SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-Appellant Annselm Morpurgo (“appellant”), pro se, appeals the District Court’s judgment dismissing her complaint brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

This Court reviews de novo a district court’s sua sponte dismissal of a complaint. See Giano v. Goord, 250 F.3d 146, 149-50 (2d Cir. 2001). We also review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, construing the complaint liberally, accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor. See Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002); see also Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir. 2003). To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Although all allegations contained in the complaint are assumed to be true, this tenet is “inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). A claim will have “facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

As an initial matter, appellant argues that the District Court erred in finding appellant’s objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation to be insufficient to warrant applying a de novo standard of review, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal *98 Rules of Civil Procedure. However, even if the District Court should have applied a de novo standard of review, any error was harmless, as our own de novo review of the record reveals appellant’s objections to have been without merit. Insofar as appellant, in her objections and on appeal, has challenged the district court’s dismissal of her conspiracy claims under §§ 1988 and 1985, we find that appellant failed to plead enough facts to state a conspiracy claim under either of those statutes, for substantially the same reasons stated by the District Court. See Morpurgo v. Incorporated Village of Sag Harbor, et al., 697 F.Supp.2d 309 (E.D.N.Y. Mar.5, 2010). We note that appellant has abandoned any challenge to the dismissal of her claims based on appellees’ alleged individual actions, having failed to raise those claims on appeal. See LoSacco v. City of Middle-town, 71 F.3d 88, 92-93 (2d Cir. 1995).

Finally, we hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant leave to amend her complaint. The complaint, even when read liberally, does not “suggest[ ] that [appellant] has a claim that she has inadequately or inartfully pleaded and that she should therefore be given a chance to reframe,” see Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000), and appellant has not given any indication as to the manner in which she would amend the complaint.

CONCLUSION

We have considered all of appellant’s claims on appeal and have found them to be without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.