SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant appeals from an order by the district court dismissing his complaint for failure to state a claim. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review.

We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint under Federal Rule of Procedure 12(B)(6). Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 124 (2d Cir. 2010). We review for abuse of discretion a district denial of a plaintiffs request for leave to amend a deficient complaint. Green v. Mattingly, 585 F.3d 97, 104 (2d Cir. 2009).

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must be “plausible on its face,” such that the court can “draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, — U.S. -, -, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Moreover, the False Claims Act is an antifraud statute, so qui tam actions under the Act must satisfy the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b). Gold v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 68 F.3d 1475, 1476-76 (2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam). The district court concluded that Appellant’s complaint lacked the plausibility and particularity needed to state a claim under Iqbal and Rule 9(b). We agree. Appellant’s complaint fails to allege any basis for concluding that Defendants engaged in any fraud. Indeed, while Defendants’ eligibility for federal funding may be debatable on the face of their submissions to the federal government, there is no plausible allegation of scienter with respect to those submissions. Since scienter is a necessary element of an FCA claim, we affirm the district court’s order dismissing Appellant’s entire complaint.

Further, the district court was well within its discretion to deny Appellant leave to amend his complaint. Where it is reasonable to conclude that amendments would be futile, a district court has discretion to deny leave to amend. See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 220-21 (2d Cir. 2006). The present record indicates that under the theories presented in his complaint, Appellant will never be able to plausibly allege that Defendants committed fraud; thus, the district court was within its discretion to deny leave to amend based on futility.

Moreover, Appellant never formally moved the district court for leave to amend, so the district court was also within its discretion to deny such leave without analysis or comment. Id.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.