SUMMARY ORDER

The district court dismissed Astra Media’s claim that Clear Channel engaged in predatory pricing in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2. We review dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo. Famous Horse Inc. v. 5th Ave. Photo Inc., 624 F.3d 106, 108 (2d Cir. 2010). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must comport with the minimal requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, — U.S. —, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Although Rule 8(a)(2) requires only “a short plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Iqbal requires “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. This involves a two-step process. First, conclusory statements must be disregarded, and, second, the remaining factual assertions must, when read together, make a plausible case for relief. Id. at 1949-50. The complaint must be dis *336 missed “where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct.... ” Id. at 1950.

Reviewing this portion of the complaint de novo, we agree with the district court that the predatory pricing claim is insufficiently pled. A defendant’s pricing practice violates the Sherman Act only if the plaintiff can “prove that the prices complained of are below an appropriate measure of [the defendant’s] costs.” Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222, 113 S.Ct. 2578, 125 L.Ed.2d 168 (1993). The complaint fails properly to allege as much.

To begin with, Astra Media fails to allege plausibly that Clear Channel’s price with respect to the Disney Theatrical bid was below cost. The complaint is silent with respect to what price Clear Channel ultimately charged Disney or what Clear Channel’s actual costs were. Instead, As-tra Media simply states that $170 per taxicab per month “is close to the industry standard” cost for contracts such as Disney’s and that, to the extent Clear Channel priced below this, Clear- Channel was carrying advertising below its actual cost. These assertions are both eonclusory. First, Astra Media provides no facts to support its contention that $170 is actually close to the standard industry cost. It is unclear from the complaint whether the industry standard is higher or lower than $170 or by how much. Second, it gives no basis to infer reasonably that Clear Channel — which, as the largest supplier of taxi-tops in New York City, may enjoy substantial economies of scale — has the same cost structure as the rest of the industry. Astra Media, therefore, failed properly to plead that Clear Channel’s prices were below an appropriate measure of its costs. 2

That said, even if the complaint did contain adequate factual assertions about Clear Channel’s price and cost with respect to Disney, these assertions are still limited to a single bid for a single contract. In a business environment in which the competing parties have entered into numerous contracts with numerous parties for the provision of rented advertising space, 3 an allegation that one of those contracts provides below-cost prices for services is insufficient to allege predatory pricing. An inference of predation will only arise when a defendant engages in economically irrational activity; and when that activity principally involves pricing, it is economically irrational only if it hurts a defendant’s bottom line. See Phillip Areeda and Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 697, 703 (1975) (sacrifice of short-run profits is a necessary condition of predation); see also Buffalo Courier-Express, Inc. v. Buffalo Evening News, Inc., 601 F.2d 48, 55 (2d Cir. 1979) (Friendly, J.) (requiring evidence that a limited newspaper giveaway would produce at least a short-term loss for defendant’s operations taken as a whole). With this in mind, “[c]ourts have been wary of plaintiffs’ attempts to prove predatory pricing through evidence of a low price charged for a single product out of many, or to a single customer.” Mor *337 gan v. Ponder, 892 F.2d 1355, 1362 (8th Cir. 1989) (citing, inter alia, Buffalo Courier-Express ). Here, the complaint provides no reasonable inference that a company as large as Clear Channel would suffer a meaningful loss from underpricing a single contract. The district court, therefore, correctly dismissed the predatory pricing claim.

The presence of this federal Sherman Act claim in the complaint was the sole alleged basis for removing the case from state court. See Def.’s Notice of Removal, April 20, 2009, Dkt. No. 1. Without that claim or the federal discrimination claim that was also dismissed, Astra Media’s action would not have been removable to federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). Having dismissed Astra Media’s Sherman Act and federal discrimination claims, the district court was left with only the state-law claims, which were “otherwise non-removable” to federal court, and the district court had discretion to “remand” to the state court “all matters in which State law predominate^.” Id. § 1441(c); see also § 1367(c)(3) (district court has discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related state-law claims when it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction”). In this case, the district court should have exercised its discretion to remand.

Although sections 1441(c) and 1367(c) are permissive rather than mandatory, we have generally held that where all the federal claims have been dismissed at a relatively early stage, the district court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over pendent state-law claims. This has been especially true where the state law governing these claims is unsettled. See, e.g., Giordano v. City of New York, 274 F.3d 740, 754-55 (2d Cir. 2001); Oliveira v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 251 F.3d 56, 64 (2d Cir. 2001); Fay v. South Colonie Central School District, 802 F.2d 21, 34 (2d Cir. 1986); see also Valencia v. Lee, 316 F.3d 299, 306-08 (2d Cir. 2003) (reversing — after the case had been tried — the district court’s exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over “unsettled questions of New York law” where the plaintiffs had conceded before the case was ready for trial, and before any substantive motions had been filed, that “they had no viable federal claims”).

Here, it appears that Astra Media’s remaining claims raise unsettled questions of state law. Perhaps most importantly, there is a question as to whether the New York courts have adopted — or would adopt — the Iqbal pleading standard, under which several of Astra Media’s claims were dismissed by the district court. In addition, the contours of New York law governing claims of tortious interference with contract are not entirely clear. Compare Guard-Life Corp. v. S. Parker Hardware Manufacturing Corp., 50 N.Y.2d 183, 194, 428 N.Y.S.2d 628, 406 N.E.2d 445 (1980) (stating that recovery is possible on a tor-tious interference with contract claim even in the absence of breach of contract), with Lama Holding Co. v. Smith Barney Inc., 88 N.Y.2d 413, 424, 646 N.Y.S.2d 76, 668 N.E.2d 1370 (1996) (citing Israel v. Wood Dolson Co., 1 N.Y.2d 116, 120, 151 N.Y.S.2d 1, 134 N.E.2d 97 (1956), which predates Guard-Life, for the proposition that breach of contract is an essential element of the claim). The New York courts are better suited to resolve these issues than either this Court or the district court. See United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966).

Accordingly, the portion of the district court’s judgment dismissing Astra Media’s Sherman Act and federal discrimination claims are AFFIRMED, but the remainder of the judgment is VACATED and the state-law claims are REMANDED to the *338 district court for entry of an order remanding the state-law claims to the state court from which the action was removed.