SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff Bruce Sweeper, pro se and incarcerated, alleges that defendants, employees of the New York State Department of Correctional Services (“DOCS”), violated the First Amendment of the United States Constitution by placing him in the Special Housing Unit for refusing to comply with an order to desist from praying while working on his shift in the mess hall on October 17, 2005, during the Muslim holiday of Ramadan. Sweeper sued defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The District Court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and Sweeper filed a timely appeal. On appeal, Sweeper moves for (1) injunctive relief against Superintendent Taylor and (2) monetary relief against Officers McBride and McCoy. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review orders granting summary judgment de novo, and affirming only if the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, reveals no genuine issue of material fact. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Redd v. Wright, 597 F.3d 532, 535-36 (2d Cir. 2010).

With regard to his claims for monetary relief against Officers McBride and McCoy, Sweeper does not challenge the District Court’s dismissal of his claim against Officer McBride and has therefore abandoned any such challenge. See Lo- *82 Sacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 92-93 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that issues not raised by a pro se litigant in an appellate brief are abandoned). With respect to Sweeper’s claim against Officer McCoy, having conducted an independent de novo review, we hold, for substantially the reasons stated by the District Court in its well-reasoned opinion, Sweeper v. Taylor, No. 906-CV-379, 2009 WL 815911 (N.D.N.Y. Mar.27, 2009), that McCoy was entitled to qualified immunity when he issued Sweeper a misbehavior report for disobeying an order to desist from praying.

Finally, Sweeper’s claims for injunctive relief against Superintendent Taylor are moot as a result of Sweeper’s transfer from Gouverneur Correctional Facility to another facility. “It is settled in this Circuit that a transfer from a prison facility moots an action for injunctive relief against the transferring facility.” Prins v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 504, 506 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Thompson v. Choinski, 525 F.3d 205, 209 (2d Cir. 2008) (affirming the dismissal of a prisoner’s claims for kosher food and access to the prison library because he had been transferred to a different facility).

CONCLUSION

We have considered each of Sweeper’s arguments on appeal and find them to be without merit. For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court and DENY Sweeper’s motion for injunctive and monetary relief.