SUMMARY ORDER

Defendant-appellant Jose Mercede appeals from an order of the district court entered September 24, 2008, denying his motion for a sentencing reduction. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts, procedural history, and specification of issues on appeal.

Mercede contends that the district court’s finding that he was responsible for more than 4.5 kilograms of crack cocaine was not supported by the evidence and that the district court did not sufficiently explain why it was denying Mercede’s motion. 1 His arguments are without merit.

First, the evidence was more than sufficient to allow the district court to find Mercede’s offense involved more than 4.5 kilograms of crack cocaine. The govern *479 ment presented, inter alia, Mercede’s own statement in a proffer session that the conspiracy sold, on average, 70 to 80 grams of crack cocaine per week, multiplying the lower estimate, 70 grams, by 100 weeks (less than the total length of the charged conspiracy), yields a total of 7 kilograms of crack cocaine sold by the conspiracy, well above the 4.5 kilogram threshold at issue here. Although on appeal Mercede argues that the crack cocaine amounts the government offered are “either vague, or undefined, and clearly not placed in the context of a time frame,” Mercede did not make this argument to the district court, and we see no error in the district court’s conclusion that Mer-cede was responsible for at least 4.5 kilograms of crack cocaine, given his own quite specific estimate of the amount of crack cocaine the conspiracy sold per week and the duration of that conspiracy.

Second, the district court was sufficiently specific in its explanation of why it was denying Mercede’s motion. The district court said:

The motion is denied. I find after a hearing on the issue that the quantity of crack cocaine involved in the offense far exceeded 4.5 kilograms. Accordingly, the application of the retroactive guideline to the defendant’s case does not produce a lower sentencing range. He is therefore ineligible for a reduction of sentence.

From this explanation, it is clear that the district court credited the evidence the government submitted, including, as noted above, Mercede’s own statements in his proffer, and on that basis found that Mercede was ineligible for a sentence reduction. In light of the hearing the district court held and the parties’ submissions on the issue of whether Mercede was eligible for resentencing, the district court’s explanation of its decision was sufficient, and nothing more was required. Cf. United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 29 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that “[a] court’s reasoning can often be inferred by comparing what was argued by the parties or contained in the pre-sentence report with what the judge did” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.