United States v. Tamara Quicutis

USCA11 Case: 24-10138 Document: 88-1 Date Filed: 08/18/2026 Page: 1 of 15

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________

No. 24-10138 Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee, versus TAMARA QUICUTIS, KAREL FELIPE,

Defendants-Appellants. ____________________

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cr-20303-DPG-5

____________________ Before JORDAN, KIDD, and WILSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Defendants-Appellants Tamara Quicutis and Karel Felipe appeal their respective convictions and sentences of 70 months im- prisonment and 100 months imprisonment for conspiracy to com- mit healthcare fraud and wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1347, 1349, and conspiracy to commit money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), (h). They each raise challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting their con- victions and to purported errors during sentencing. After careful review, we affirm in part, vacate and remand in part, and remand with additional instructions to fix a clerical error.

I.

First, Quicutis challenges the sufficiency of the evidence sup- porting her conviction for conspiracy to commit money launder- ing. We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence sup- porting a conviction de novo. United States v. Nerey, 877 F.3d 956, 967 (11th Cir. 2017). The relevant question is whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). In conducting this review, “we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and all reasonable infer- ences and credibility choices are made in the government’s favor.” United States v. Mercer, 541 F.3d 1070, 1074 (11th Cir. 2008) (per cu- riam). “A jury is free to choose among reasonable constructions of the evidence.” United States v. Cruz-Valdez, 773 F.2d 1541, 1545 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc).

“The test for sufficiency of evidence is identical regardless of whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial, and no distinction is to be made between the weight given to either direct or circum- stantial evidence.” United States v. Mieres-Borges, 919 F.2d 652, 656–57 (11th Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“Concealment money laundering is any transaction de- signed to conceal or disguise the true nature or location of illegally obtained funds.” United States v. Iriele, 977 F.3d 1155, 1173–74 (11th Cir. 2020); 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). To establish a conspiracy to commit money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h), the govern- ment must prove an agreement between two or more persons to commit a money-laundering offense and that the defendant know- ingly and voluntarily participated in that agreement. United States v. Feldman, 936 F.3d 1288, 1307 (11th Cir. 2019). The government may prove this through “circumstantial evidence, including infer- ences from the conduct of the alleged participants or from circum- stantial evidence of a scheme.” Iriele, 977 F.3d at 1174 (quotation marks omitted).

Quicutis argues that the trial evidence showed she was not involved in any of the actual laundering of the Medicare fraud pro- ceeds, and thus she should not have been convicted of conspiracy to commit money laundering. She contends that the testimony in- dicated that she was “basically a secretary,” and there was no evi- dence that she “was told of the ultimate plan[] to launder the funds from the Medicare scheme.” However, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, a rational jury could have found Quicutis guilty of conspiracy to commit money laun- dering based on the circumstantial evidence presented at trial. This evidence includes Quicutis’s use of latex gloves to write checks, creating false fingerprints on the checks, working in two small of- fice apartments with her co-conspirators for nearly two years, checking patient eligibility in the underlying Medicare fraud scheme, seeing another co-conspirator carrying grocery bags full of cash into the office apartments, and her inability to tell anyone what she did or where she worked.

II.

Next, Felipe challenges the sufficiency of the evidence sup- porting his conviction for conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud and wire fraud.

In establishing the knowledge element of a conspiracy, “the government need not prove that the defendant knew all of the de- tails or participated in every aspect of the conspiracy.” United States v. Vernon, 723 F.3d 1234, 1273 (11th Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted). Instead, “the [g]overnment must only prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant knew of the essential nature of the conspiracy.” United States v. Gonzalez, 834 F.3d 1206, 1215 (11th Cir. 2016) (quotation marks omitted).

“Credibility questions are the exclusive province of the jury, and on sufficiency review we must assume that they were an- swered in a manner that supports the verdict, unless witness testi- mony is unbelievable as a matter of law.” United States v. Downs, 61 F.4th 1306, 1316 (11th Cir. 2023) (citation modified). “Testi- mony is inherently unbelievable only when it is so contrary to the teachings of basic human experience that no reasonable person would believe it beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Kelley, 412 F.3d 1240, 1247 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation modified).

To convict a defendant of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, the government must prove (1) that a conspiracy to commit wire fraud existed, (2) the defendant had knowledge of the conspiracy, and (3) the defendant knowingly and voluntarily joined the con- spiracy. United States v. Feldman, 931 F.3d 1245, 1257 (11th Cir. 2019); see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1349.

It is also unlawful for any person to knowingly and willingly attempt or execute a scheme or artifice: “(1) to defraud any health care benefit program; or (2) to obtain, by means of false or fraudu- lent pretenses, representations, or promises, any of the money or property owned by, or under the custody or control of, any health care benefit program,” and to conspire to do the same. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1347(a), 1349. “Medicare is a ‘health care benefit program.’” United States v. Willner, 795 F.3d 1297, 1306 (11th Cir. 2015) (quot- ing 18 U.S.C. § 24(b)). “The elements of a healthcare fraud conspir- acy are the existence of an agreement to commit health care fraud in violation of § 1347, the defendant’s knowledge of that agree- ment, and the defendant’s knowing and voluntary joinder in that agreement.” United States v. Scott, 61 F.4th 855, 864 (11th Cir. 2023) (internal citation omitted).

Felipe argues that the trial evidence “amounted to nothing more than guilt by association.” He contends that his personal cir- cumstances, such as his drug use and lack of proficiency with the English language, fundamentally precluded any meaningful partic- ipation in the conspiracy. We disagree.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the gov- ernment, a rational jury could have found Felipe guilty of conspir- acy to commit healthcare fraud and wire fraud based on the evi- dence presented at trial. Co-conspirator Gonzalez-Delgado testi- fied that he explained the Medicare fraud scheme to Felipe and promised him a five percent cut if he mailed a cost report on behalf of the operation.1 Trial testimony and documentary exhibits indi- cated that Felipe began receiving his five percent cut shortly after the cost report was mailed. Other testimonial evidence indicated that Felipe answered phone calls from patients, and the term “Med- icare” was used around the office daily. Felipe’s limitations would not have precluded a rational jury from finding beyond a reasona- ble doubt that he knew of the essential nature of the conspiracy and voluntarily joined it.

III.

In her reply brief, Quicutis challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting her conviction for conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud. Issues not raised in an appellant’s initial brief and instead raised for the first time in a reply brief are abandoned. United States v. Magluta, 418 F.3d 1166, 1185–86 (11th Cir. 2005). “Absent an affirmative waiver by a party, we may exercise our dis- cretion to address an issue not raised in an opening brief in extraor- dinary circumstances.” United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 887– 88 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc).

Here, Quicutis has abandoned her challenge to the suffi- ciency of the evidence supporting her conviction for conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud and wire fraud by failing to raise this ar- gument in her initial brief and instead presenting it for the first time in her reply brief. 2 Thus, we decline to address this issue.

IV.

Next, Quicutis challenges the district court’s imposition of a two-level sophisticated means enhancement to her offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C). She concedes that the overall scheme to defraud Medicare and launder the stolen money was “no doubt” sophisticated, but argues that the intentional conduct she personally engaged in was not sophisticated.

We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its interpretation and application of the Guidelines to the facts de novo. United States v. Barrington, 648 F.3d 1178, 1194–95 (11th Cir. 2011). A “district court’s finding that sophisticated means were used is a finding of fact that is reviewed for clear error.” United States v. Presendieu, 880 F.3d 1228, 1248 n.12 (11th Cir. 2018).

Under the Sentencing Guidelines, a defendant’s base offense level for a money laundering offense is “[t]he offense level for the underlying offense from which the laundered funds were derived, if . . . the defendant committed the underlying of- fense . . . and . . . the offense level for that offense can be deter- mined.” U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(a)(1). The offense level for a fraud of- fense is calculated under § 2B1.1. Id. The fraud guideline provides a two-level enhancement to a defendant’s offense level if “the of- fense . . . involved sophisticated means and the defendant inten- tionally engaged in or caused the conduct constituting sophisti- cated means.” Id. § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C).

In 2015, the Sentencing Commission amended § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C) to narrow its focus to the sophistication of the de- fendant’s conduct rather than the totality of the scheme. See Pres- endieu, 880 F.3d at 1248; U.S. Sentencing Commission, Adopted Amendments (Effective November 1, 2015), Amendment 792. In doing so, the Commission explained that “basing the enhancement on the defendant’s own intentional conduct better reflects the defend- ant’s culpability and will appropriately minimize application of this enhancement to less culpable offenders.” U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 792. After the 2015 amendment, “the sophisticated means en- hancement is both offense-based and defendant-based,” and a dis- trict court must “determine whether the defendant [herself] inten- tionally engaged in or caused the conduct constituting sophisti- cated means.” United States v. Buchanan, 146 F.4th 1342, 1357 (11th Cir. 2025).

The court applied a two-level sophisticated means enhance- ment to Quicutis’s offense level, which resulted in a total offense level of 35 rather than 33. But the district court did not provide a finding as to whether Quicutis’s own intentional conduct was so- phisticated, and subsequently, why her conduct would warrant ap- plication of the sophisticated means enhancement. Thus, we va- cate and remand to provide the court with an opportunity to ad- dress this enhancement application.

V.

Quicutis next challenges the district court’s imposition of a two-level enhancement to her offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(2)(B) based on her conviction for conspiracy to commit money laundering.

While Quicutis objected to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting Count Two at trial, she did not raise sufficiency of the evidence as a legal basis for challenging the § 2S1.1(b)(2)(B) en- hancement during her sentencing proceedings; instead, she argued that the enhancement violated grouping rules or constituted im- permissible double counting. A defendant “fails to preserve a legal issue for appeal if the factual predicates of an objection are included in the sentencing record, but were presented to the district court under a different legal theory.” United States v. Massey, 443 F.3d 814, 819 (11th Cir. 2006).

“When the appealing party does not clearly state the grounds for an objection in the district court, we are limited to re- viewing for plain error.” United States v. Massey, 443 F.3d 814, 818 (11th Cir. 2006). Plain error requires (1) an error (2) that is plain and (3) that affects substantial rights. United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1298 (11th Cir. 2005).

The Guidelines require a two-level sentencing enhancement when the defendant is convicted of conspiracy to commit money laundering. U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(2)(B) (2023). The Guidelines fur- ther provide that “[a]n instruction to use the offense level from an- other offense guideline refers to the offense level from the entire offense guideline.” Id. § 1B1.5(b)(1).

Quicutis argues that the district court erred in applying the two-level enhancement under § 2S1.1(b)(2)(B) because there was insufficient evidence supporting her guilt as to Count Two and even if there was, there was no reason to apply the additional two levels. We disagree. As we explained in our analysis of Issue I, there is sufficient evidence to support her guilt as to the money laundering conspiracy charge.

The district court did not err in applying the § 2S1.1(b)(2)(B) enhancement after applying the § 2B1.1 enhancements. Under § 2S1.1(a)(1), Quicutis’s base offense level for her money launder- ing offense was the “offense level for the underlying offense from which the laundered funds were derived.” This guideline required the court to determine Quicutis’s offense level for the underlying health care fraud and wire fraud scheme, which in turn implicated the enhancements under § 2B1.1. See id. §§ 2B1.1, 1B1.5(b)(1). Once Quicutis’s base offense level was calculated under §§ 2S1.1(a)(1) and 2B1.1, she was subject to applicable additional enhancements under the money laundering guideline, including § 2S1.1(b)(2)(B) because she was convicted of conspiracy to commit money laun- dering under 18 U.S.C. § 1956. 3

VI.

Felipe contends that the district court imposed a procedur- ally unreasonable sentence because it failed to consider his argu- ment that he proceeded to trial only because the government de- clined to agree to recommend a minor role adjustment during plea negotiations. Felipe characterizes this argument as a relevant fac- tor that was due significant weight.

We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence un- der a deferential abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Oudomsine, 57 F.4th 1262, 1266 (11th Cir. 2023).

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), “a sentencing court must impose a sentence that is sufficient, but not greater than necessary to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, to provide just punishment for the offense, to afford adequate deter- rence, and to protect the public from further crimes of the defend- ant.” United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349, 1355 (11th Cir. 2022) (in- ternal quotation marks omitted); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). A district court must also consider, among other factors, the nature and cir- cumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the de- fendant, the sentencing range established for the applicable cate- gory of offense committed by the applicable category of defendant under the Sentencing Guidelines, and the need to avoid unwar- ranted sentence disparities among similarly situated defendants. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (4)(A), (6). The weight given to any § 3553(a) factor is committed to the discretion of the district court. United States v. Olson, 127 F.4th 1266, 1276 (11th Cir. 2025).

At the sentencing hearing, Felipe argued that he should be given “points for acceptance of responsibility” because he only went to trial to justify that he was merely a minor player in the scheme. Felipe contended that the government’s refusal to recom- mend a minor role adjustment during plea negotiations was the reason he proceeded to trial. Now, Felipe argues that the district court refused to consider his argument. We disagree.

At the sentencing hearing, the district court disagreed with Felipe that it should have credited him for acceptance of responsi- bility despite his decision to put the government to its burden of proof at trial. The court explained that Felipe could have “throw[n] [himself] on the mercy of the court” and pled guilty without a plea agreement. The court did not fail to consider Felipe’s argument; instead, it indicated that the argument offered little justification for Felipe’s failure to accept responsibility, as he could have still pled guilty without a plea agreement. The court later reinforced this finding when it noted that Felipe had never accepted responsibility for his offense. Additionally, the weight to assign this factor rela- tive to the other sentencing factors was committed to the district court’s discretion. See Olson, 127 F.4th at 1276.

VII.

Felipe contends that the district court’s order that he pay $44,351,817 in restitution violated his Sixth Amendment rights un- der Southern Union Co. v. United States, 567 U.S. 343 (2012), and Ap- prendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). He also argues that the district court violated the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA) by failing to specify the payee to whom restitution is owed in its written judgment.

We review a challenge to the legality of a restitution order de novo. United States v. Robertson, 493 F.3d 1322, 1330 (11th Cir. 2007). “A district court has authority to order restitution only as authorized by statute.” United States v. Edwards, 728 F.3d 1286, 1291 (11th Cir. 2013). The MVRA requires a district court to grant res- titution to the victim of an offense “in which an identifiable victim or victims has suffered a . . . pecuniary loss.” 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a), (c)(1)(B). The government can count as a “victim” under the MVRA. United States v. Mateos, 623 F.3d 1350, 1370 (11th Cir. 2010).

In Apprendi, the Supreme Court held that, “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submit- ted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 530 U.S. at 490. In Southern Union, the Supreme Court held that “the rule of Apprendi applies to the imposition of criminal fines,” and, thus, “that juries must determine facts that set a fine’s maximum amount.” 567 U.S. at 356, 360. After Southern Union, we reaffirmed our prior holding that Apprendi does not apply to restitution orders. United States v. Gatlin, 90 F.4th 1050, 1074 (11th Cir. 2024).

As Felipe concedes, his Sixth Amendment challenge to the restitution order based on Southern Union and Apprendi is foreclosed by our decision in Gatlin. Additionally, the district court’s failure to specify a payee to whom restitution is owed in its written judg- ment provides no basis for vacating Felipe’s sentence because the court explicitly identified Medicare as the victim at sentencing.

But because the written judgment does not identify the vic- tim, we can remedy this conflict by issuing a limited remand with instructions for the district court “to enter an amended judgment that conforms to its oral pronouncement.” United States v. Chavez, 204 F.3d 1305, 1316 (11th Cir. 2000). Thus, we remand with in- structions for the district court to clearly identify the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services respectively as the victim to whom restitution is owed. 4

VIII.

Thus, we affirm Quicutis’s and Felipe’s convictions. We af- firm Felipe’s sentence with limited remand to fix a clerical error. We vacate Quicutis’s sentence and remand for further proceedings on whether the sophisticated means enhancement applies.

AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.