SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff Chukwumeziri N. Ezuma appeals from an award of summary judgment in favor of defendants on Ezuma’s claims of unlawful retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., the First Amendment, and corresponding state and local law. On de novo review, we consider the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Havey v. Homebound Mortgage, Inc., 547 F.3d 158, 163 (2d Cir. 2008). Nevertheless, plaintiff must point to more than a mere “scintilla” of favorable evidence to demonstrate the triable issue of material fact necessary to *180 defeat summary judgment. Id.; see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In applying these principles, we assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and the record of prior proceedings, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision.

We affirm for substantially the reasons stated in the district court’s thorough and well-reasoned opinion. See Ezuma v. City University of New York, 665 F.Supp.2d 116 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). We write briefly only to explain our independent determination that Ezuma’s speech regarding a colleague’s inadequate credentials did not address a matter of public concern.

“Whether an employee’s speech addresses a matter of public concern is a question of law for the court to decide, taking into account the content, form, and context of a given statement as revealed by the whole record.” Lewis v. Cowen, 165 F.3d 154, 163 (2d Cir. 1999). As we recently observed, “[t]he heart of the matter is whether the employee’s speech was calculated to redress personal grievances or whether it had a broader public purpose.” Ruotolo v. City of New York, 514 F.3d 184, 189 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, the record evidence demonstrates — at best — that Ezuma’s challenge to his colleague’s credentials was intended to express his personal dissatisfaction with CUNY’s choice of an acting chair and the implications of that choice on his department’s image. Accordingly, on the particular facts of this case, Ezuma’s colleague’s failure to obtain a doctoral degree from a properly accredited university was a matter of concern within the academic community and not the public at large. As Ezu-ma’s speech did not pertain to a matter of public concern, he had no First Amendment claim based on his employer’s reaction to the speech. See Garcetti v. Cebal-los, 547 U.S. 410, 418, 126 S.Ct. 1951, 164 L.Ed.2d 689 (2006); Williams v. Toum of Greenburgh, 535 F.3d 71, 76-77 (2d Cir. 2008). Defendants were therefore properly awarded summary judgment on these claims.

We have considered Ezuma’s remaining arguments and conclude that they are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, as well as those stated by the district court, the March 30, 2009 judgment is AFFIRMED.