*137 SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Baruch Coleman appeals pro se from (1) the dismissal of his claims alleging employment discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and state and local law, and (2) the denial of his post-judgment motion for reconsideration and for leave to file a second amended complaint. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and the record of prior proceedings, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.

1.Motion To Dismiss

“We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), construing the complaint liberally, accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor.” Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002); see also Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir. 2003). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). A claim will have “facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, — U.S. - 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

Our independent review of the record confirms that the district court properly dismissed the complaint, as Coleman failed to allege facts sufficient to render plausible his eonclusory allegations that defendants (1) terminated him because of his religion, and (2) retaliated against him after he filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Given the absence of specific factual allegations, the complaint does not support the inference that defendants are liable for the misconduct alleged. See id.

2. Motion for Reconsideration and for Leave To Amend

Because the district court properly dismissed Coleman’s complaint, and because Coleman identified no controlling decisions or facts that the district court overlooked in doing so, we cannot conclude that the denial of his motion for reconsideration was an abuse of discretion. See Devlin v. Transp. Commc’ns Int’l Union, 175 F.3d 121, 131-32 (2d Cir. 1999) (reviewing motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion). Nor can we conclude that the district court abused its discretion in denying Coleman leave to amend. The district court afforded Coleman one opportunity to amend the complaint, and Coleman made no specific showing as to how he would cure the defects that persisted if given a second opportunity to amend. See ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 108 (2d Cir. 2007) (reviewing denial of leave to amend for abuse of discretion).

3. Conclusion

We have considered Coleman’s remaining arguments on appeal and conclude that they lack merit. Accordingly, the district court’s February 5, 2009 judgment and March 3, 2009 order are AFFIRMED.