SUMMARY ORDER

Each of these petitions challenges a decision of the BIA either affitcming the decision of an immigration judge (“IJ”) denying asylum and related relief or reversing the IJ’s decision granting relief. Some of the petitioners 2 also challenge decisions of the BIA denying motions to remand. The applicable standards of review are well-established. See Jim Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 157-58, 168-69 (2d Cir. 2008).

Petitioners, all natives and citizens of China, sought relief from removal based on their claim that they fear persecution because they have one or more children in violation of China’s population control program. For largely the same reasons as this Court set forth in Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d 138, we find no error in the agency’s decisions. See id. at 158-72.

Some of the petitioner 3 argue that the BIA has erred by improperly conducting de novo review of determinations made by an IJ. Many of them rely on a recent decision of the Third Circuit, ruling, in the context of a claim under the Convention

*333 Against Torture, that the BIA must review for clear error findings of fact, including predictions of future events, but may review de novo conclusions of law as to whether the facts found satisfy a particular legal standard. See Kaplun v. Attorney General, 602 F.3d 260 (3d Cir. 2010). Their claims lack merit. The BIA has not reviewed de novo any of the IJ’s factual findings. Instead, the BIA has concluded, on de novo review, that the facts, as found by the IJ, do not meet the legal standard of an objectively reasonable fear of persecution. That approach is entirely consistent with the applicable regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3). See Jian Hid Shao, 546 F.3d at 162-63 (concluding that the BIA did not erroneously conduct de novo review of the IJ’s factual findings by making “a legal determination that, while [petitioners’] credible testimony was sufficient to demonstrate a genuine subjective fear of future persecution, more was needed to demonstrate the objective reasonableness of that fear”). Similarly, in Chengbin Zheng v. Holder, No. 09-3368-ag, contrary to the petitioner’s argument, the BIA did not erroneously review certain record evidence de novo when it adopted and affirmed the IJ’s decision in its entirety and simply noted that certain evidence was not authenticated or failed to demonstrate the objective reasonableness of the petitioner’s claimed fear of persecution. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3); see also Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 162-63.

Three of the petitioners 4 argue that the agency applied an incorrect burden of proof by requiring them to establish a certainty of persecution. However, in those cases, the agency explicitly considered whether they had demonstrated a well-founded fear of persecution as opposed to a certainty of persecution. See Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 156.

Some of the petitioner 5 argue that the BIA failed to give sufficient consideration to the statement of Jin Fu Chen, who alleged that he suffered forcible sterilization after his return to China based on the two children born to his wife in Japan. A prior panel of this Court has remanded a petition making a similar claim so that Jin Fu Chen’s statement (which was submitted to the BIA after a remand) could be considered by the IJ. See Zheng v. Holder, 361 Fed.Appx. 184 (2d Cir. 2010). Since the remand in Zheng, the BIA has repeatedly concluded that Jin Fu Chen’s statement does not support a claim of a well-founded fear of persecution. Accordingly, it is clear that further consideration of the statement in cases in which the IJ or the BIA failed to consider it would not change the result. See Shunfu Li v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 141, 150 (2d Cir. 2008). We cannot say, furthermore, that the agency’s conclusion concerning the probative force of the statement involved any error of law.

In Huizhu Lin v. Holder, No. 09-4709-ag, we find no merit to petitioner’s argument that she established her eligibility for CAT relief based on her purportedly illegal departure from China. See Mu Xiang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 432 F.3d 156, 159-60 (2d Cir. 2005). Finally, in Ai Jiao Lin v. Holder, No. 08-6248-ag, the BIA reasonably declined to review evidence submitted for the first time on appeal absent any argument as to why such evidence merited further consideration on remand. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(iv); see *334 also Matter of Fedorenko, 19 I. & N. Dec. 57, 74 (BIA 1984).

For the foregoing reasons, these petitions for review are DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in these petitions is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in these petitions is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in these petitions is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).