Skinner v. Chapman

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Skinner v. Chapman, 412 F. App'x 387 (2d Cir. 2011)

Skinner v. Chapman

Opinion

SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant David M. Skinner, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s judgment granting the summary judgment motions of Defendant-Appellees Mark Chapman and Debra Breese. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review an order granting summary judgment de novo and ask whether the district court properly concluded that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir. 2003). In determining whether there are genuine issues of material fact, we are “required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought.” Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, “conclusory statements or mere allegations [are] not sufficient to defeat a summary judgment mo *388 tion.” Davis v. New York, 316 F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir. 2002).

Having conducted an independent and de novo review of the record in light of these principles, we affirm the district court’s judgment for substantially the same reasons stated by the district court in its thorough and well-reasoned decision. We have considered Skinner’s arguments on appeal and have found them to be without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.

Reference

Full Case Name
David M. SKINNER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Mark CHAPMAN, Debra Breese, Defendants-Appellees, Thomas Recktenwald, Joan Merry, John Tunney, Town of Wayland, County of Steuben, Village of Wayland, Defendants
Cited By
2 cases
Status
Unpublished