SUMMARY ORDER

Pro se plaintiff Emmanuel Etere, a former provisional employee of the New York City Department of Corrections (“DOC”), appeals from the district court’s dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) of his complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that defendants deprived him of a property interest without due process of law by suspending him and terminating his employment. 1 We review such a dismissal de novo, “construing the complaint liberally, accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor.” Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002). In applying this standard, we assume familiarity with the facts and the record of prior proceedings, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.

A plaintiff asserting a procedural due process claim under § 1983 must show that “a government entity deprived [him] of a right secured by law.” Finley v. Giacobbe, 79 F.3d 1285, 1296 (2d Cir. 1996). A property interest in employment may be the subject of a due process claim only if the plaintiff has “a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” Board of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). Such an interest is established not by the Constitution but by “existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law-rules....” Id.

Under New York law, a provisional employee “has no property rights in his position and may be lawfully discharged without a hearing and without any stated specific reason.” Finley v. Giacobbe, 79 F.3d at 1297 (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Brennan v. N.Y. City Bd. of Educ., 260 F.3d 123, 130 (2d Cir. 2001). Further, because a provisional employee has “no property interest in the employment, there can be no property interest in the procedures that follow from the employment.” Jannsen v. Condo, 101 F.3d 14, 16 (2d Cir. 1996).

Etere concedes that he was a provisional employee. As such, he lacked a property interest either in his employment or in any related procedural protections, such as notice of the reasons for his suspension or a pre-termination hearing. Thus, Etere cannot state a claim for the deprivation of property without due process based on defendants’ failure to afford him such protections. Nor can Etere state a due process claim for retaliation based on his assertion of procedural rights that he did not possess. 2 Accordingly, his complaint was properly dismissed.

*26 We have considered Etere’s other arguments on appeal, and we conclude that they are without merit. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.