Christopher D. Jackson v. Birmingham Veterans Affairs Medical Center

USCA11 Case: 25-12390 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 08/24/2026 Page: 1 of 6

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 25-12390 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

CHRISTOPHER D. JACKSON,

Plaintiff-Appellant, versus BIRMINGHAM VETERANS AFFAIRS MEDICAL CENTER,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama D.C. Docket No. 2:24-cv-01235-GMB ____________________

Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Christopher Jackson appeals the district court’s dismissal of his pro se amended complaint alleging that his civil liberties and Fifth Amendment right to due process were violated when he was arrested at the Birmingham Veterans Affairs Medical Center (“the VA”). Jackson argues that dismissal was unwarranted because the district court failed to enforce the discovery rules in Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 and its own initial order, making it impossible for him to prove his claim that the VA violated his constitutional rights.

Summary disposition is appropriate either where time is of the essence, such as “situations where important public policy is- sues are involved or those where rights delayed are rights denied,” or where “the position of one of the parties is clearly right as a mat- ter of law so that there can be no substantial question as to the out- come of the case, or where . . . the appeal is frivolous.” Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1161-62 (5th Cir. 1969).

We review a district court’s order granting a motion to dis- miss for failure to state a claim de novo. Caterpillar Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Venequip Mach. Sales Corp., 147 F.4th 1341, 1346 (11th Cir. 2025). Denial of leave to amend a complaint is reviewed for abuse of dis- cretion, while a district court’s conclusion that amending a com- plaint would be futile is reviewed de novo. Hsi Chang v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 845 F.3d 1087, 1093-94 (11th Cir. 2017).

Under Rule 12(b)(6), defendants may move for a district court to dismiss a case because the complaint fails to state a claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Dismissal is warranted if, assuming the facts alleged in the plaintiff’s complaint are true, the complaint “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” Id. A com- plaint must include factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to 25-12390 Opinion of the Court 3 relief above the speculative level” by “stat[ing] a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable infer- ence that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ash- croft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Plausibility requires “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. Factual allegations are taken as true and construed “in the light most favorable to” the complainant. Caterpillar Fin. Servs. Corp., 147 F.4th at 1346 (quoting Cavalieri v. Avior Airlines C.A., 25 F.4th 843, 847 (11th Cir. 2022)).

Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will be liberally construed. Campbell v. Air Jam. Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168 (11th Cir. 2014). How- ever, liberal construction does not permit courts “‘to serve as de facto counsel for a party, or to rewrite an otherwise deficient plead- ing in order to sustain an action.’” Id. at 1168-69 (quoting GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998)). Therefore, “issues not briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant are deemed abandoned.” Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008).

An appellant abandons a claim when: (a) he makes only passing references to it, (b) he raises it in a perfunctory manner without supporting arguments and authority, (c) he refers to it only in the “statement of the case” or “summary of the argument,” (d) the references to the issue are mere background to the appel- lant’s main arguments or are buried within those arguments, or (e) he raises it for the first time in his reply brief. Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681-83 (11th Cir. 2014). “[S]imply stating that an issue exists, without further argument or discussion, constitutes abandonment of that issue and precludes our consider- ing the issue on appeal.” Singh v. United States, 561 F.3d 1275, 1278 (11th Cir. 2009). We will not review forfeited issues unless the is- sue is extraordinary enough to excuse forfeiture and:

(1) the issue involves a pure question of law and re- fusal to consider it would result in a miscarriage of justice; (2) the party lacked an opportunity to raise the issue at the district court level; (3) the interest of sub- stantial justice is at stake; (4) the proper resolution is beyond any doubt; (5) the issue presents significant questions of general impact or of great public con- cern.

United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 872-73 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc).

A district court typically must provide a pro se plaintiff with at least one opportunity to amend his complaint prior to dismissing the action with prejudice, but it is not required to do so if it finds that amendment would be “‘futile,’” which occurs “‘when the complaint as amended would still be properly dismissed.’” Silber- man v. Miami Dade Transit, 927 F.3d 1123, 1132-33 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Cockrell v. Sparks, 510 F.3d 1307, 1310 (11th Cir. 2007)). 25-12390 Opinion of the Court 5

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 outlines the discovery protocols in federal civil cases. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26. “Facial chal- lenges to the legal sufficiency of a claim or defense, such as a mo- tion to dismiss based on failure to state a claim for relief, should . . . be resolved before discovery begins.” Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1367 (11th Cir. 1997) (footnote omitted).

The Fourth Amendment is violated when a person is war- rantlessly arrested without probable cause, and such an arrest can serve as the basis for a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Gates v. Kho- khar, 884 F.3d 1290, 1297 (11th Cir. 2018).

A plaintiff asserting a Fifth Amendment violation must iden- tify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed rather than relying on a general claim of a constitutional violation, as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights but merely pro- vides a method for vindicating federal rights that exist elsewhere. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989) (stating that consti- tutional claims must be analyzed under the specific constitutional provision at issue rather than a generic standard, because analysis of any constitutional claim begins by identifying the specific consti- tutional right allegedly infringed), overruled on other grounds by, Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001).

Here, we grant the motion for summary affirmance because the VA has met its burden of showing that its position is clearly correct as a matter of law. Jackson abandoned any challenge to the district court’s dismissal of his amended complaint and denial of further leave to amend by not addressing them in his brief on ap- peal. Moreover, even if exceptional circumstances were present to excuse Jackson’s abandonment, the district court’s dismissal of Jackson’s amended complaint was clearly correct as a matter of law, as Jackson did not sufficiently allege specific facts to support his due process claim. And his arguments on appeal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 are frivolous because discovery had not yet started due to the pending motion to dismiss.

For the reasons discussed, we affirm the district court’s dis- missal of Jackson’s pro se amended complaint.

AFFIRMED.