SUMMARY ORDER

Daniel Jean-Gilles appeals from the district court’s denial of his motion to set aside the verdict or for a new trial and his request for an injunction against county policies on public speeches by employees. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts in the case, its relevant procedural history, and the issues on appeal.

In this case, the jury found that Jean-Gilles’ public speeches were a substantial factor in the decision not to promote him to the position of Commissioner of Human Rights but that he would have been denied the promotion even had he not made the speeches.1 Jean-Gilles argues *25that Ram Nagubandi, the person actually chosen, was not qualified for the position, and that the jury’s finding that the County would have taken the same action absent Jean-Gilles’ protected speech was speculative.2 See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977).3

The County sought a candidate for Human Rights Commissioner with either four years’ experience “involving interpersonal or intergroup relations of a nature which commonly requires training in the social-psychology field,” or six years’ “responsible management experience in a Human Rights agency or in an activity closely related thereto with respect to duties and functions,” or “any equivalent combination of the above training and experience.” Nagubandi had been Vice Chairman of the County’s Industrial Development Agency for six years, had served on the Boards of Directors of Leadership Rockland and United Way of Rockland, and was a founding member of Asian Americans of Rock-land County (AMOR). During twenty years of work with AMOR, Nagubandi had been both its Chairman and Vice-Chairman, and had helped Rockland County residents negotiate and resolve about thirty cases of alleged employment diserimination. The jury was entitled to conclude that this experience satisfied the County’s requirements.

Furthermore, there was ample evidence in the record that Jean-Gilles had a record of incompetence and insubordination entirely unrelated to his public speech. In particular, the jury could reasonably have relied upon evidence of his failure to process human rights complaints in a timely manner, his refusal to perform basic job functions such as signing letters on behalf of the Commissioner in her absence and his habit of sending hostile, lengthy memos to his supervisors about everything from his job performance to his lunch breaks. In short, the jury had ample reason to conclude the County would not have promoted Jean-Gilles even had he made no public speeches.

Jean-Gilles also argues that because his public comments involved racial matters, the jury’s finding that he was denied the promotion because of his speech compelled a finding that he was denied the promotion on account of his race. As a matter of logic, this argument is obviously wrong; one can object to speech without objecting to its content. Jean-Gilles cites no case in which any court has made the inference he demands.4

*26Finally, Jean-Gilles argues that the district court should have granted his request for an injunction against the enforcement of the County’s policies on public speech by County employees. The parties disagree whether a post-trial request for in-junctive relief that is not included in a pretrial order or a timely Rule 50(b) motion should be reviewed under a “manifest injustice” or an “abuse of discretion” standard.5 However, even assuming that the “abuse of discretion” standard applies, we agree with the district court’s reasoning in denying the injunction and conclude that the trial court’s decision in that regard was not an abuse of discretion.

The judgment of the district court is accordingly AFFIRMED.