Xiong Cheng Ye v. Mukasey
Xiong Cheng Ye v. Mukasey
Opinion of the Court
SUMMARY ORDER
Xiong Cheng Ye, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a December 19, 2007 order of the BIA, affirming the February 7, 2006 decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Sandy Horn, which denied his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Xiong Cheng Ye, No. A95 708 515 (B.I.A. Dec. 19, 2007), aff'g No. A95 708 515 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Feb. 7, 2006). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.
As an initial matter, contrary to the government’s argument, we find that Ye has not abandoned his claim for relief under the CAT. Indeed, as the agency denied Ye’s application for CAT relief for the same reasons it denied his applications for asylum and withholding of removal, his arguments presented here challenge the agency’s denial of all three forms of relief. Cf. Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 541 n. 1, 545 n. 7 (2d Cir. 2005).
A. Religion Claim
We find that the agency did not err in determining that Ye failed to establish a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of his religion. The record in this case, which does not include evidence of country conditions in China, would not compel any reasonable adjudicator to find that Ye established an objectively reasonable fear of persecution on account of his attendance at an underground church on two occasions. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). Accordingly, the agency reasonably denied Ye’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief based on his religion. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir. 2006) (withholding of removal and CAT claims necessarily fail if the applicant is unable to show the objective likelihood of persecution needed to make out an asylum claim and the factual predicate for the claims is the same).
B. Family Planning Claim
As to Ye’s application for relief based on his family planning claim, that claim fails as a matter of law insofar as it is based on his girlfriend’s forced abortion because the definition of “refugee,” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42), does not extend automatically to partners of individuals who have been forced to have an abortion. See Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 494 F.3d 296, 314 (2d Cir. 2007) (en banc). Ye’s claim of past persecution and a well-founded fear of persecution based on his “other resistance” to the family planning policy is also unavailing. See id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have eompleted our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34(b).
The government argues that Ye failed to exhaust before the agency his claim that he suffered past persecution on account of his "other resistance” to the family planning policy. This argument is without merit. While the judicially imposed issue exhaustion requirement is mandatory, Lin Zhong v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 480 F.3d 104, 119-20 (2d Cir. 2007), before the IJ and in his brief to the BIA, Ye claimed that he had been beaten unconscious for attempting to prevent family planning officials from taking his girlfriend to have an abortion. Moreover, it appears that the agency considered Ye to have asserted a claim of past persecution on account of his resistance, where the agency found that he failed to provide sufficient corroborating evidence in support of that claim in the form of medical records from his injuries. Therefore, as we can be confident that the purposes of the exhaustion requirement have been met, see Theodoropoulos v. INS, 358 F.3d 162, 171 (2d Cir. 2004) (discussing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d) and noting that this Court must ensure that the agency "had a full opportunity to consider a petitioner’s claims before they are submitted for review by a federal court”), we consider Ye's claim of other resistance exhausted.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- XIONG CHENG YE v. Michael B. MUKASEY, United States Attorney General
- Cited By
- 1 case
- Status
- Published