SUMMARY ORDER

Ortansa Miehaelesco, pro se, appeals the denial of her motion for remand and the dismissal of her complaint as barred by res judicata. We review de novo the district court’s decisions on a motion for remand, see Isaacson v. Dow Chem. Co., 517 F.3d 129, 135 (2d Cir. 2008), and on a Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, see Holmes v. Grubman, 568 F.3d 329, 335 (2d Cir. 2009). In applying these standards, we assume familiarity with the facts and the record of prior proceedings, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.

1. Remand

A party opposing removal must file a motion to remand “within thirty days after the filing of the notice of removal.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Although defendants filed their notice of removal on May 7, 2007, Miehaelesco failed to move for remand until September 28, 2007. Thus, her motion was untimely and properly denied. Even if we were to construe Michaelesco’s June 4, 2007 letter, copied to the district court, as a timely motion for remand, we conclude, like the district court, that no remand was warranted based on defendants’ failure to file appearances in state court and their purported lack of unanimity. Defendants properly filed their notice of removal in federal court, see 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a), and we identify no error in the district court’s acceptance of defendants’ form of consent to the removal, see Phoenix Global Ventures, LLC v. Phoenix Hotel Assocs., Ltd., 422 F.3d 72, 75 (2d Cir. 2005).

2. Res Judicata

Res judicata bars an action when a prior action involving the same parties or those in privity with them was adjudicated on the merits and the claims asserted in the subsequent action were, or could have been, raised in the prior action. Pike v. Freeman, 266 F.3d 78, 91 (2d Cir. 2001). This test is satisfied here. In 2004, asserting claims arising from the same facts described in her instant complaint, Miehaelesco sued the same defendants against whom she now proceeds. On January 6, 2006, the district court dismissed her complaint on the ground that her claims were time-barred. 2 Contrary to Michaelesco’s contention, this was an adjudication on the merits. See PRC Harris, Inc. v. Boeing Co., 700 F.2d 894, 896 (2d Cir. 1983) (observing that “[t]he longstanding rule in this Circuit ... is that a dismissal for failure to comply with the statute of limitations will operate as an adjudication on the merits” for purposes of res judicata). Nor is there any merit to Michaelesco’s assertion that the defense of res judicata is not properly raised on a motion to dismiss. See Day v. Moscow, 955 F.2d 807, 811 (2d Cir. 1992).

We have considered all of Michaelesco’s remaining arguments and we conclude that *574 they are without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 3