SUMMARY ORDER

Pro se plaintiff Alfred Mancuso appeals from the dismissal of his complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and access to the courts. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and record of prior proceedings, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.

We review de novo a judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c), see Hardy v. N.Y. City Health & Hosps. Corp., 164 F.3d 789, 792 (2d Cir. 1999), under the same standard applicable to a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), see Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 157 n. 4 (2d Cir. 2010). Thus, we must accept the factual allegations contained in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Gill v. Pidlypchak, 389 F.3d 379, 384 (2d Cir. 2004). Although we liberally construe a pro se complaint, see Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006), it must plead sufficient facts “to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)); see also Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) (applying Iqbal and Twornbly to pro se complaint). Mancuso fails to satisfy this pleading burden.

Mancuso’s claims appear to be predicated in the main on the invalidity of the indictment underlying his 1978 felony murder conviction. Because success on such claims “would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence,” a precondition to their pursuit was a pleading that Mancuso’s underlying conviction had been reversed, expunged, invalidated, or impugned. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-89, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). This “favorable termination rule” applies with equal force “no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief) [or] the target of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct-leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings).” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82, 125 S.Ct. 1242, 161 L.Ed.2d 253 (2005); see also Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 646-48, 117 S.Ct. 1584, 137 L.Ed.2d 906 (1997) (applying Heck rule to claims for declaratory relief). Because Mancuso does not allege that his conviction has been overturned or declared invalid, he fails to satisfy the “favorable termination rule.”

We need not here decide whether Man-cuso’s allegation about the denial of access to grand jury minutes might nevertheless state a due process claim falling outside Heck because such a claim would, in any event, be untimely. Mancuso’s complaint alleges that he was denied access to grand jury records in 2002. His complaint, filed in 2007, thus falls well outside the three-year statute of limitations for § 1983 claims brought in New York. See Patterson v. County of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 225 (2d Cir. 2004); Veal v. Geraci, 23 F.3d 722, 724 (2d Cir. 1994).

Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed the complaint.

We have considered Mancuso’s remaining arguments on appeal and conclude that they are without merit. Accordingly, the *62 judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.