United States v. Haidar Abo Ayedh Almuntaser

USCA11 Case: 25-14139 Document: 24-1 Date Filed: 08/20/2026 Page: 1 of 8

NOT FOR PUBLICATION In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 25-14139 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee, versus HAIDAR ABO AYEDH ALMUNTASER, a.k.a. Abo Ayedh Almuntaser Haidar, a.k.a. Al-Muntasar Haam,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama D.C. Docket No. 2:25-cr-00018-JB-N-4 ____________________

Before ROSENBAUM, BLACK, and WILSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Haidar Almuntaser challenges the procedural and substan- tive reasonableness of his 60-month sentence for conspiracy to commit international money laundering, a 48-month upward vari- ance from his Guidelines imprisonment range. He asserts the dis- trict court plainly erred by failing to adequately explain its reasons for varying upward significantly. Similarly, he contends his sen- tence was substantively unreasonable because the court provided little justification for its substantial variance. After review, we af- firm.

I. PROCEDURAL REASONABLENESS A sentence is procedurally reasonable when the district court, among other things, duly considers the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and adequately explains its chosen sentence. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The relevant § 3553(a) factors include the nature and circumstances of the offense; the history and char- acteristics of the defendant; the applicable Guidelines range; the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, pro- tect the public, and deter the defendant; and the need to avoid un- warranted sentencing disparities. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); see Gall, 552 U.S. at 50 n.6. The district court must “state in open court the rea- sons for its imposition of the particular sentence” that it selects. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). If a court selects a sentence outside of the Guide- lines range, it must describe the reason for its variance with speci- ficity and include this reason in a statement of reasons form issued under 21 U.S.C. § 994. Id. § 3553(c)(2). “The primary reason Sec- tion 3553(c) requires an oral and written statement is so that a de- fendant can meaningfully appeal the sentence.” United States v. Stei- ger, 99 F.4th 1316, 1325 (11th Cir. 2024) (en banc). A defendant’s substantial rights are not affected by a § 3553(c) error if the record is clear enough to allow meaningful appellate review of the sen- tence. Id. A court need not explicitly address “each of the § 3553(a) factors or all of the mitigating evidence,” so long as the record re- flects the court considered the factors and the parties’ arguments. United States v. Taylor, 997 F.3d 1348, 1354 (11th Cir. 2021).

While a district court must consider the § 3553(a) factors in determining a sentence, it is not required to state in its explanation that it has evaluated each factor individually. United States v. Ortiz- Delgado, 451 F.3d 752, 758 (11th Cir. 2006). An acknowledgment by the district court that it has considered the § 3553(a) factors is suffi- cient. United States v. Turner, 474 F.3d 1265, 1281 (11th Cir. 2007). Further, the district court must set forth a sufficient explanation to satisfy us that it has “considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis” for its sentencing decision. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007). However, the court is under no duty to explain the sentence in “great detail.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1195 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc).

We review Almuntaser’s challenge to the procedural rea- sonableness of his sentence for plain error because he failed to timely object on this ground at his sentencing hearing. Steiger, 99 F.4th at 1322 (stating when a party fails to object to an error regard- ing the district court’s statement of reasons for imposing a sen- tence, we will review for plain error). Almuntaser has failed to show his sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the dis- trict court adequately explained the sentence imposed and pro- vided a written statement of reasons supporting its upward vari- ance. The court stated at the sentencing hearing that it considered all the information—including the PSI, sentencing memoranda, the § 3553(a) factors, and “everything I’ve heard here today in court”— when making its sentencing determination. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. The court also relied on several specific § 3553(a) factors in explain- ing its sentence, including the nature and circumstances of the case, Almuntaser’s history and characteristics, the seriousness of the of- fense, and the need for general and specific deterrence. Addition- ally, because the district court adopted the sentence recommended by the Government, rather than those recommended by Al- muntaser or the probation officer, it suggests the court adopted the arguments put forward by the Government as to its sentencing rec- ommendation, both at sentencing and in writing. See Rita, 551 U.S. at 356 (stating we may glean the district court’s reasoning based, in part, on the “context and the parties’ prior arguments”); see also United States v. Giron, 15 F.4th 1343, 1350 (11th Cir. 2021) (noting in the context of an 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) sentence reduction that the district court’s reason for denying compassionate release was “apparent in the record” where the government argued for denial and the district court adopted the government’s recommendation).

The district court also complied with the formal require- ments for imposing its upward variance by providing its reasoning both at sentencing and in a separate statement of reasons. Though Almuntaser asserts the court “fail[ed] to provide a detailed written statement of reasons,” the district court was under no obligation to provide “great detail” as to its reasons for imposing the upward variance. See Irey, 612 F.3d at 1195; 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2). Rather, the court only needed to provide enough detail for this Court to apply meaningful appellate review. See Steiger, 99 F.4th at 1325. Because the record reflects the court considered the factors and the parties’ arguments and because the court provided several reasons both at sentencing and in its statement of reasons to justify the up- ward variance, the court adequately explained his sentence. See id.; Taylor, 997 F.3d at 1354. Therefore, Almuntaser has failed to show the district court plainly erred as to procedural reasonableness.

II. SUBSTANTIVE REASONABLENESS In reviewing the substantive reasonableness of a sentence, we “will not substitute our own judgment for that of the sentenc- ing court and we will affirm a sentence so long as the court’s deci- sion was ‘in the ballpark of permissible outcomes.’” United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349, 1355 (11th Cir. 2022) (quotation marks omit- ted). A district court abuses its discretion and imposes a substan- tively unreasonable sentence “when it (1) fails to afford considera- tion to relevant factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) com- mits a clear error of judgment in considering the proper factors.” Irey, 612 F.3d at 1189 (quotation marks omitted). The party chal- lenging the sentence bears the burden of proving that it is unrea- sonable based on the facts of the case and the § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Shabazz, 887 F.3d 1204, 1224 (11th Cir. 2018).

Section 3553(a)’s overarching instruction is that any sen- tence must be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary,” to com- ply with the purposes listed in § 3553(a)(2). 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). In determining its sentence, the district court must make an “individ- ualized assessment” based on the facts of each particular case. Gall, 552 U.S. at 50. The district court must consider all relevant § 3553(a) factors, but “the weight given to each factor is committed to the sound discretion of the district court,” which may greatly weigh one factor over the others. Butler, 39 F.4th at 1355.

Because Almuntaser broadly advocated for a shorter sen- tence at his sentencing hearing, his substantive reasonableness challenge was preserved and is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Sotelo, 130 F.4th 1229, 1244 (11th Cir. 2025) (re- viewing the substantive reasonableness of a sentence under the def- erential abuse-of-discretion standard); Holguin-Hernandez v. United States, 589 U.S. 169, 175 (2020) (stating a defendant may preserve an objection to the substantive reasonableness of a sentence by ad- vocating for a shorter sentence before the district court). Al- muntaser has not shown the district court abused its discretion by imposing a sentence of 60 months’ imprisonment, which was a 48- month upward variance. The sentence imposed was “in the ball- park of permissible outcomes” and was based on several § 3553(a) factors. See Butler, 39 F.4th at 1355; Shabazz, 887 F.3d at 1224. The court stated it considered the § 3553(a) factors and clarified that several § 3553(a) factors influenced its decision to vary upward— the seriousness of the offense, the nature and circumstances of the case, Almuntaser’s history and characteristics, and the need for general and specific deterrence. See Butler, 39 F.4th at 1355. Though Almuntaser provided arguments in mitigation before the district court, the district court was entitled to weigh the factors it identified more heavily than the mitigating arguments Almuntaser provided. See id. While the upward variance determined by the court was significantly higher than the Guidelines range and both Almuntaser’s and the probation officer’s recommended sentences, the court justified its reason for varying significantly upward. See United States v. Early, 686 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2012) (providing an upward variance is substantively reasonable when the district court provides an explanation that is “compelling enough to sup- port the degree of the variance”); Irey, 612 F.3d at 1196 (explaining major variances require “a more significant justification”).

Almuntaser has not established the court failed to afford proper consideration to a factor due significant weight, and we will not substitute our judgment for that of the district court where the sentence it imposed was within the range of permissible sentences. See Irey, 612 F.3d at 1187 (stating we give deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors support its chosen sen- tence, and the fact that we could reasonably conclude that a differ- ent sentence was appropriate provides an insufficient basis to re- verse the district court’s decision). Nor has Almuntaser shown the court considered an impermissible or irrelevant factor or commit- ted a clear error of judgment in its consideration of the sentencing factors. See id. at 1189. Additionally, though Almuntaser received an upward variance, his sentence was well below the statutory maximum of 240 months, which is another indication of reasona- bleness. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a), (h); United States v. Goldman, 953 F.3d 1213, 1222 (11th Cir. 2020) (stating an indicator of reason- ableness is whether the sentence falls well below the maximum penalty).

Accordingly, as Almuntaser has failed to show his sentence was procedurally or substantively unreasonable, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.