Lesch v. United States

SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Anthony R. Lesch appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for reconsideration of its decision dismissing his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts, proceedings below, and specification of appellate issues and hold as follows.

The standard of review of a district court order granting or denying a motion for relief from a final judgment is whether the order constituted an abuse of discretion. See Devlin v. Transp. Commc’ns Int’l Union, 175 F.3d 121, 132 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting the same abuse-of-discretion review for Rules 59(e) and 60(b)). “A district court would necessarily abuse its discretion if it based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.” Transaero, Inc. v. La Fuerza Aerea Boliviana, 162 F.3d 724, 729 (2d Cir. 1998). A *183 motion for relief from a judgment is generally not favored and is granted only upon a showing of exceptional circumstances. Pichardo v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 46, 55 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Intl. Bhd. of Teamsters, 247 F.3d 370, 391 (2d Cir. 2001)). “[Reconsideration will generally be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked — matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court.” Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995). Thus, a motion to reconsider should not be granted where the moving party is solely attempting to relitigate an issue that already has been decided. Id. Here, the district court properly found that Lesch sought only to re-argue his previously submitted claims. Thus, the reconsideration motion was correctly denied, and Lesch’s appeal is without merit. See id.; Transaero, 162 F.3d at 729.

To the extent Lesch can challenge the district court’s failure to allow him to re-plead upon its sua sponte dismissal, see Digitel, Inc. v. MCI Worldcom, Inc., 239 F.3d 187, 189 n. 2 (2d Cir. 2001), such a claim is unavailing. A district court need not grant a pro se plaintiff leave to amend if it can rule out any possibility, however unlikely it might be, that an amended complaint would succeed. See Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000); Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795-96 (2d Cir. 1999). Although the district court did not expressly consider the propriety of allowing Lesch leave to amend, an amendment would have been futile, as Lesch sought compensation for property that was forfeited pursuant to a judgment to which he consented in connection with his conviction for production of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251. Thus, Lesch has no non-frivolous challenge to the district court’s dismissal of his complaint. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.