New v. Pelosi

SUMMARY ORDER

Brandon New appeals pro se the dismissal of his complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). We review such a dismissal de novo, “construing the complaint liberally, accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor.” Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002). The presumption of veracity accorded factual allegations does not, however, extend to “legal conclusions.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, — U.S. -, -, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Further, to survive dismissal, a complaint must state a plausible claim for relief. See id.; Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009). In applying these standards, we assume familiarity with the facts and procedural history.

Like the district court, we conclude that New’s complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. New has not established standing to sue on behalf of any other voters, see W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co., LLC v. Deloitte & Touche LLP, 549 F.3d 100, 109-10 (2d Cir. 2008), and offers no claim that his own right to vote was abridged on the basis of race or sex. Thus, he fails to allege a cognizable violation of the Fifteenth or Nineteenth Amendment. Even construed liberally as alleging a Fourteenth Amendment violation, see Triestvicm v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006), New’s complaint states no plausible claim for relief, see Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 376-81, 83 S.Ct. 801, 9 L.Ed.2d 821 (1963).

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.