SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-appellant Lucille A. Roussin obtained health insurance through the AARP Insurance Plan, a trust created by AARP, Inc. to provide health insurance to AARP members. Roussin brought this purported class action asserting claims of breach of fiduciary duty against AARP, Inc., the AARP Insurance Plan, and the Plan’s trustees (collectively “defendants”). She alleges, principally, that defendants were grossly negligent and breached their fiduciary duties by charging health insurance rates that included an “allowance to AARP for its sponsorship of the insurance program and for use of AARP trademarks and services.” Roussin v. AARP, Inc., 664 F.Supp.2d 412, 413-14 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).

The District Court dismissed Roussin’s complaint on the ground that it was barred by the Filed Rate Doctrine, which “ ‘bars suits against regulated utilities grounded on the allegation that the rates charged by the utility are unreasonable.’ ” Id. at 415 (quoting Wegoland Ltd. v. NYNEX Corp., 27 F.3d 17, 18 (2d Cir. 1994)). The District Court observed that the AARP Insurance Plan rates had been approved by the New York State Department of Insurance (N.Y.SDI). Id. at 415. The Court also noted that “New York courts have routinely applied the filed rate doctrine to bar plaintiffs’ claims seeking the recovery of insurance premiums that have been approved by the NYSDI.” Id. at 416 (collecting cases). The Court held, as a result, that the filed rated doctrine barred this action because Roussin’s claims were “all premised upon an underlying challenge to [the AARP Insurance Plan] rates.” Id. at 416.

Roussin filed a timely appeal. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of this action, and the issues raised on appeal.

We conduct a de novo review of an order dismissing claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Stuto v. Fleishman, 164 F.3d 820, 824-25 (2d Cir. 1999). Undertaking that review, we affirm the dismissal of this action for substantially the reasons set forth in the District Court’s well-reasoned opinion.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the September 30, 2009 judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.