SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Mei Fang Ren, a native and citizen of China, seeks review of the Octo *262 ber 31, 2007 order of the BIA denying her motion to remand and affirming the April 10, 2006 decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Alan L. Page denying her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Mei Fang Ren, No. A 097 390 656 (B.I.A. Oct. 31, 2007), aff'g No. A 097 390 656 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City April 10, 2006). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we consider both the IJ’s and BIA’s opinions “for the sake of completeness.” Zaman v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 233, 237 (2d Cir. 2008). The applicable standards of review are well-established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); See also Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009).

As a preliminary matter, Ren’s brief does not challenge the agency’s findings that she failed to establish a well-founded fear of persecution or torture on account of: (1) the birth of her first U.S. citizen child; or (2) her illegal departure from China. Ren has therefore waived any challenge to those findings. See Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 541 n. 1, 545 n. 7 (2d Cir. 2005).

The IJ rejected Ren’s political-opinion claim after finding her not credible. Ren argues that the IJ erroneously relied on her airport and credible fear interviews as a basis for the adverse credibility determination; however, there is a “sufficiently accurate record” of these interviews to merit consideration in determining her credibility. See Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 179 (2d Cir. 2004); Ming Zhang v. Holder, 585 F.3d 715, 724-25 (2d Cir. 2009). As to Ren’s assertion that the IJ erroneously relied on omissions and inconsistencies that did not go to the heart of her claim, the cumulative effect of those discrepancies constitutes substantial evidence for the adverse credibility determination. See Tu Lin v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 395, 402 (2d Cir. 2006). The IJ therefore did not err in denying Ren’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief to the extent her claim was based on alleged difficulties with Chinese authorities. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir. 2006).

Ren also argues that the BIA erred in denying her motion to remand because: (1) it applied the wrong legal standard; and (2) “the existence of U.S. born children is sufficient under the prima facie evidence standard for a remand.” We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to remand for abuse of discretion. Li Yong Cao v. Dep’t of Justice, 421 F.3d 149, 157 (2d Cir. 2005). The BIA did not abuse its discretion. We have previously reviewed the BIA’s consideration of evidence similar to that which Ren submitted and have found no error in its conclusion that such evidence is insufficient to establish a reasonable possibility of persecution. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169-72 (2d Cir. 2008); see also Wei Guang Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 275 (2d Cir. 2006). Therefore, even if we were to credit Ren’s argument that the BIA applied the improper legal standard, remand would be futile because she did not establish her prima facie eligibility for relief.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34(b).