appeal under most circumstances,” Boyd, 975 F.3d at 1192 (alterations adopted) (quoting Bushert, 997 F.2d at 1352–53). The district court also ensured that Cato agreed to its description of the waiver and explained its conclusion, on the record, that Cato was waiving his right to appeal and had done so knowingly and volun- tarily. Under these circumstances, we will apply the waiver accord- ing to its terms. Bascomb, 451 F.3d at 1294.

Cato’s sentencing challenge—to the substantive reasonable- ness of his sentence—falls within the terms of his waiver and does not implicate any of the exceptions. See United States v. Hardman, 778 F.3d 896, 900 (11th Cir. 2014) (“The language of a plea agree- ment should be given its ordinary and natural meaning unless the parties indicate otherwise.”). Cato was sentenced within his advi- sory guideline range; the sentence he received did not exceed the maximum penalties for his offense; and the government did not appeal. Thus, no exception applies.

Nor would enforcing the waiver in this case result in a mis- carriage of justice. See Hunter, 146 S. Ct. at 1708. We acknowledge that three Supreme Court Justices recently discussed how a sub- stantively unreasonable sentence might amount to a miscarriage of justice and, therefore, justify non-enforcement of an appeal waiver. See id. at 1721 (Gorsuch, J., concurring)1 (“A miscarriage of justice would seem to arise, as well, when a district court metes out pun- ishment that is so substantively unreasonable that it would fail un- der the ‘deferential abuse-of-discretion standard’ that appellate courts already apply in sentencing challenges.” (quoting Gall v. 1 Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence was joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson. See 146 S. Ct. at 1715.

United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 51–52 (2007)). Even still, as the ma- jority in Hunter explained, an error that amounts to a miscarriage of justice “must be obvious—not one a judge could reasonably make.” Id. at 1713 (majority opinion). Cato’s arguments about the substantive reasonableness of his sentence do not show such an ob- vious error; the district court sentenced Cato within his guidelines range, discussed mitigating and aggravating factors, and focused, reasonably, on Cato’s offense conduct—namely, his “particularly” dangerous “spree of selling guns and high-capacity magazines.” See generally United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349, 1355 (11th Cir. 2022) (explaining that, while a district court must consider all relevant sentencing factors, “the weight given to each factor is committed to the sound discretion of the district court,” and it may attach great weight to one factor over the others). Considering the rec- ord, which includes the district court’s discussion of these various relevant factors, and because a sentence appeal waiver poses a “substantial barrier” to our review of the merits, id. at 1714, we discern no miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, we will enforce the parties’ agreement and dismiss Cato’s appeal. 2

DISMISSED.

2 The text of the waiver permits the government to request remand so that the district court can determine whether Cato breached the agreement and allow the government to withdraw. That said, the government has not re- quested that relief, so we do not consider it further.