United States v. Salim Mohamed Yehya Alsahqani

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 25-13957 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus SALIM MOHAMED YEHYA ALSAHQANI, Defendant-Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama D.C. Docket No. 2:25-cr-00018-JB-1 ____________________ Before ROSENBAUM, BLACK, and WILSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: Salim Alsahqani challenges the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his 60-month sentence for conspiracy to commit international money laundering, a 48-month upward variance USCA11 Case: 25-13957 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 09/14/2026 Page: 2 of 8

A. Procedural Reasonableness A sentence is procedurally unreasonable when the district court fails to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The relevant § 3553(a) factors include the nature and circumstances of the offense; the history and char- acteristics of the defendant; the applicable Guidelines range; the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, pro- tect the public, and deter the defendant; and the need to avoid un- warranted sentencing disparities. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); see Gall, 552 U.S. at 50 n.6. While a district court must consider the § 3553(a) factors in determining a sentence, it is not required to state in its explanation that it has evaluated each factor individually. United States v. Ortiz-Delgado, 451 F.3d 752, 758 (11th Cir. 2006). We have found the district court sufficiently considered the factors and the USCA11 Case: 25-13957 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 09/14/2026 Page: 3 of 8

25-13957 Opinion of the Court 3 parties’ arguments where the record reflected that the court heard the defendant’s mitigating argument, and the court stated that it considered the § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Turner, 474 F.3d 1265, 1281 (11th Cir. 2007). The district court must set forth a suf- ficient explanation to satisfy us that it has “considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis” for its sentencing decision.

Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007). But the court is under no duty to explain the sentence in “great detail.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1195 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc).

A district court imposes a procedurally unreasonable sen- tence where it bases the sentence on clearly erroneous facts. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. A factual finding is “clearly erroneous if the record lacks substantial evidence to support it.” United States v. Robertson, 493 F.3d 1322, 1335 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted).

Factual findings “must be based on reliable and specific evidence and cannot be based on speculation.” United States v. Newman, 614 F.3d 1232, 1238 (11th Cir. 2010). Another example of a procedur- ally unreasonable sentence is where the court fails to adequately explain its chosen sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. The district court must “state in open court the reasons for its imposition of the par- ticular sentence” that it selects. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). If a court se- lects a sentence outside of the Guidelines range, it must describe the reason for its variance with specificity and include this reason in a statement of reasons form issued under 28 U.S.C. § 994. Id. § 3553(c)(2). “The primary reason Section 3553(c) requires an oral USCA11 Case: 25-13957 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 09/14/2026 Page: 4 of 8

Alsahqani has failed to show his sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the district court considered the nature and circumstances of the offense, did not rely on clearly erroneous facts, and adequately explained the sentence imposed. As to the factors the court considered, the court stated at the sentencing hearing that it considered “all the information that’s available to [it]”—including the PSI, sentencing memorandum, the § 3553(a) factors, and the Sentencing Guidelines—when making its sentenc- ing determination. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. The court also relied on several specific § 3553(a) factors in explaining its sentence, in- cluding the nature and circumstances of the case, Alsahqani’s his- tory and characteristics, the seriousness of the offense, and the need for general and specific deterrence. Additionally, because the district court adopted the sentence recommended by the Govern- ment and stated it found Alsahqani’s Guidelines range insufficient “essentially for the reasons that the United States argued in [its] submission,” rather than those recommended by Alsahqani or the probation officer, this shows the court adopted the arguments put forward by the Government as to its sentence recommendation, both at sentencing and in writing. See Rita, 551 U.S. at 356 (stating we may glean the district court’s reasoning based, in part, on the “context and the parties’ prior arguments”).

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25-13957 Opinion of the Court 5 Alsahqani also contends the court relied on clearly errone- ous facts—namely, the Facebook Messenger communications re- lated to firearm sales that were presented in the Government’s sen- tencing memorandum—but his argument fails. To the extent the court relied on the messages, Alsahqani has not established those facts were clearly erroneous where FBI agent Carvalho attested at the hearing to the veracity of the sentencing memorandum’s fac- tual material. Robertson, 493 F.3d at 1335.

The district court also complied with the formal require- ments for imposing its upward variance by providing its reasoning both at sentencing and in a separate statement of reasons. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2). Though Alsahqani broadly asserts the court failed to sufficiently justify its upward variance, the district court explained its upward variance both orally and in a written state- ment of reasons and was under no obligation to provide “great de- tail” as to its reasons for imposing the upward variance. See Irey, 612 F.3d at 1195; 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2). Rather, the court needed to provide enough detail for this Court to apply meaningful appel- late review. See Steiger, 99 F.4th at 1325. Because the record reflects the court considered the factors and the parties’ arguments and be- cause the court provided several reasons both at sentencing and in its statement of reasons to justify the upward variance, the court adequately explained its sentence. See id.; Turner, 474 F.3d at 1281.

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Irey, 612 F.3d at 1189 (quotation marks omitted).

An upward variance is substantively reasonable when the district court provides an explanation that is “compelling enough to support the degree of the variance.” United States v. Early, 686 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2012). Thus, major variances require “a more significant justification.” Irey, 612 F.3d at 1196.

Alsahqani has not shown the district court abused its discre- tion by imposing a sentence of 60 months’ imprisonment, which was a 48-month upward variance. United States v. Shabazz, 887 F.3d 1204, 1224 (11th Cir. 2018) (stating the party challenging the sen- tence bears the burden of proving that it is unreasonable based on the facts of the case and the § 3553(a) factors). The sentence im- posed was “in the ballpark of permissible outcomes” and was based on several § 3553(a) factors. See Butler, 39 F.4th at 1355. The court stated it considered the § 3553(a) factors and clarified that several USCA11 Case: 25-13957 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 09/14/2026 Page: 7 of 8

25-13957 Opinion of the Court 7 § 3553(a) factors influenced its decision to vary upward—the na- ture and circumstances of the case, Alsahqani’s history and charac- teristics, the need for general deterrence, and the inadequacy of the Guidelines range. Though Alsahqani provided argument in miti- gation before the district court that he was responsible only for “a very small portion” of the $15,000 in international transactions, the district court was at liberty to weigh the factors it identified more heavily than the mitigating argument he provided. See Butler, 39 F.4th at 1355 (stating the district court must consider all relevant § 3553(a) factors, but “the weight given to each factor is committed to the sound discretion of the district court,” which may greatly weigh one factor over the others). And though the upward vari- ance determined by the court was significantly higher than the Guidelines range and the probation officer’s recommended sen- tence, the court explained its reason for varying upward so signifi- cantly. See Early, 686 F.3d at 1221; Irey, 612 F.3d at 1196.

Alsahqani has not established the court failed to afford proper consideration to a factor due significant weight, and even if Alsahqani made such an argument, this Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the district court where the sentence it im- posed was within the range of permissible sentences. See Irey, 612 F.3d at 1189. Nor has Alsahqani shown the court considered an impermissible or irrelevant factor or committed a clear error of judgment in its consideration of the sentencing factors. See id. Ad- ditionally, though Alsahqani received an upward variance, his 60- month sentence was well below the statutory maximum of 240 months, which is another sign of reasonableness. See United States USCA11 Case: 25-13957 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 09/14/2026 Page: 8 of 8

AFFIRMED.