*105 SUMMARY ORDER

Defendant-Appellant Jack O’Connor appeals from the June 10, 2010 order of the district court granting in part PlaintiffAppellee Rico Diamond’s motion for attorney’s fees and granting his motion for costs. On appeal, O’Connor argues that the district court abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees and costs to Diamond because he recovered only nominal damages in this civil rights action. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and procedural history of this case.

Title 42, section 1988 of the United States Code provides that in any action brought under section 1983, “the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). Determining whether an award of attorney’s fees is appropriate is a two-step inquiry. First, fees may be awarded only to a “prevailing party.” Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 109, 113 S.Ct. 566, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992). Second, the requested fee must be reasonable in view of “the plaintiffs overall success.” Id. at 114, 113 S.Ct. 566 (quoting Tex. State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 793, 109 S.Ct. 1486, 103 L.Ed.2d 866 (1989)). We review the district court’s decision to award attorney’s fees to a prevailing party for abuse of discretion. Pino v. Locascio, 101 F.3d 235, 237 (2d Cir. 1996).

Upon our review of the record, we conclude that the district court’s award of attorney’s fees and costs to Diamond was not an abuse of its discretion. We have considered O’Connor’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. For substantially the reasons stated by the district court in its opinion, Diamond v. O’Connor, No. 05-cv-279 (D. Vt. June 10, 2010), the order of the district court is AFFIRMED.