United States v. Alvaro Montero-Monsalvo

USCA11 Case: 25-12121 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 09/11/2026 Page: 1 of 6

NOT FOR PUBLICATION In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 25-12121 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee, versus ALVARO MONTERO-MONSALVO, a.k.a. Papa,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 8:21-cr-00377-KKM-AEP-1

____________________

Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Alvaro Montero-Monsalvo appeals his conviction for con- spiring with other persons, including persons on board a vessel sub- ject to United States jurisdiction, to distribute and possess with the intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine. See 46 U.S.C. §§ 70503(a)(1), 70506 (a)–(b); 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1)(B)(ii). We af- firm.

I.

Montero-Monsalvo and other members of a Colombian drug-trafficking organization arranged for the transportation of co- caine aboard a Venezuelan fishing vessel called the Maria Purisima. The Maria Purisima was traveling about 42 nautical miles north of Venezuela when a Royal Netherlands naval ship with a detach- ment of the United States Coast Guard aboard intercepted it. As the naval ship approached, the crew of the Maria Purisima threw at least a dozen bales of cocaine overboard. The Coast Guard detach- ment recovered more than 300 kilograms of cocaine from the jetti- soned bales.

The Maria Purisima flew a Venezuelan flag from the top of the pilot house, and when questioned, the captain claimed that the vessel was registered in Venezuela. So the government of the United States contacted the government of Venezuela and asked for authorization to stop and board the Maria Purisima and search the vessel, cargo, and crew. The Venezuelan government granted authorization as requested. Later, the Venezuelan government also waived its primary right to exercise jurisdiction over the Maria 25-12121 Opinion of the Court 3 Purisima and its cargo and crew, to the extent necessary to enforce United States law.

Law enforcement arrested the fourteen crew members aboard the Maria Purisima and transported them to Florida, where they were prosecuted for drug trafficking. Crew members and other cooperating witnesses told federal agents that Montero- Monsalvo had traveled to Venezuela to hire the captain and secure the fishing vessel for the cocaine-smuggling venture.

Montero-Monsalvo was extradited from Colombia and charged with conspiring with others, including individuals on board a vessel subject to United States jurisdiction, to distribute and possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, in violation of the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act and 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1)(B)(ii). He filed motions to dismiss the indict- ment, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction under the MDLEA and that the MDLEA was unconstitutional as applied to him. The district court denied his motions to dismiss.

After a bench trial, the district court adjudicated Montero- Monsalvo guilty as charged and sentenced him to 156 months in prison followed by five years of supervised release. He now ap- peals, arguing again that the district court lacked jurisdiction and that the MDLEA is unconstitutional as applied to him.

II.

We review the denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment for lack of jurisdiction de novo. United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815, 820 (11th Cir. 2024). We also review de novo a district court’s interpretation of a statute and its determination that the statute is constitutional. Id. We review a district court’s jurisdictional fact- findings for clear error. United States v. Gruezo, 66 F.4th 1284, 1290 (11th Cir. 2023).

III.

The MDLEA makes it a crime to knowingly or intentionally “manufacture or distribute, possess with intent to manufacture or distribute, or place or cause to be placed with intent to manufac- ture or distribute a controlled substance on board a covered ves- sel,” or to conspire to do the same. 46 U.S.C. §§ 70503(a)(1); 70506(b). A “covered vessel” is defined in part as “a vessel of the United States or a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” Id. § 70503(e)(1). And a vessel registered in a foreign na- tion is “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” under the MDLEA “if that nation has consented or waived objection to the enforcement of United States law by the United States.” Id. § 70502(c)(1)(C).

Montero-Monsalvo argues that the district court lacked ju- risdiction to convict him under the MDLEA because (1) as a Vene- zuelan vessel, the Maria Purisima was not “subject to the jurisdic- tion of the United States” absent Venezuela’s consent, and the gov- ernment’s assertion that Venezuela consented to United States ju- risdiction was not credible; and (2) he is a foreign national whose role in the conspiracy took place entirely on foreign soil—not “on board a covered vessel”—and the cocaine carried by the Maria Puri- sima was destined for the Netherlands, not the United States. He 25-12121 Opinion of the Court 5 argues that if the MDLEA is interpreted to cover his conduct, it exceeds Congress’s constitutional power to define and punish “Fel- onies committed on the high Seas,” and his prosecution violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause because there was no nexus between the United States and his conduct, the vessel, or the drug-trafficking conspiracy. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. These arguments are foreclosed by our binding precedents or by the stat- ute itself.

First, the MDLEA provides that a foreign nation’s consent or waiver of objection to the enforcement of U.S. law by the United States “is proved conclusively by certification of the Secretary of State or the Secretary’s designee.” 46 U.S.C. § 70502(c)(2)(B). Here, the district court did not clearly err in finding that Venezuela waived its right to exercise jurisdiction over the Maria Purisima to the extent necessary to enforce U.S. law because the government produced a certification to that effect by the Secretary of State’s de- signee, and because Montero-Monsalvo and his attorney signed a pretrial stipulation conceding that fact.

Second, Montero-Monsalvo’s constitutional arguments fail for reasons we have explained before. We recently held that, even if the Felonies Clause itself does not authorize Congress to punish drug-trafficking conspiracies in foreign territories, the Necessary and Proper Clause does. United States v. Pineda-Torres, 184 F.4th 1252, 1254 (11th Cir. 2026). The Necessary and Proper Clause per- mits legislation that is “necessary and proper for carrying into Exe- cution” Congress’s enumerated powers, including the power to punish felonies on the high seas. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; see Pineda-Torres, 184 F.4th at 1254. Because “land-based conspirators often ‘direct, finance, and profit from’ drug smuggling operations” at sea, the Necessary and Proper Clause permits Congress to pun- ish those conspirators in aid of its “legitimate end of banning drug trafficking on the high seas.” Pineda-Torres, 184 F.4th at 1254 (quo- tation omitted). And as “we have explained repeatedly, the con- duct proscribed by the MDLEA need not have a nexus to the United States because universal and protective principles support its extraterritorial reach.” United States v. Canario-Vilomar, 128 F.4th 1374, 1383 (11th Cir. 2025) (alteration adopted, quotation omitted).

IV.

We AFFIRM Montero-Monsalvo’s conviction.