United States v. William Jack Filing

USCA11 Case: 25-13999 Document: 24-1 Date Filed: 08/19/2026 Page: 1 of 4

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________

No. 25-13999 Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee, versus WILLIAM JACK FILING,

Defendant-Appellant. ____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 8:24-cr-00463-VMC-AEP-1

____________________ Before NEWSOM, ABUDU, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

William Jack Filing appeals his 180-month sentence, a 30- month downward variance from the Sentencing Guidelines range, 2 Opinion of the Court 25-13999 arguing that the district court clearly erred in imposing an obstruc- tion-of-justice enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 because the court failed to make independent factual findings to support the application of the enhancement. His argument is foreclosed by precedent, so we affirm.

When “a defendant objects to a sentence enhancement re- sulting from [his] trial testimony, a district court must review the evidence and make independent findings necessary to establish a willful impediment to or obstruction of justice, or an attempt to do the same.” United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 95 (1993). If the government still seeks to apply the enhancement, “it has the bur- den of introducing sufficient and reliable evidence to prove the nec- essary facts by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. Washington, 714 F.3d 1358, 1361 (11th Cir. 2013) (citation modi- fied). Once the district court has imposed an enhancement for ob- struction of justice, we review “the district court’s factual findings for clear error and the application of the factual findings to the sen- tencing guidelines de novo.” United States v. Guevara, 894 F.3d 1301, 1311 (11th Cir. 2018) (citation modified).

Section 3C1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines provides for a two-level enhancement in cases where

(1) the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice with respect to the investigation, prosecu- tion, or sentencing of the instant offense of convic- tion, and (2) the obstructive conduct related to (A) the

25-13999 Opinion of the Court 3 defendant’s offense of conviction and any relevant conduct; or (B) a closely related offense.

U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.

The text of § 3C1.1 includes “a clear mens rea requirement of willfully obstructing or attempting to obstruct the administration of justice.” Guevara, 894 F.3d at 1311 (citation modified). A defend- ant obstructs justice by committing perjury, which is “false testi- mony concerning a material matter with the willful intent to pro- vide false testimony, rather than as a result of confusion, mistake, or faulty memory.” United States v. Duperval, 777 F.3d 1324, 1337 (11th Cir. 2015) (citation modified). We generally require “an ex- planation by the district court as to why it has applied the obstruc- tion of justice enhancement . . . .” Guevara, 894 F.3d at 1311.

A district court can satisfy this requirement by making “a general finding of obstruction encompassing all the factual predi- cates of perjury.” Duperval, 777 F.3d at 1337 (citation modified). A district court need not make specific findings as to the conduct that amounted to obstruction where “it both adopts a presentence in- vestigation report [PSI] that contains specific findings and the de- fendant fails to request that the court make more specific findings.” United States v. Wayerski, 624 F.3d 1342, 1352 (11th Cir. 2010). But “[c]lear factual findings are necessary to assess whether” a defend- ant’s conduct amounts to obstruction. United States v. Alpert, 28 F.3d 1104, 1108 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc). A sentencing court must do more than just adopt the PSI “and recite its agreement with the 4 Opinion of the Court 25-13999 arguments of the prosecutor and [its] recommendation.” United States v. Banks, 347 F.3d 1266, 1269 (11th Cir. 2003).

Here, the district court did not clearly err in finding that Fil- ing committed perjury during his trial testimony and imposing the obstruction-of-justice enhancement on that basis. The district court made a general finding that Filing committed perjury by providing false testimony at trial. It also adopted the PSI, which contained specific findings to support the application of the en- hancement. And beyond that, the court did not simply adopt the PSI without comment; it also explained that it was troubled by Fil- ing’s dishonesty while testifying. Finally, the PSI contained specific findings to support the application of the enhancement, including the fact that Filing’s testimony contradicted Filing’s previous state- ments and those of a witness. We therefore affirm.

AFFIRMED.