United States v. Shawn Hartsfield

USCA11 Case: 26-11318 Document: 16-1 Date Filed: 08/24/2026 Page: 1 of 4

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 26-11318 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee, versus SHAWN HARTSFIELD,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 5:24-cr-00034-MW-MJF-3 ____________________

Before BRASHER, ABUDU, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Shawn Hartsfield appeals her concurrent 36-month sen- tences for 1 count of conspiracy to distribute and possess with in- tent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, 1 count 2 Opinion of the Court 26-11318 of possession with intent to distribute 5 grams or more of metham- phetamine, and 3 counts of possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, which was a downward de- parture from the statutory mandatory minimum. On appeal, she argues that our holding in United States v. Perez, 160 F.4th 1193 (11th Cir. 2025), cert. denied, 224 L. Ed. 2d 509 (Apr. 20, 2026), is contrary to congressional intent and asserts that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) allows a court to consider the § 3553(a) factors when issuing a sentence be- low the mandatory minimum. The government moves for sum- mary affirmance, arguing that binding authority forecloses Harts- field’s challenge.

Summary disposition is appropriate either where time is of the essence, such as “situations where important public policy is- sues are involved or those where rights delayed are rights denied,” or where “the position of one of the parties is clearly right as a mat- ter of law so that there can be no substantial question as to the out- come of the case, or where . . . the appeal is frivolous.” Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969).

We review the legality of a sentence de novo. Perez, 160 F.4th at 1195.

Upon a motion by the government, § 3553(e) allows a sen- tencing court to impose a sentence below the statutory mandatory minimum “to reflect a defendant’s substantial assistance in investi- gating or prosecuting another defendant.” Id. (quotation marks omitted); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). In Perez, we held that the plain text and structure of the statute, as well as our precedent, makes clear 26-11318 Opinion of the Court 3 that “[t]he extent of any departure from a statutory minimum un- der section 3553(e) must be based only on substantial-assistance factors” and that “[d]istrict courts may not vary downward based on section 3553(a).” Perez, 160 F.4th at 1195-97.

We are bound to adhere to our prior panel precedent unless that precedent has been abrogated by this Court sitting en banc or by the Supreme Court. United States v. White, 837 F.3d 1225, 1228 (11th Cir. 2016). “To overrule or abrogate a prior panel’s decision, the subsequent Supreme Court or en banc decision must be clearly on point and must actually abrogate or directly conflict with, as opposed to merely weaken, the holding of the prior panel.” United States v. Gillis, 938 F.3d 1181, 1198 (11th Cir. 2019) (quotation marks omitted).

The government is clearly correct as a matter of law that our precedent in Perez squarely forecloses Hartsfield’s argument that § 3553(e) allows a court to consider the § 3553(a) factors when issu- ing a sentence below the mandatory minimum.

AFFIRMED.

26-11318 Abudu, J., Concurring 1 ABUDU, Circuit Judge, Concurring:

Because we are bound by our prior-panel-precedent rule to apply United States v. Perez, 160 F.4th 1193 (11th Cir. 2025), here, we must affirm the district court’s decision. I write separately to reit- erate that our precedent “create[s] a one-directional sentencing re- gime.” Perez, 160 F.4th at 1198, 1199 (Abudu, J., concurring) (“As a matter of public policy, and perhaps due process, a sentencing framework that allows wide discretion to increase one’s sentence while barring comparable discretion for downward departures warrants reevaluation.”), cert. denied, 224 L. Ed. 2d 509 (Apr. 20, 2026) (mem.); see also United States v. Day, 162 F.4th 1136, 1141 (11th Cir. 2025) (Kidd, J., concurring); United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1119 (3rd Cir. 1990) (Rosenn, J., concurring) (reasoning that a defendant’s due process rights may be violated by a sentencing scheme that “replace[s] judicial discretion over sentencing with prosecutorial discretion”).