SUMMARY ORDER

Software for Moving, Inc. (“SFM”) sued La Rosa Del Monte Express, Inc. and La Rosa Del Monte Express (Chicago), LLC (collectively, “La Rosa”) after they stopped making payments on a web-based software package that SFM had developed. La Rosa sought to arbitrate the dispute, but SFM resisted, claiming that it was not contractually obligated to arbitrate with La Rosa. After a three-day bench trial, the district court (Koeltl, J.) found that a valid arbitration agreement existed and ordered the parties to proceed to arbitration. SFM appeals. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision. 1

This case turns on the validity of the parties’ 2005 Software Development and License Agreement (“License Agreement”). SFM maintains that the signature of its President, Shlomo Kogos, appearing on the final page of that agreement is a forgery and that SFM is therefore not bound by the agreement’s arbitration provision. However, following a three-day bench trial on that issue, the district court found that “virtually all of the direct and circumstantial evidence” supported the conclusion that Kogos signed the agreement, and ordered the parties “to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the arbi *43 tration [provision] in the License Agreement.” On appeal, SFM challenges the district court’s finding that it had entered into the License Agreement.

We review a district court’s factual finding after a bench trial for clear error. See U.S. Titan, Inc. v. Guangzhou Zhen Hua Shipping Co., 241 F.3d 135, 145 (2d Cir. 2001). Far from being clearly erroneous, the district court’s conclusion that the parties entered into a valid arbitration agreement is supported by a wealth of evidence. For example, a former La Rosa employee, who appears to have no financial interest in the case, testified that Ro-gos gave him a signed copy of the License Agreement. Similarly, a current La Rosa employee testified to seeing a signed copy of the agreement well before the present dispute arose. Rogos himself testified that he had anticipated that the parties’ initial oral agreement would be reduced to writing once the parties reached a consensus on its terms, and the parties acted as if they were operating under the License Agreement throughout the course of their relationship. In fact, SFM filed a signed addendum to the License Agreement in support of its initial Complaint in this case, and treated the addendum as valid up until the time of Rogos’s deposition testimony, when Rogos suddenly decided that La Rosa had forged his signature on that document as well. The district court noted that this “change of position ... weighs against the credibility of [Rogos’s] testimony,” a conclusion entitled to deference from this Court. See United States v. Iodice, 525 F.3d 179, 185 (2d Cir. 2008).

The only evidence that arguably supports SFM’s otherwise wholly implausible claim is the fact that the License Agreement references an email address for Ro-gos that did not exist until sometime after March 3, 2005, the date contained on the License Agreement. However, as the district court astutely observed, the agreement does not state that it was drafted or signed on March 3, 2005, only that it became effective on that date. This is consistent with Rogos’s own testimony that the parties had an initial oral agreement that was to be converted into writing at a later date. In fact, SFM and La Rosa had a history of acting in just that manner. Thus, the district court was entirely free to credit the “coherent and facially plausible” explanation, Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985), provided by La Rosa that the License Agreement was created sometime after the parties consented to its terms and backdated to reflect the actual date on which the agreement became effective. 2

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.