SUMMARY ORDER

Eduardo Ernesto Gonzalez-Ordonez seeks review of a March 8, 2010 order of the BIA affirming the September 17, 2008 decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Noel A. Brennan, which denied his motion to suppress evidence and found him removable as charged. In re Gonzalez-Ordonez, No. A098 616 623 (B.I.A. Mar. 8, 2010), aff'g No. A098 616 623 (Immig.Ct.N.Y.C. Sept. 17, 2008). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of this case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we review the decision of the IJ as supplemented and modified by the BIA. See Ming Xia Chen v. BIA, 435 F.3d 141, 144 (2d Cir. 2006). The applicable standards of review are well-established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009).

As an initial matter, even if the BIA erred in denying the motion to suppress, there was independent evidence of Gonzalez-Ordonez’s alienage sufficient to satisfy the government’s limited burden. See Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 231, 234 (2d Cir. 2006) (“ ‘[T]he INS must show only identity and alienage; the burden then shifts to the respondent to prove the time, place, and manner of his entry.’ ” (quoting INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1039, 104 S.Ct. 3479, 82 L.Ed.2d 778 (1984))). In an affidavit submitted to the IJ in support of the motion to suppress, Gonzalez-Ordonez conceded that he “did not have legal status in this country.” J.A. at 164. See Katris v. INS, 562 F.2d 866, 869 (2d Cir. 1977) (“[T]he illegal arrest of an alien unlawfully in the United States does not void a subsequent deportation order based on the alien’s admission of his status at the hearing.”). In addition, the government proffered two non-immigrant visa applications filed by Gonzalez-Ordonez in 2000 and 2002, which state that he is a citizen of Ecuador. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1039, 104 S.Ct. 3479 (“The ‘body’ or identity of a defendant or respondent in a criminal or civil proceeding is never itself suppressible as a fruit of an unlawful arrest, even if it is conceded that an unlawful arrest, search, or interrogation occurred.”). Because Gonzalez-Ordonez offered no evidence that he was lawfully present in the United States, the BIA correctly upheld his removal.

In any event, the motion to suppress was correctly denied because the initial stop and subsequent search were lawful. Gonzalez-Ordonez’s claim that “there was no indication that would lead the military officials to conclude that [he] was not lawfully present,” Pet’r’s Br. at 9, was not raised below and will not be considered by this court in the first instance, see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); Gill v. INS, 420 F.3d 82, 86 (2d Cir. 2005). Indeed, Gonzalez-Ordonez acknowledged in his brief below that the officers at the Air Force base “certainly had the right to suspect an alien with no proper [identification] being physically present at their Base.” J.A. at 52. Further, because Gonzalez-Ordonez fails to challenge the BIA’s determination that the circumstances of the stop and search were not egregious and did not undermine the reliability of the evidence obtained, see Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d at 235, we deem this issue abandoned, see Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 542 n. 1 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Issues not sufficiently argued in the briefs are considered *43 waived and normally will not be addressed on appeal.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2) and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).