United States v. Johnny Smith, Jr.

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 25-12333 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus JOHNNY SMITH, JR., Defendant-Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 5:23-cr-00031-MW-MJF-1 ____________________ Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: Johnny Smith Jr., a federal prisoner serving a 120-month sen- tence after pleading guilty to possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine and possession of a firearm USCA11 Case: 25-12333 Document: 26-1 Date Filed: 09/11/2026 Page: 2 of 20

First, the District Court did not err in denying Smith’s mo- tion to suppress evidence found in his residence because the search warrant affidavit established probable cause where law enforce- ment’s controlled buy of methamphetamine sufficiently corrobo- rated an earlier tip received by a confidential informant (“CI”).

Next, the District Court did not err in finding that, given the facts known to the officers at the time they conducted an investigatory stop of Smith’s vehicle, law enforcement had a reasonable suspi- cion that Smith possessed a firearm as a convicted felon. Finally, the District Court did not err in denying Smith’s motion to suppress his pre-Miranda 1 statements because it properly found that the pub- lic safety exception2 allowed for officers to inquire about a gun in the car before reading Smith his Miranda warnings.

Accordingly, we affirm.

2 The District Court and the parties’ briefs use the term “officer-safety excep- tion.” Our Circuit precedent, cited by both parties on appeal, uses the term “public safety exception.” See United States v. Newsome, 475 F.3d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir. 2007); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655–59, 104 S. Ct. 2626, 2631–33 (1984). Because Quarles and Newsome explicitly understand officer safety as a component of public safety exception analysis, we understand the terms to be interchangeable.

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25-12333 Opinion of the Court 3 I. BACKGROUND A. The CI’s Tip and the Controlled Buy Leads to a Search Warrant Affidavit In November 2022, a CI working with the Bay County Sher- iff’s Office (“BCSO”) provided information to Investigator Stephen Pettijohn that Johnny Smith Jr. and his wife, Brandy Sue Skipper, were selling methamphetamine from their residence.3 The CI physically showed Smith’s residence to Investigator Pettijohn. In- vestigator Pettijohn confirmed Smith’s identity through BCSO rec- ords and prior booking photographs, and, using BCSO’s database, confirmed the residence was Smith’s. Investigator Pettijohn searched Smith’s arrest history within Bay County and discovered Smith had criminal charges dating to 2007, which included “princi- pal to production of methamphetamine, possession of listed chem- icals, possession of a weapon or ammo by a convicted felon, carry- ing a concealed weapon, possession of methamphetamine with in- tent to [sell, manufacture, or distribute] and numerous other charges.”

Following the CI’s tip, law enforcement organized a con- trolled buy of methamphetamine at Smith’s residence. Law en- forcement searched the CI, gave the informant money, and fol- lowed the informant to Smith’s residence. Law enforcement ob- served the CI going into and coming from Smith’s residence with

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Following the controlled buy, Investigator Pettijohn submit- ted a search warrant affidavit for Smith’s residence. The affidavit stated that the CI’s tip and the controlled buy occurred within a twenty-one-day period before Investigator Pettijohn’s submission of the affidavit. Bay County Judge E. William Dyer signed and is- sued the search warrant on November 21, 2022.

B. The Investigatory Stop and Arrest Early the following morning, on November 22, 2022, law enforcement set up around Smith’s residence and prepared to exe- cute the search warrant. Investigator Pettijohn, who planned and coordinated the execution of the search warrant, testified he de- cided to detain Smith away from his residence because of safety concerns involving the presence of firearms in the residence, the USCA11 Case: 25-12333 Document: 26-1 Date Filed: 09/11/2026 Page: 5 of 20

25-12333 Opinion of the Court 5 tactical disadvantage posed to law enforcement due to the resi- dence’s layout, 4 and the presence of Smith’s teenage children and multiple dogs within the home. Investigator Pettijohn stationed Deputy John Allen and Lieutenant David Higgins nearby to pre- pare for Smith’s departure. Investigator Pettijohn told Allen and Higgins that Smith was a convicted felon, law enforcement had a search warrant for Smith’s residence, and Smith was known to pos- sess firearms. 5 At around 6:30 a.m., Lieutenant Higgins observed Smith leaving his residence and alerted Deputy Allen. Deputy Allen fol- lowed Smith, activated his lights, and stopped Smith roughly one- third of a mile from Smith’s residence. As Deputy Allen stopped Smith’s truck, Lieutenant Higgins arrived and placed his vehicle in front of the truck. Lieutenant Higgins then approached the driver’s side window of Smith’s truck, told Smith that law enforcement was executing a search warrant at his residence, and asked Smith to step out of the truck. Deputy Allen asked Smith if he had any weapons in the truck. Smith replied there was a firearm in the truck. The officers removed Smith from the truck, handcuffed him, and read

4 Investigator Pettijohn testified that the residence could be fairly character- ized as a “junkyard.” From the dirt road outside the residence, “the house was recessed into the property . . . had a high fence around the perimeter of the property, and the interior of the property . . . was very filled with broke-down cars and scrap metal and anything and everything you could think of.”

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C. The Motion to Suppress Hearings In August 2023, a federal grand jury charged Smith with knowing and intentional possession of 50 grams or more of meth- amphetamine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(viii) (“Count One”); knowingly being a felon in possession of a firearm affecting interstate commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(8) (“Count Two”); and knowingly possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-traf- ficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) (“Count Three”). Smith initially pleaded not guilty.

On April 26, 2024, Smith moved the District Court to sup- press all items seized from his residence and vehicle and all state- ments he made as a result of his detention on November 22, 2022.

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25-12333 Opinion of the Court 7 The District Court held two hearings on Smith’s motion to sup- press. 6 At the first hearing, the Court heard testimony from Inves- tigator Pettijohn, Deputy Allen, Lieutenant Higgins, and from Smith himself.

On the search warrant issue, the District Court found the warrant was supported by probable cause where a CI’s tip about drug trafficking was corroborated with a controlled buy at the same residence. The Court described this probable cause finding as a “no-brainer” and was “astound[ed]” by Smith’s position that the warrant neither established probable cause nor created an objec- tive, good-faith basis for Investigator Pettijohn’s reliance on the signed warrant in executing the search of Smith’s residence. The Court also found that Smith received his Miranda warnings when officers secured Smith outside of his truck. In reaching this finding, the District Judge explained he “absolutely believe[d] that Lieuten- ant Higgins was telling the truth” when Lieutenant Higgins testi- fied his common practice is to Mirandize a suspect as soon as he secures the suspect in handcuffs. 7 After hearing additional arguments by both parties, the Court denied Smith’s motion to suppress evidence found in Smith’s residence and reserved ruling on the balance of the motion

6 Hearings on the motion to suppress were held on June 6, 2024, and August 20, 2024.

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The Court held a second evidentiary hearing on Smith’s mo- tion to suppress on August 20, 2024. At the hearing, it summarized the issue before the Court: There does not have to be probable cause to stop a vehicle, but there does have to be reasonable suspi- cion. The case law makes plain that while you can consider the officer’s experience and while you can consider the criminal history, that those things alone are not enough. And there’s also case law that says just because you’ve been seen with a gun before is not enough. So the question becomes when we combine those three things . . . is that enough to articulate a reasonable suspicion that [Smith] has a gun in the ve- hicle. . . . Is it reasonable suspicion, or is it a hunch?

After a thorough review of the parties’ testimony and the case law, the District Court denied the balance of Smith’s motion to sup- press. In ruling on the motion, the Court explained its reasoning: [T]he officers provided specific, articulable, and ob- jective facts based on which they could reasonably suspect that Defendant was unlawfully in possession of a firearm. Namely, the officers’ testimony, which this Court credits, established, among other things, USCA11 Case: 25-12333 Document: 26-1 Date Filed: 09/11/2026 Page: 9 of 20

25-12333 Opinion of the Court 9 that (1) they were aware that Defendant had previ- ously engaged in a suspected drug transaction with a confidential informant in the past three weeks, (2) the informant disclosed that during the transaction, De- fendant brandished a sawed-off shotgun, (3) this infor- mation was corroborated by the audio recording of the transaction, (4) they were aware of Defendant’s criminal history, including a prior felony conviction, (5) law enforcement was planning to execute a search warrant for Defendant’s home based on suspected drug sales, and (6) their training and experience with respect to suspected drug dealers alerted them to the likelihood that Defendant would be armed for his own protection given his suspected drug trafficking activities. Although the information known to offic- ers at the time of the traffic stop would not necessarily support an arrest supported by probable cause or a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt, these specific facts, in combination, provide sufficient support for a brief, investigatory stop founded upon a reasonable suspicion that Defendant was a convicted felon in possession of a firearm. This Court also finds that the officer-safety exception allowed for the officers to in- quire about a gun in the car prior to Defendant receiv- ing his Miranda warning.

On April 2, 2025, Smith pleaded guilty to Counts One and Three. The plea agreement stated that, although Smith waived his right to appeal his conviction and sentence, he reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.

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III. DISCUSSION On appeal, Smith argues that: (1) the District Court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence seized in his residence because the police’s search warrant was not supported by probable cause; (2) the District Court erred in denying Smith’s motion to suppress evidence seized from Smith’s truck because law enforce- ment lacked a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity when they made an investigatory stop of Smith’s truck; and (3) the District Court erred in denying Smith’s motion to suppress his statement during the investigatory stop that he had a gun in the truck based on the public safety exception to Miranda. We address each of Smith’s challenges in turn.

A. The Search Warrant Smith argues that the residential search warrant was not supported by probable cause because the CI had never previously USCA11 Case: 25-12333 Document: 26-1 Date Filed: 09/11/2026 Page: 11 of 20

25-12333 Opinion of the Court 11 worked with law enforcement and therefore lacked a historical rec- ord of reliability. Smith also argues that the temporal gap between the controlled buy at Smith’s residence and the issuance of the search warrant reduced the likelihood that contraband would be present at the time of the search.

The Fourth Amendment provides: [t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup- ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly de- scribing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

U.S. Const. amend. IV. For searches of a place, probable cause means a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in that particular place. United States v. Holmes, 141 F.4th 1183, 1194–95 (11th Cir. 2025). To establish probable cause, the af- fidavit must state facts “sufficient to justify a conclusion that evi- dence or contraband will probably be found at the premises to be searched.” United States v. Martin, 297 F.3d 1308, 1314 (11th Cir. 2002). The information in the affidavit must also be fresh. Id. “We give great deference to a lower court’s determination of probable cause.” United States v. Bradley, 644 F.3d 1213, 1263 (11th Cir. 2011).

Here, the search warrant affidavit established probable cause. The affidavit alleged that, within the past twenty-one days, Investigator Pettijohn had received a tip from a CI that Smith was USCA11 Case: 25-12333 Document: 26-1 Date Filed: 09/11/2026 Page: 12 of 20

The information in the affidavit was neither stale nor uncor- roborated. Smith’s argument on appeal focuses on reliability of the CI, who had never previously cooperated with law enforcement, coupled with the twenty-one-day window between the controlled buy and Investigator Pettijohn’s submission of the affidavit.

To support his argument that the CI was unreliable, Smith points to Ortega v. Christian, 85 F.3d 1521, 1525 (11th Cir. 1996), where we held that law enforcement lacked probable cause to exe- cute an arrest where it relied solely on a confidential informant identifying the perpetrator of a crime. But Ortega is distinguishable

8 On appeal, Smith argues that the affidavit was misleading because it pre- sented Smith’s criminal history of arrests, even where those arrests did not result in formal charges or convictions. However, in ruling on the motion to suppress, the District Court found that the affidavit contained no material omission with respect to Smith’s criminal history. Moreover, the District Court stated that even if it “struck [Smith’s] criminal history, the rest of the information in the affidavit would still be enough to support a valid search warrant.”

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25-12333 Opinion of the Court 13 from the facts here. In Ortega, law enforcement took no steps “to investigate the informant’s tip” and gathered “no evidence . . . which would have corroborated the informant’s identification of Ortega as a perpetrator in the commission of the crime.” Id. Here, law enforcement organized a controlled buy at Smith’s residence and engaged in covert surveillance to monitor the CI throughout the buy. Law enforcement searched the CI before and after the buy and tested the methamphetamine provided by the CI after the buy.

Here, as in Ortega, we reiterate that “the corroboration of the de- tails of an informant’s tip through independent police work adds significant value to the probable cause analysis.” 85 F.3d at 1525. See Martin, 297 F.3d at 1314 (“When there is sufficient independent cor- roboration of an informant’s information, there is no need to es- tablish the veracity of the informant.”).

Finally, Smith cites no Eleventh Circuit case law indicating a twenty-one-day window between a controlled buy and a search warrant application constitutes an unreasonable delay. Applying a rule of reasonableness to all the circumstances here, we find that Investigator Pettijohn submitted the affidavit within a reasonable time considering the necessary coordination with other law en- forcement officers. See United States v. Mitchell, 565 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2009) (accepting some delay in obtaining a warrant in cir- cumstances where the assistance of another law enforcement of- ficer was sought).

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B. The Investigatory Stop Next, Smith argues that law enforcement failed to provide specific, articulable facts to support a reasonable suspicion that Smith possessed a firearm when law enforcement searched and seized Smith’s truck on November 22, 2022.

In Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment governs “seizures” that do not result in a traditional arrest and prosecution for a crime. 392 U.S. 1, 16. 88 S. Ct. 1868.

1877 (1968). 9 A person is seized “whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away.” Id. Even in the absence of probable cause, law enforcement may stop and briefly detain a person to investigate a reasonable suspicion that he is involved in criminal activity. United States v. Williams, 876 F.2d 1521, 1523 (11th Cir. 1989). “An officer may conduct a brief investi- gative stop of a vehicle, analogous to a Terry-stop, if the seizure is justified by specific articulable facts sufficient to give rise to a rea- sonable suspicion of criminal conduct.” United States v. Strickland, 902 F.2d 937, 940 (11th Cir. 1990). “The reasonable suspicion neces- sary to justify such a stop is dependent upon both the content of The Fourth Amendment is made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 1691 (1961).

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25-12333 Opinion of the Court 15 information possessed by police and its degree of reliability.”

Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 397, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Although a mere ‘hunch’ does not create reasonable suspicion, the level of suspicion the standard requires is ‘considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a pre- ponderance of the evidence,’ and ‘obviously less’ than is necessary for probable cause.” Id. (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 1585 (1989)). In evaluating the validity of an in- vestigatory stop, we must consider “the totality of the circum- stances—the whole picture.” Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7.

The District Court was correct in finding that, given the rec- ord and the facts known to the officers at the time they conducted the stop of Smith’s truck, law enforcement had reasonable suspi- cion that Smith unlawfully possessed a firearm as a convicted felon.

In making its finding, the District Court clarified that neither the officers’ training and experience with respect to suspected drug dealers, Smith’s prior arrests, nor Smith brandishing a gun at his residence would, taken individually, support a reasonable suspicion that Smith was armed when he left his residence. When taken to- gether, however, the District Court correctly held the factors cre- ated specific, articulable facts supporting the officer’s reasonable suspicion.

Smith argues the facts considered by the District Court can- not support a reasonable suspicion Smith was armed while driving his truck to work. We disagree. Our analysis is controlled by the to- tality of the circumstances, and reasonable suspicion may exist USCA11 Case: 25-12333 Document: 26-1 Date Filed: 09/11/2026 Page: 16 of 20

United States v. Bishop, 940 F.3d 1242, 1249 (11th Cir. 2019). Here, it is undisputed the officers conducted the investigatory stop of Smith’s truck away from the residence on November 22, 2022, as part of their operational plan to execute the search warrant. Both Lieutenant Higgins and Deputy Allen knew Smith’s status as a con- victed felon. They knew that Smith had been convicted of carrying a concealed weapon.10 The officers were aware of the CI’s tip that Smith sold narcotics and owned several firearms, and the CI’s re- port that Smith walked into the controlled buy midway through the transaction brandishing a sawed-off shotgun. These specific facts, in combination, provide sufficient support for an investiga- tory stop founded upon a reasonable suspicion that Smith was a convicted felon in possession of a firearm when he exited his resi- dence in the early morning on November 22, 2022. We therefore affirm the District Court’s denial of Smith’s motion to suppress ev- idence seized from Smith’s truck.

10 While this conviction was for the concealed carry of a knife rather than a firearm, the officers were not aware of this information based on their review of the records. The reasonableness of the stop must be judged on the facts known to the officer at the time of the stop. United States v. Martin, 636 F.2d 974, 976 (5th Cir. 1981).

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25-12333 Opinion of the Court 17 C. Smith’s Statement Prior to Receiving his Miranda Warnings Finally, Smith challenges the District Court’s finding that the public safety exception allowed the officers to inquire about a gun in Smith’s truck before Smith receiving his Miranda warnings.

The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”11 U.S. Const. amend. V. In Miranda, the Supreme Court held that the government “may not use statements, whether exculpatory or in- culpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.” 384 U.S. at 444, S. Ct. at 1612. It is undisputed in the record that Smith was in cus- tody for purposes of Miranda after he was pulled over, and, thus, Lieutenant Higgins’ question about the presence of a gun in the vehicle prior to his arrest is subject to exclusion unless an exception applies. The Supreme Court has carved out a “narrow exception to Miranda for situations where there is a threat to public safety.”

United States v. Newsome, 475 F.3d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655–59, 104 S. Ct. 2626, 2631–33 (1984)).

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The District Court’s factual findings are clear and supported by evidence in the record. It found that “before [the officers] began a search, before [they did] anything, for officer safety, [they] ask[ed] about the weapon.” The District Court also credited Lieutenant Higgin’s testimony that he read Smith his Miranda warnings as soon as he cuffed Smith outside the truck. As discussed above, the officers had reasonable suspicion to believe that Smith was armed in his truck because they reasonably believed Smith sold narcotics, USCA11 Case: 25-12333 Document: 26-1 Date Filed: 09/11/2026 Page: 19 of 20

25-12333 Opinion of the Court 19 there were several guns in his house, and a CI reported Smith bran- dished a sawed-off shotgun during the controlled buy. The officers’ reasonable suspicion did not dissipate upon pulling Smith over, when they came into close proximity with Smith and when Smith’s hands were free to reach for a weapon. Once Smith admitted to having a weapon in his truck, law enforcement had probable cause to search his truck. See United States v. Tamari, 454 F.3d 1259, 1261 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding the “automobile exception” permits the search of an operational vehicle where “agents have probable cause to believe the vehicle contains evidence of a crime”).

On appeal, Smith argues that the officers’ questions were in- vestigatory and lacked a reasonable nexus to police protection. He relies on Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 89 S. Ct. 1095 (1968), where four law enforcement officers entered a sleeping defendant’s room and—without administering a Miranda warning—questioned him about a gun used in a murder at a restaurant several hours earlier.

Law enforcement then asked the defendant whether he had been to a restaurant that night, and, when he answered yes, asked him if he owned a pistol. Id. at 325, 89 S. Ct. at 1096. He admitted owning one. Id. Law enforcement then asked the defendant twice where the pistol was located. Id. He admitted it was in the washing ma- chine. Id. The Court held that the use of the defendant’s testimony, obtained in the absence of a Miranda warning, violated the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 326, 89 S. Ct. at 1096−97.

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Smith’s later statements took place after he received his Mi- randa warnings. Smith’s knowing and voluntary statements made after he received his Miranda warnings are admissible. Oregon v. El- stad, 470 U.S. 298, 318, 105 S. Ct. 1285, 1298 (1985). The District Court properly denied suppression of those statements.

Here, as in Quarles, the public safety exception is properly applied where Lieutenant Higgins asked “only the question neces- sary” to secure the officers’ safety before advising Smith of his rights. 467 U.S. at 659, 104 S. Ct. at 2633. Therefore, we affirm the District Court’s denial of Smith’s motion to suppress statements made before he received his Miranda warning.

IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District Court’s de- nial of Smith’s motion to suppress evidence.

AFFIRMED.