SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Mark W. Levóla, pro se and incarcerated, appeals the district court’s order denying his motion for injunctive relief. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal, and repeat them only where necessary below.

We have jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal because Levóla challenges the distinct court’s denial of his motion for injunctive relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (“[T]he courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from ... [interlocutory orders of the district courts ... refusing ... injunctions.”); accord Lynch v. City of New York, 589 F.3d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 2009). We review the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion. See Alleyne v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t, 516 F.3d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 2008). Ordinarily, “a party seeking a preliminary injunction [must] show (a) irreparable harm and (b) either (1) likelihood of success on the merits or (2) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly toward the party requesting the preliminary relief.” Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd., 598 F.3d 30, 35 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotations omitted). A party, like Levóla, however, who seeks “a ‘mandatory’ injunction — that is ... an injunction that will alter rather than maintain the status quo — ... must meet the more rigorous standard of demonstrating a ‘clear’ or ‘substantial’ likelihood of success on the merits.” Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 47 (2d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).

Levóla sought an order from the district court compelling the Defendants to admit him as a patient at a specific hospital. The district court denied his motion, finding that Levóla had failed to demonstrate both irreparable harm and a likelihood of success on the merits. We agree.

Accepting as true the allegations in Levola’s complaint, Levóla did not allege any facts to suggest that he faced a serious and immediate danger of irreparable harm. Indeed, Levóla claimed that he began receiving deficient medical care in 2004, but he did not file his complaint until 2009, well after many of the events he identified had' occurred. See Hirschfeld v. Bd. of Elections, 984 F.2d 35, 39 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that a party’s delay in seeking an injunctive relief “severely undermines [its] argument that absent a stay irreparable harm w[ill] result”); see also Majorica, S.A. v. R.H. Macy & Co., 762 F.2d 7, 8 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding that plaintiff had failed to show irreparable harm because it waited seven months to seek an injunction).

Therefore, the district court appropriately concluded that Levóla failed to show that he faced an immediate danger of irreparable harm, and we affirm the district court’s order on that basis. See Grand River Enter. Six Nations, Ltd. v. Pryor, 481 F.3d 60, 67-68 (2d Cir. 2007) (affirming lower court’s denial of preliminary injunc *566 tion because movant failed to demonstrate irreparable injury).

For the foregoing reasons, the order of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.