SUMMARY ORDER

Defendant Felix DeJesus, who was convicted following a jury trial of one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 1,000 grams or more of heroin and one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of crack cocaine, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), 846, challenges the substantive reasonableness of his 300-month sentence, imposed after remand from this court pursuant to United States v. Regalado, 518 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2008). See United States v. Rosario, 280 Fed.Appx. 78, 80 (2d Cir. 2008) (instructing district court to consider whether it would have imposed non-Guidelines sentence in light of discretion to deviate from crack cocaine Guideline and inviting consideration of disparity in sentences imposed on DeJesus and his brother). We review the reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of discretion and will “set aside a district court’s substantive determination only in exceptional cases where the trial court’s decision cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.” United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 189 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc) (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Rigas, 490 F.3d 208, 238 (2d Cir. 2007). In undertaking this review, we assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and record of prior proceedings, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.

DeJesus submits that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because it is greater than necessary to achieve the goals of sentencing and fails adequately to account for his disadvantaged youth, the brevity of his previous terms of incarceration, and his steps toward rehabilitation. We are not persuaded.

*831 The challenged 300-month sentence reflects a five-year reduction from the thirty-year prison term originally imposed. That reduction was made in consideration of Dejesus’s claim that the original thirty-year term sentenced him to twenty months more imprisonment than his brother, whose criminal history category and offense level were higher and who also played a significant a role in the charged conspiracy. See United States v. Rosario, 280 Fed.Appx. at 80. 1 The district court plainly considered and credited Dejesus’s rehabilitation efforts when, at the original sentencing, it cited this ground to support a downward departure from offense level 43 to 42. As for the remaining mitigating factors, the district court considered them outweighed by the defendant’s long criminal record, history of violence, and supervisory role in what the district court described as “one of the worst drug conspiracies” to have operated in the Bridgeport area. Sent’g Tr. at 72; United States v. DeJesus, No. 00 Cr. 227 (D.Conn. Apr. 30, 2007) (Ruling and Order Regarding Crosby Remand, at 2). This assessment was informed by insight gained from three trials pertaining to the charged conspiracy and the imposition of dozens of sentences on members of the criminal scheme. In these circumstances, we conclude that the district court acted well within its discretion in imposing the challenged sentence, see Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51-52, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007) (discussing institutional advantages of district court); accord United States v. Jones, 531 F.3d 163, 170-71 (2d Cir. 2008), and we reject the claim of substantive unreasonableness as without merit, see United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d at 189.

We have considered Dejesus’s other arguments on appeal and conclude that they are without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.