United States v. Shane Barfield

USCA11 Case: 25-14264 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 09/10/2026 Page: 1 of 4

NOT FOR PUBLICATION In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 25-14264

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee, versus SHANE JACQUCES BARFIELD, as guardian ad litem Shane Jacques Barfield,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 4:24-cr-00005-WMR-JHR-1 ____________________

Before LUCK, LAGOA, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

2 Opinion of the Court 25-14264

Shane Barfield appeals his sentence of 120 months’ impris- onment for one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and one count of possession of a firearm by a person previ- ously convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), (9). He argues that the district court erred because it applied U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(c)(1)(A) and U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1(c)(1)’s cross references to U.S.S.G. § 2A2.1(a)(2) based on attempted second-degree murder without finding that he specifically intended to kill police officers.

When reviewing a challenge to the applicability of the Guidelines, we consider legal issues de novo, review factual findings for clear error, and apply the Guidelines to the facts with due def- erence, which is akin to clear error review. United States v. Rothen- berg, 610 F.3d 621, 624 (11th Cir. 2010). We are not a fact-finding body, so we do not consider on appeal arguments about whether record evidence could support by a preponderance of the evidence a factual finding that the district did not make. See United States v. Fulford, 662 F.3d 1174, 1181-82 (11th Cir. 2011) (explaining that “we will not substitute ourselves for the district court as factfinder,” de- clining to consider whether record evidence supported a factual finding that the district court did not make, and remanding to the district court for further findings).

A defendant convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm has their offense level calculated un- der § 2K2.1. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1. However, under the cross-reference in § 2K2.1(c)(1), if the defendant possessed the gun in connection 25-14264 Opinion of the Court 3 with the commission or attempted commission of another felony offense, the guideline in § 2X1.1 applies if it results in a higher of- fense level. Id. § 2K2.1(c)(1)(A). Section 2X1.1 itself contains a cross-reference that directs that whenever an attempt is directly covered in another provision, that provision should be ap- plied. Id. § 2X1.1(c)(1). Section 2A2.1 applies to attempted murder and provides for a base offense level of 33 if the object of the of- fense would have constituted first-degree murder, or a base offense level of 27 otherwise. Id. § 2A2.1(a)(1)-(2).

Second-degree murder “is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought,” and attempted second-degree murder requires a finding that the defendant intended to kill a per- son and took a substantial step towards that goal. 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a); see Alvarado-Linares v. United States, 44 F.4th 1334, 1346 (11th Cir. 2022). In Braxton v. United States, the Su- preme Court reversed the affirmation of a sentence where the de- fendant was sentenced as if he had been convicted of attempted murder, though he only pleaded guilty to lesser charges, since the stipulation he made about his conduct was silent as to whether he had the specific intent to kill, and no other evidence established that intent. 500 U.S. 344, 349-50 (1991).

Here, the district court clearly erred by apply- ing § 2K2.1(c)(1)(A) and § 2X1.1(c)(1)’s cross references to § 2A2.1(a)(2) based on attempted second-degree murder be- cause, as the government concedes, it did not make a finding that 4 Opinion of the Court 25-14264 Barfield intended to kill an officer. The sentence of the district court is vacated and remanded for resentencing.

VACATED AND REMANDED.