SUMMARY ORDER

This Court reviews the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. See Young v. County of Fulton, 160 F.3d 899, 902 (2d Cir. 1998). In doing so, this Court is required to construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and to draw all reasonable inferences in its favor. See Anderson v. Liber *151 ty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to defendants Robert King and John Craine for substantially the same reasons stated by the district court in its September 8, 2008, 2008 WL 4179690, opinion. The district court had previously granted the State University of New York’s (“SUNY”) motion for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff Mark Syrkin’s complaint was not timely. As the Title VII claim against SUNY is based on the same facts and decided under the same standard as the Section 1983 claims against King and Craine, we need not decide the timeliness issues; instead we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment for SUNY on the alternative merits grounds as stated in the September 8, 2008 opinion. See Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 159 (2d Cir. 2004) (“The elements of one are generally the same as the elements of the other and the two must stand or fall together.”); Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 239 F.3d 456, 466 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[W]e may affirm a grant of summary judgment for different reasons than those relied upon by the district court.”).

Finding no merit in Syrkin’s remaining arguments, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.