SUMMARY ORDER

Li Hu He, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a September 10, 2009, order of the BIA denying his motion to reopen. In re Li Hu He, No. A073 188 637 (B.I.A. Sept. 10, 2009). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of this case.

We review the BIA’s denial of He’s motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir. 2006). An alien may only file one motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the final administrative decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). He’s motion was indisputably untimely, as it was filed more than six years after the BIA issued a final order in the case. Nonetheless, there is no time or numerical limitation if the alien establishes materially “changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h).

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that He failed to demonstrate a material change in country conditions with respect to the Chinese government’s treatment of unregistered house church members. At his 2001 hearing, He submitted the 1998 State Department Profile of Asylum Claims for China. The Profile stated that “[Unregistered religious activity is illegal and is a punishable offense.” It also reported “expectations of continued or increased repression of unofficial Christian groups.” With his motion to reopen, He submitted the 2007 International Religious Freedom Report for China, which stated that “respect for freedom of religion remained poor.” The 2007 Report also noted that while “some local authorities continued to harass religious groups that did not register,” in other areas, “supervision ... was less stringent and registered and unregistered churches coexisted openly,” and that “[a]s in past years, local authorities took steps to repress unregistered religious groups.” In addition, the newspaper articles He submitted showed instances of repression of particular groups of house church members, but did not establish that the Chinese government’s treatment of Christians has materially changed since his prior hearing, with one article specifically noting that “repression against unofficial church groups varies by region.” Therefore, even assuming that some of He’s evidence indicated an increase in persecution of Christians, the BIA’s decision was not an abuse of discretion. See Ke Zhen Zhao v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 265 F.3d 83, 93 (2d Cir. 2001); see also Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 171 (2d Cir. 2008) (“we do not ourselves attempt to resolve conflicts in record evidence, a task largely within the discretion of the agency”); Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 342 (2d Cir. 2006) (the weight afforded to the evidence lies largely within the agency’s discretion). Furthermore, contrary to He’s argument, the BIA’s failure to provide a “reasoned analysis” of the evidence *93 in the record was also not an abuse of discretion. See Wei Guang Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 275 (2d Cir. 2006) (the BIA need not “expressly parse or refute on the record each individual argument or piece of evidence offered by the petitioner,” and may consider evidence of changed country conditions “in summary fashion without a reviewing court presuming that it has abused its discretion” (internal quotations omitted)); see also Xiao Ji Chen, 471 F.3d at 338 n. 17 (“[W]e presume that [the agency] has taken into account all of the evidence before [it], unless the record compellingly suggests otherwise.”). 1

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).