Charles Steven Chauncy v. Dennis Lee Gorden
Opinion
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 25-13289 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________ CHARLES STEVEN CHAUNCY, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus DENNIS LEE GORDEN, Defendant-Appellee. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 6:24-cv-00573-RBD-NWH ____________________ Before LUCK, ABUDU, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: Charles Chauncy alleged that Dennis Gorden tortiously in- terfered with Chauncy’s inheritance under Addison McNairy’s USCA11 Case: 25-13289 Document: 22-1 Date Filed: 09/11/2026 Page: 2 of 8
2 Opinion of the Court 25-13289 2007 will. The district court granted summary judgment for Gor- den because the statute of limitations had run on Chauncy’s tor- tious-interference claim. Chauncy appeals the summary judgment for Gorden. After careful review, we affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND Chauncy’s mother, Nel Morgan, was in a long-term relation- ship with McNairy. McNairy executed three wills during his life- time: (1) a 1998 will leaving his estate in equal parts to his brother and Morgan; (2) a 2007 will leaving his estate to Morgan and her heirs; and (3) a 2018 will leaving his estate to a charitable trust ad- ministered by his friend Gorden.
Morgan died in January 2018, and McNairy died in Au- gust 2018, shortly after executing the 2018 will. Chauncy peti- tioned to probate the 2007 will (which left Chauncy with McNairy’s entire estate as Morgan’s heir), while Gorden petitioned to probate the 2018 will (which left Chauncy with nothing). The probate court found that the 2007 will was invalid because one of its wit- nesses, McNairy’s friend Michael Main, testified that McNairy was not present when the witnesses signed the will, as required under Florida law. See Fla. Stat. § 732.502(1)(c). Because the 2007 will was invalid, the probate court explained, Chauncy had no interest in McNairy’s estate and therefore he had no standing to challenge the 2018 will. Thus, in July 2019, the probate court granted Gor- den’s petition to probate the 2018 will over the 2007 will. Chauncy sought review in the Florida appellate court.
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25-13289 Opinion of the Court 3 In September 2019, while the appeal was pending, Chauncy found receipts showing that McNairy, Main, and the second wit- ness had lunch together at the same restaurant on the day the 2007 will was executed. He therefore moved the probate court for relief from judgment claiming that the receipts showed that the 2007 will was properly witnessed. The probate court, however, denied the motion in January 2020, explaining that although the receipts sug- gested the men had lunch together, they did not prove that McNairy was in the witnesses’ presence at the time the witnesses signed the will. The next month, Chauncy settled with Gorden and they jointly stipulated to dismiss Chauncy’s appeal.
About two years later, in 2022, Chauncy learned about the 1998 will through Gorden’s testimony in a separate federal court proceeding. Chauncy then petitioned to reopen the estate, arguing that the 1998 will—which named Morgan as a beneficiary—gave him standing to challenge the 2018 will as Morgan’s sole heir, and that Gorden’s failure to disclose the 1998 will was fraud on the court. The probate court, however, dismissed the petition for lack of standing, finding that Chauncy had no interest under the 1998 will because it named Morgan (not Morgan and her heirs) as a ben- eficiary, so Chauncy’s interest lapsed when Morgan predeceased McNairy. Chauncy appealed, but the Florida appellate court af- firmed in December 2023, likewise concluding that “Chauncy [wa]s not an interested person as a beneficiary under the 1998 [w]ill.” Chauncy v. Gorden, 374 So. 3d 884, 886 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2023).
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4 Opinion of the Court 25-13289 PROCEDURAL HISTORY Chauncy then filed this action against Gorden in March 2024, alleging that Gorden tortiously interfered with Chauncy’s expectancy under the 2007 will. Chauncy alleged that Gorden procured the 2018 will by exercising undue influence over McNairy in the final months of his life, that McNairy did not have the requisite testamentary capacity to execute the 2018 will, and that Gorden caused Main to testify falsely that the 2007 will was invalid. As a result, Chauncy claimed, the probate court invali- dated the 2007 will and probated the 2018 will instead, “caus[ing] harm to Dr. Chauncy’s rightful testamentary expectancy in the pro- bate proceeding” under the 2007 will.
Gorden moved for summary judgment, arguing that the four-year statute of limitations on claims of tortious interference with an expectancy barred Chauncy’s March 2024 suit because the claim accrued in July 2019, when the probate court granted Gor- den’s petition to probate the 2018 will. Chauncy countered that his claim accrued when the probate case was “complete,” which oc- curred in December 2023, when the Florida appeals court affirmed the probate court’s dismissal of his petition to reopen the probate case based on the 1998 will.
The district court granted summary judgment for Gorden because Chauncy’s tortious-interference claim was time-barred.
His claim, the district court explained, accrued “in July 2019 when the court rejected the 2007 will and probated the 2018 will.”
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25-13289 Opinion of the Court 5 Chauncy moved to alter or amend the judgment, arguing that his 2022 petition to probate the 1998 will should have delayed or tolled the accrual of his claim because Gorden “fraudulently con- ceal[ed] the existence of the 1998 [w]ill,” which prevented him from filing his tortious interference action sooner. The district court denied the motion because “the 1998 will only bequeathed a gift to Chauncy’s mother, so it lapsed when she passed away be- cause she predeceased [McNairy].”
STANDARD OF REVIEW We review de novo the district court’s “application of the statute of limitations and its subsequent grant of summary judg- ment,” applying the “the same legal standards as the district court.”
M.H.D. v. Westminster Schs., 172 F.3d 797, 802 n.13 (11th Cir. 1999).
DISCUSSION Chauncy argues that the district court erred in concluding that his tortious-inference claim was time-barred because the dis- trict court incorrectly determined that it accrued in July 2019, when the 2018 will was probated. In Florida, the statute of limitations for tortious interference with an expectancy is four years, which ac- crues when all the elements of the claim have occurred. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(i), (n); id. § 95.031(1).
A claim for tortious interference with an expectancy has four elements: “(1) the existence of an expectancy; (2) intentional inter- ference with the expectancy through tortious conduct; (3) causa- tion; and (4) damages.” Whalen v. Prosser, 719 So. 2d 2, 5 (Fla. Dist. USCA11 Case: 25-13289 Document: 22-1 Date Filed: 09/11/2026 Page: 6 of 8
6 Opinion of the Court 25-13289 Ct. App. 1998). Because the beneficiary’s “hope of an inheritance is not sufficiently concrete to create a property right,” the claim can’t accrue while the testator is still alive. Id. at 5. Rather, the claim will only accrue when the “disappointed beneficiary[’s]” rights would have vested “when the testator dies or the will is filed for probate.” Id. at 5 & n.3.
Here, the elements of Chauncy’s tortious-interference claim occurred by July 2019. Chauncy’s complaint alleged that: (1) he had an expectancy under the 2007 will; (2) Gorden intentionally in- terfered with that expectancy by “excersis[ing] undue influence over Mr. McNairy,” “procur[ing] the execution of the 2018 Will in favor of Mr. Gorden,” and “solicit[ing] the false testimony of Mr. Michael Main in order to disrupt and undermine the probate pro- ceedings”; (3) Gorden’s interference caused “the probate court [to] conclude[] that the 2007 [w]ill was not valid” in July 2019; and (4) as a result, Chauncy “suffered and continues to suffer damages” from the loss of his expectancy.
For two reasons, Chauncy argues that the district court is wrong about the July 2019, accrual date. First, he contends, his tortious-interference claim is based, at least in part, on Gorden’s fraudulent inducement of perjured testimony about the validity of the 2007 will, and he didn’t discover the fraud until after July 2019.
The problem for Chauncy is that this would push back the accrual date to no later than September 2019, when Chauncy discovered the receipts that caused him to believe that Gorden induced Main to testify falsely. See Fla. Stat. § 95.031(2)(a) (providing that in an USCA11 Case: 25-13289 Document: 22-1 Date Filed: 09/11/2026 Page: 7 of 8
25-13289 Opinion of the Court 7 action “founded upon fraud,” the statute of limitations begins to run “from the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence”). That would still put his tortious-interference claim— filed in March 2024—outside the four-year statute of limitations.
Second, Chauncy maintains that Gorden’s alleged “fraudu- lent concealment” of the 1998 will pushed back the accrual of his claim until either 2022, when Chauncy learned about the 1998 will, or 2023, when the Florida appeals court affirmed the probate court’s denial of his motion to reopen based on the 1998 will. But Chauncy’s claim was not based on Gorden’s interference with the 1998 will; it was based on Gorden’s alleged tortious interference with Chauncy’s expectancy under the 2007 will. Chauncy cannot raise a new theory at summary judgment or on appeal. See Sorenson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 174 F.4th 54, 64 n.3 (11th Cir. 2026) (“The proper procedure . . . to assert a new ‘basis for entitlement’ was to seek to amend their complaint.” (quoting Hurlbert v. St. Mary’s Health Care Sys., Inc. 439 F.3d 1286, 1297 (11th Cir. 2006))). And even if he had amended his complaint to add the new theory, as the Florida appellate court explained, Chauncy had no expectancy under the 1998 will because his interest lapsed when his mother predeceased McNairy. See Chauncy, 374 So. 3d at 886. So there was nothing for Gorden to interfere with.
We therefore agree with the district court that the statute of limitations barred Chauncy’s claim and affirm its grant of summary judgment in favor of Gorden.
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8 Opinion of the Court 25-13289 AFFIRMED.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.