Kraljer v. Snare & Triest Co.
Kraljer v. Snare & Triest Co.
Opinion of the Court
July IS, 1913, at about 12:30 p. m., the libelant, a deck hand on the tug G. M. Sorrell, was struck by an old rivet coming from the Williamsburg Bridge, across the East River, as the tug passed under it. No one on the bridge saw the rivet fall, or knew of any rivet likely to fall. The city had been engaged the day before in driving out old rivets from the top chord, and on the day of the accident in driving new rivets in their places. It was the lunch hour at the time the libelant was injured, and no work was going on.
A scaffold, composed of loose boards, was erected on each side of the chord, with upright boards on the outside edges to prevent rivets or tools from rolling off, and the scaffolds were covered by canvas, to prevent rivets or tools from dropping down between the boards. Besides this, a bag was provided to catch the old rivets as they were driven out. After that they were put in a pail, which was from time to time lowered down to the foot walk below and carried from that point to a box some
Decree affirmed.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- KRALJER v. SNARE & TRIEST CO.
- Cited By
- 6 cases
- Status
- Published
- Syllabus
- •1. Bridges 46—Torts—Deeective Bridge—Res Ipsa Loquitur. On a libel for injuries to a deck baud on a tugboat, caused by a rivet falling from a bridge as the tug passed under it, where it appeared that the city’s employes had been removing old rivets and replacing them with new ones, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies, so that the burden of explaining the cause of the accident rested with the city, although the burden of proof still remained with the libelant. [Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Bridges, Cent. Dig. §§ 108, 110-122; Dec. Dig. 46.] 2. Municipal Corporations 753—Torts—Dei-ective Bridge—Res Ipsa Loquitur. Evidence that the city had adopted ample precautions to avoid such accidents, but that its employés frequently departed from the system in such a manner as to render the falling of rivets probable, is not a sufficient explanation to relieve the city from liability. LEd. Note.—For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 1584, 1586; Dec. Dig. 753.]